

Individual Psychology



Erwin Wexberg and Beran Wolfe

Individual Psychology

by

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Translated by

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Translator's Preface

PHYSICIANS and laymen who desired a working knowledge of Individual Psychology, heretofore have been obliged to travel to Vienna to consult at length with Dr. Alfred Adler, or read through an unwieldy literature of articles and monographs written in difficult scientific German. Adler himself has written no complete system of Individual Psychology, perhaps because the herculean labors of the psychological pioneer militate against the work of thorough unification and systematization. Yet the growing importance of Individual Psychology has intensified the need for a volume that might serve as a definitive textbook of its theory and technique.

Dr. Erwin Wexberg, perhaps the most brilliant and constructive co-worker of Adler in Vienna, has attempted this task in the present volume. None of Adler's pupils is so well fitted as Dr. Wexberg, either by virtue of experience, literary ability, or close association with Adler, to present the ideas of the great humanist. "Individual Psychology" is a concise encyclopedia of human understanding, as well as a guide to the technique of the most effective system of psychotherapy and pedagogy devised in modern times. Its rational approach to the problems of mental life, its scientific simplicity, and its vibrant humanism must

appeal to all those who would understand and influence human behavior.

"Individual Psychology" is the first book to show how far Adler has gone beyond his first announcement of the theory of organ inferiority and its psychic compensation, and it is to be hoped that it will dispel many of the misconceptions concerning the work of Adler and his school. Wexberg has succeeded admirably in describing the constructive and practical elaborations of the fundamental themes of the Adlerian psychology, and has demonstrated that Individual Psychology means more than the "inferiority complex" and the "will to power."

In translating the present work an effort has been made to utilize terms familiar to the intelligent layman as far as possible. Long personal association and study both with Alfred Adler and Erwin Wexberg, together with the earlier translation of Adler's "Understanding Human Nature" and Wexberg's "Your Nervous Child," have aided the translator in the preparation of the present volume, while the practical application of Individual Psychology in the clinics, juvenile courts, public and private schools of New York City has enabled the translator to develop an appropriate terminology for its application to American problems.

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Individual Psychology

Introduction

The History of Individual Psychology

PSYCHOLOGY is one of the oldest sciences. Whoever writes its history must begin with the old Egyptians, for there is no system of religion and no school of philosophy that has not attempted to solve the riddle of man's soul. The psychological facts and laws found scattered in the writings of the ancients, to be sure, can hardly be considered scientific today, but the same must be said of the natural sciences, which were considered unimportant branches of philosophy in ancient times. Exact experimental research was unknown in the days when purely speculative hypotheses of science were considered as worthy as the empiric results of observation.

It is true that the natural sciences became sciences long before psychology did. As late as the beginning of the nineteenth century the world knew only a purely speculative psychology, hardly to be distinguished from philosophy, and even Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," which built up scientific premises along psychological lines—that is, upon the realization of the possibilities of human reason—was far removed from modern scientific psychology.

It was the sudden development of the natural sciences

in the nineteenth century which elevated psychology into a science. To the materialistic philosophy of an age that would brook no riddles in life, psychic and mental functions appeared, perforce, as partial manifestations of the biochemic processes of life, whereas at the same time the prevailing materialism neglected the subjective aspects of the psychic life as unimportant concomitant manifestations. The soul no longer existed: a mechanical age substituted brain functions in its stead. These brain functions became the object of experimental observation; an exact physiology of the senses was built up by Fechner, but little progress was made. When investigators essayed to probe the higher psychic processes according to scientific methods, they found themselves thwarted because they could no longer neglect the subjective aspects of their studies. Exact experimentation proved a failure, and that part of physiological psychology which was concerned with the higher psychic functions remained speculative. Each psychic mechanism abstractly analyzed was considered to be composed of sensations, imaginations, feelings, and desires; yet no one had ever seen any one of these isolated portions of the soul, and with the exception of sensations no one could say in what brain centers they originated. Consequently the psychology which wanted to be brain physiology remained sterile.

Teachers and physicians listened to lectures from professors and learned a great deal of interesting material about the sense organs and the brain, together with a scheme of the higher functions that seems purely academic to us today; but these students learned

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nothing which might have helped them in their professional tasks, or given them a working knowledge of the distinction between healthy and pathological mental life. When it came to *dealing* with a stubborn child, a teacher was hardly helped by knowing that the child's attitude might be catalogued in the sphere of will or of emotion; he had to call upon his common sense and his unscientific understanding of human nature, so far as he had any, to make the child docile.

The understanding of human nature is not new. Teachers, physicians, business men, great poets, and shrewd old women have been applying this precious knowledge since time immemorial. Some of the common-sense precepts of practical human understanding are clear enough, and yet these concepts are not science. The old formulas of human understanding were not gained methodically, but intuitively, and this differentiated them from true science. The lack of method precluded any continuity of research, and for this reason everyone had to begin all over for himself. A poet of the nineteenth century knew no more about the human soul than one of the seventeenth. Intuitive psychology was derived from single cases, but the real laws of human behavior are not to be learned without a scientific method. And the method of physiological psychology proved itself to be completely ineffectual in so far as the questions of human behavior were concerned.

The stimulus to the development of the scientific understanding of human nature came from psychopathology. The need for a valid practice based upon a theory which would better explain pathological men-

tal manifestations arose where the practical necessity of medical treatment assumed major importance. Charcot, the French psychopathologist, basing his theories upon his experiments with hypnosis and hysteria, believed that he had found a new viewpoint in psychopathology; but he could not liberate himself from a neurological point of view, and he considered hysterical and hypnotic phenomena purely as brain phenomena. Bernheim, the founder of the Nancy school, went a step farther when he made *suggestion* the chief point of his theory and thus stepped on purely psychological ground for the first time. The real creator of the first modern psychopathologic theory, capable of explaining the newly acquired knowledge of human behavior, was Janet. His theory of the splitting of the personality, and of psychological automatism, was incomparably closer to the living reality of abnormal mental states than all previous attempts to explain psychological facts on a physiological basis.

Sigmund Freud was directly related to his teachers, the French psychopathologists. Without Janet's work, the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious would never have been imagined. The uniqueness of psychoanalysis consisted in the search for the laws of mental life in the *content* of mental phenomena rather than in their form, as was previously the custom. Janet had been satisfied to describe certain psychopathological phenomena and sum them under the concept of the *dissociation of personality*. He considered the dynamic emotional excitation as the cause of this splitting of the personality, whereas Freud went farther and sought the causes of the dissociation in the

psychic content and in the emotionally colored thoughts and remembrances of the personality. Freud believed the fact that some of the most important of these thoughts and remembrances seemed to be absent in the conscious life of an individual—or could be aroused only through hypnosis, or by a special form of introspection—was the expression of a dissociation of the personality into two systems—the unconscious and the conscious.

The psychoanalytic discovery of the dynamic significance of the psychic content, both conscious and unconscious, cleared the way for that most important practical hypothesis, the theory of psychic determination. Previously, investigators who applied the deterministic point of view were balked by the enigmas of mental phenomena. If a man suddenly could not remember a name which at another time he knew very well, the phenomenon was labeled distraction or fatigue, for want of a better explanation. No one attempted to explain why this specific name was lost under the influence of distraction, whereas some other far less familiar name was retained. Freud's conception of the dynamics of psychic content provided an explanation. If the name was linked, by association, with painful or unpleasant memories, it is conceivable that it should be forgotten, because its retention in memory was unpleasant. A dynamic emotional factor distorted the mechanism of memory and effected a mistake for which the conscious central personality wished to assume no responsibility. The individual dynamic nucleus of the personality could be found, therefore, in neurotic symptoms, those mechanisms which were capable of pro-

ducing dreams and the like against the will of the conscious ego.

This marked the opening of a tremendous field for research. Where formerly psychologists were compelled to seek for an explanation of mental phenomena in the brain mechanism whenever the chain of cause and effect was broken in conscious association, the greatly extended possibility of finding a psychological explanation for these phenomena was now at hand. To be sure, the criteria of scientific exactitude could not be too strict. When mental phenomena are treated in terms of the unconscious, we are not dealing with mathematical evidence, but with interpretations. No matter how plausible an explanation, deduced by interpretation, might be, it could not compel belief. Nevertheless, the assumption that an unconscious psychic life existed was in itself a keen hypothesis; consciousness had always been considered the most fundamental index of mental activity, and, even to-day, when psychoanalysis is more than a generation old, the debate as to whether psychoanalytic concepts and methods are scientifically admissible is still going on. In essence, psychoanalysis remains just where it began; the theory of the dissociation of personality (introduced by Janet), in the form of the dissociation of the conscious and the unconscious, the "I" and the "Id," is still its fundamental theory.

Other psychological schools whose common goal was to make psychology more applicable to the problems of life appeared from various quarters. Several investigators realized that the fundamental laws of cause and effect, which are the essence of the physical sciences, are not valid in psychology. Dilthey

launched a school of "understanding" psychology to complement the prevailing "explanatory" or descriptive psychology. It was his aim to make the poet's and dramatist's deep understanding of human nature scientific. The difficulty lay in the substitution of technique for intuition, of science for artistic creation. Lipps believed that this goal could be accomplished by empathy and identification. He wanted to understand the unknown personality by a method of direct approach and comprehension whose results would produce some special inner evidence. Important as the method of empathy is in learning to understand human nature and conduct, its scientific value is problematical. The introspective psychology of Külpe, Ach and Lindworsky went a step beyond Lipps, and finally the movement culminated with the conception of "essential immanence" (*immanent-wesentlichen*) in the phenomenology of Husserl, Österreich, Scheler and Jaspers.

Whereas previously only objective matter was the material of the psychological experiment (lest the bounds of physical science be overstepped) the phenomenologists tried to make the subjective experience of the experimental object part of the experiment. Scientific exactitude had to be relinquished in part because phenomenological data—that is, the subjective data—could never be verified; the experimental results could never be verified as in a physical experiment by repetition. So great was the need for a vital workaday psychology that this objection was overruled, and for this reason those who carry on research along phenomenological lines need hardly fear the reproach that their work is not sufficiently scientific.

In contradistinction to the old "faculty" psychology,

which could not free itself from its catalogue of perception, imagination, emotion, will, and other bloodless abstractions, the research of the phenomenologists was valid because of its greater proximity to life, and because it emphasized the unity of experience. As soon as psychologists were ready to admit that unprejudiced self-observation and introspection was the most important source of psychological material, it became evident that the older descriptive cataloguings were nothing more than artificial divisions, whereas the totality of mental experience remained the essence of psychology.

Phenomenology prepared the way for the decisive step toward a comparative and contextual point of view in psychology, but the necessary new stimulus was not derived from psychology, but from general biology.

Biology, above all other sciences, was implicated in the materialistic wave of the nineteenth century. In this period it was believed that all vital functions were to be explained fundamentally, if not actually, according to mechanistic principles. From the first attempt to synthesize protein to the artificial creation of living protoplasm seemed but a step in the sanguine hopes of this young science. Failure was inevitable. The more that was learned about biochemistry, the plainer it became to common-sense scientists that the riddle of the universe would not be solved by finding the physico-chemical formulæ for organic bodies. For living material was and remained different from dead material, not only in quantity but also in quality. And this was the first step in a new direction.

The new biology did not experiment with dead mat-

ter in order to understand the living, but investigated the living organism with the hope of understanding why it was what it was. The single-celled yeast plant, as well as the highly organized tree or mammal, was considered as a unit organism. The laws of shape and form, of development, and of functions which remained undisturbed and permanent through every metamorphosis and change, were common to all organisms. Every organ and every tissue obeys the law of the total organism. Cut a tapeworm in half, and the anterior fragment will develop into a complete new tapeworm in a short while; and this process of regeneration, which is essentially the same as that which we find in the healing wound of a higher mammal, cannot be explained according to mechanistic principles. One can investigate the biochemical reactions down to the division of cells, and yet the final goal of these reactions, which is the maintenance of the integrity of the organism as a whole, cannot be deduced biochemically. Thus the organism is proved a unity whose parts are subordinated to it according to the laws of an indwelling purposiveness. "The whole precedes its parts." Every part acquires meaning only when it is taken in its relationship to the whole.

The teleological * point of view that originated in the new relative biology was applied to the problems of mental life as a matter of course. William Stern and Spranger were the founders of the new theory of psychological relativity. On the one hand the mechanistic point of view was found as inadequate in psychology

* *Translator's Note:* Means and end, as contrasted to the etiological or cause-and-effect point of view.

as it was in biology; on the other, the new conceptions of psychoanalysis pointed the way to a relativistic psychology. Since the mistakes and erroneously performed actions of everyday life, the dreams, and the neurotic symptoms could no longer be considered as the fortuitous results of the imperfect brain functions, but as meaningful and purposive acts, the question immediately arose: under what circumstances can these phenomena be meaningful? The answer to this question compelled a new concept, the concept of the unity of the personality, which was entirely analogous to the concept of the unity of the organism that is the theoretical basis of neo-vitalistic biology. On the other hand, however, certain phenomena which had long been observed made the assumption of the veritable unity of the personality seem untenable. Were there not psychic conflicts and dissociations of personality? Psychoanalysis itself, logically carrying out Janet's teachings of psychic automatism, had built up the theory of two souls living in a single body and formed the system in which the unconscious opposed the conscious, or as it was labeled later, the Ego opposed the Id.

In the last analysis, psychology is only a chapter in human biology. Either the law of the indwelling purposiveness of the organism must come to an abrupt halt somewhere in the evolutionary scale before its ascent to mankind, or it must also be applicable to psychology. No objective phenomena are incompatible with this second possibility; only the subjective experience of conflict seems to oppose it. Were the physical organism capable of observing itself, and of speaking,

it also might know nothing of its meaningful unity as an organism. This can be deduced solely by objective investigation. Is it not possible that our subjective knowledge of psychic conflict and internal dissociation is self-deceptive? If there is a possibility of self-deception we must abandon the subjective standpoint in building up psychological theories, and limit ourselves to objective psychology.

Objective psychology has been taken up in our modern science in two distinct places: in Bechterew's Reflex Theory and in Watson's Behaviorism. Both of these schools are sharply opposed to phenomenology, refuse to admit any inner mental life; both schools consider all mental and psychological manifestations simply as manifestations of the organism, and subordinate to the organism. Behaviorism is a child of animal psychology, which by its very nature precludes any subjective opinion on the part of the experimental animal. Behaviorism, once it had liberated itself from a sterile anthropomorphism, found a new and comparatively simple method in the application to human beings of methods proved fruitful in animal psychology. Human behavior became the sole object of investigation.

Bechterew, on the other hand, began with the physiology of reflexes, and regarded every vital function of human beings from the reflex standpoint, regardless of whether the subjective factor of consciousness was present between perceptions and reactions. These methods of objective psychology, it is true, made it possible to carry on observations and experiments in the strict sense of the physical sciences. But the

majority of investigators refuse to accept these schools, because many of the problems of the subjective side of the mental life that had formerly occupied psychology were disregarded as if they did not exist. The progress that psychology has made by the utilization of descriptive and phenomenological methods cannot be overlooked, nor can it be sacrificed to the principle of objectivity.

These are the great movements of contemporary psychology in which Alfred Adler's Individual Psychology is steadily becoming the central point. Viewed from the historical standpoint, Adler, one of the oldest associates of Freud, is more closely related to psychoanalysis than to the other schools. The chief theory of individual psychology is based upon the Freudian discovery of the unconditional determination of psychological phenomena by psychological causes, and upon the fact that psychological phenomena can be interpreted. But in the progressive evolution of this thought, Adler proceeded farther and farther toward other psychological schools that have taken the place of the senescent "faculty" psychology: toward phenomenological psychology which made the experience of totality the central object of its investigation, because it desired to find understandable relationships valuable to life; toward the school of Spranger influenced by the neo-vitalistic biology, which is interested not so much in experience as in the personality as a meaningful unity; toward the similarly oriented personalistic psychology of William Stern; and finally toward the objective psychology of Bechterew and Watson, which laid the way for a bio-psychological relativity by ex-

cluding the value of subjective experience and conflict. Nothing proves the fact that individual psychology is an expression of contemporary thought so clearly as its relationship to these other psychological schools which knew nothing of individual psychology, and of which individual psychology knew nothing.

Individual psychology is not less valuable because of this close relationship to other contemporary psychological schools; it is distinguished from all other schools of psychological thought not only by its theory and its scientific method, but also and especially by its technique and practice. Compared with psychoanalysis, to which individual psychology is related by virtue of the fact that it is a system of psychotherapy, its advantages lie in the fact that in the practical realm of pedagogy, where psychoanalysis has proved a failure, individual psychology has become the basis of a new pedagogy which has received wide-spread recognition. In addition it has become a scientific system for the practical understanding of human conduct whose effectiveness exceeds all previous expectations.

The individual psychology which is taught by Adler and his immediate pupils in the normal schools of Vienna and Berlin has this for its goal: to make that understanding of human nature which has hitherto been the prerogative of enlightened spirits, great poets and educators, a practical and teachable science. One of the first concepts of individual psychology was that an understanding of human nature cannot be learned as one learns mathematics; the process of learning it is not simply an intellectual process, but is in itself a deep and significant process of inner trans-

formation; and it is this especially, quite aside from its psychotherapeutic and pedagogic aspects, which determines the great social importance of individual psychology.

The increasing spread of individual psychology and its system of understanding human conduct will lead not only to the psychic transformation of the individual, but also to the reconstruction of society in the degree to which individual psychology is correct. This is a fact which the sociology of the future will have to reckon with. It would be childish to expect this kind of change from propaganda and not from individual psychology itself. It is not Adler who is essential, nor the formulation of the theory which is named after him. It is probable that the nucleus of Adler's teaching will have to be said many times, and in many words, before it produces the revolutionary practice that we hope of it. It is useless, therefore, to attempt to make proselytes simply for this man and for his teachings. On the other hand every sentence that is written about individual psychology, with whatever purpose, becomes propaganda for the ideals of individual psychology. Its progress and influence will be the greater, the more fundamental is its tone of calm objectivity, the more free from any sectarian prejudice, or any attempt to found a new religion. The uniqueness of individual psychology in the cultural history of humanity lies precisely in the fact that the revolutionary conduct of daily life is not brought about by any emotional religious conversion, but by a scientific method. This phenomenon has occurred only once before in another, somewhat related realm: the rise of Karl Marx in the social

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sciences. But propaganda, so far as individual psychology is concerned, is at one and the same time as unnecessary and as unavoidable as in the social sciences.

The present attempt at a systematic exposition of individual psychology is designed to enable those who are interested to obtain a bird's-eye view of the most important elements in the teachings of Adler and his school.

Chapter I

The Unity of the Personality *The Purposive Pattern of the Personality*

EVERY living organism is a complete unity, and it is precisely this quality which differentiates it from dead matter. Remove half a heap of stones, a smaller heap remains, yet the nature of the stone heap has not been changed. A stone pile may be divided into many portions, but an organism, on the other hand, cannot be split or divided: individual means indivisible. A living organism divided into pieces is no longer a living organism, but dead matter. The simple one-celled animalcules, which reproduce by splitting, can still be called living matter because each of the split products can develop into a new individual by growth and regeneration. The concept of totality and the concept of living matter are indivisibly related and synonymous.

Seemingly dead things, as for instance a house, may have the character of totality. If a house is burned and partially destroyed, it is no longer a house, but a ruin. But a house may be considered from two entirely different points of view. To an unprejudiced observer—an inhabitant, say, of a region where houses are unknown—a house is really dead matter without meaning

and without totality. And for such an observer the ruin of a burned building is nothing more or less than a destroyed building. For people who live in houses, on the other hand, a house has an entirely different meaning, because we have given a purpose to this configuration of dead matter which we call a house. In a way, a house has a kind of life, a life which we have lent it; and because it is organized according to this borrowed vitality it seems to be complete in itself.

The difference between living matter and a house is that the house derives its purpose and its laws of organization from external sources, whereas a living organism carries its purpose and the laws of its organization within itself from the very beginning. For this reason a living organism can grow and regenerate itself, whereas this is impossible for a house. A house can be enlarged or its shape may be changed, but this change is always derived from an external source—the human spirit which at one and the same time gives the house its meaning and dictates the laws of its organization. But this is not growth. The house in itself has no life, and can be considered as a meaningful unity only inasmuch as it is the incorporation of a human thought. The gate through which we enter the house, regarded as a thing in itself, is nothing but a piece of wood hung on metal hinges. Considered in terms of the purpose we have given it, however, the gate does have meaning for us. It is a gate only in so far as it is relative to a total unity to which it belongs.

We may use the borrowed vitality of human creations as a simile to explain the essence of that real organism, the individual and the personality. Just as a

house acquires meaning and can be understood through the purpose for which it was built, so also the internal laws of living organism can be understood only in terms of the purposiveness of the whole. The purposiveness of the living organism is part and parcel of the organism, and has not been given it by any architect. In other words we can say that the purposiveness of an organism is immanent, or indwelling. Every living organism is a purposive or conative unity whose goal is the maintenance of its existence.

What is true of living organisms in general, is true also of the body-soul unity of the human organism, the human personality. Personality is a meaningful purposive unity, and its purposiveness is indwelling. Every human being is his own purpose, and all his functions are purposive devices which serve to maintain this unity. Each of his organs is meaningful only in relationship to the total organism. Complicated organs and functions are subordinate to the general goal of self-preservation. The principle of the division of labor controls their various activities, which serve a common goal. The survival of the species demands the self-preservation of the race at the extreme expense of the single individual.

Need we differentiate between body and soul? Fundamentally we do not. Viewed from a biological standpoint, that which we call the soul is a complex of functions which serve the indwelling conations of the unit organism in much the same way as any physical function. The liver produces bile, so that the organism may live. The eye sees, that the organism may live. The brain coordinates that which is seen, so that the

organism may live. The soul of the organism is the fundamental purposiveness which penetrates and vitalizes all of its functions, that of the liver as well as that of the eye, and that of the brain. All living matter, so far as it is a purposive unity directed toward some goal, may be said to have a soul.

The relationships within the organism, however, can be observed from two entirely different standpoints. Given the one standpoint we proceed according to the law of cause and effect, discard the indwelling purposes of the organism, and investigate certain phenomena within the organism as if they were simply physical or chemical processes. Take the process of digestion: the purpose of this phenomenon, the *why* of it, may best be understood, for instance, by relating it to the purposes of the organism as a whole; but the *how* of the phenomenon must be examined by the same methods of thought and observation that are used in ordinary chemistry. The law of cause and effect is valid in such a purely physical investigation, and we need not investigate the direct relationship of purely chemical processes to the whole organism and its purposive patterns. Given the second point of view, we must concern ourselves with conations—with goal and purpose, and the means of attaining the end. When something is examined from this point of view we do not care *how* it happens, that is, according to what physical and chemical laws it occurs.

To distinguish between body and soul is to distinguish between the causal point of view and the conative or teleological point of view. Let us refer again to our simile of the house: The causal point of view is the

builder's, whereas the architect's point of view is purposive and teleological. It is the architect who draws up the plan of the house and regards every element of the construction from the standpoint of its purpose. He chooses his materials according to the purpose that he has in mind, whether this be beauty or strength. The builder, on the other hand, is interested in transforming the architect's plan into reality in the shortest time and with the most economical means. The room which the architect has designed as a kitchen is to the builder only a room of certain dimensions, with walls of a specified thickness, and openings of a certain size, and he buys the flooring which the architect has specified from a factory where he can get the best quality at the cheapest price. What interests the architect is of little interest to the builder. What interests the builder is of little concern to the architect.

The psychophysical personality can be looked at from these viewpoints, which neither exclude nor contradict each other, but are complementary in much the same way that the architect and the builder are complementary to one another. We must choose the purposive point of view, to be sure, when we want to understand a personality. *To understand a personality is to understand it as a conative unity whose purpose is indwelling.*

The importance of this first and most fundamental thesis of individual psychology becomes apparent when we attempt to examine individual modes of vital expression according to it. We cannot understand human behavior when we isolate it from its content. Suppose

we see a man, whom we will call Mr. A, smiling. Neither the most careful examination of the physiology of his facial muscles, nor the most penetrating introspection of the emotions and sensations that we experience in smiling helps us to *understand* why Mr. A smiles. The question must be put in this way: Why does this human being smile in this situation? Any single act of human behavior must be examined in its relativity to two great sets of circumstances in order to be understood: in its relativity to the personality of the individual in whom it occurs, and in its relativity to the situation in which this personality is found.

If the situation is one in which any normal person would smile, the specific smile which we noted would be of little interest to anyone investigating Mr. A's individual psychology. We might best regard such a natural smile from a philosophic, rather than from a psychological standpoint, and give ourselves up to the consideration of the nature of humor. But the situation is entirely different when the individual is smiling at a thing which is not in itself humorous, when the very fact that a human being *is* smiling is unusual. Our interest as individual psychologists awakens at this point. Of the two possible systems of relativity within which we can examine the act of smiling, the relativity of the personality is the more important. Let us investigate what it is in a given situation that seems humorous to Mr. A.

In order to understand this we must know more of Mr. A as a whole human being, what he has experienced, what his temperament is, what kind of man he

is, and how he responds to stimuli of this specific kind. Let us assume that Mr. A smiled at the departure of a railway train. The simplest method of learning why he acts as he does is to ask him what makes him so happy. We may get one of three answers:

1. Mr. A, on being questioned, tells us directly some humorous occurrence of which the departure of the railway train reminded him. In this case we are satisfied, and our psychological interest fades.

2. Mr. A gives us the reason for his smiling, but his reason does not clarify the situation, and we have the impression that, under similar circumstances, we should not have laughed.

3. Mr. A, on being questioned, seems to know nothing: he has smiled without realizing that he has smiled, and consequently can give no reason for his action.

Cases 2 and 3 are of interest to the individual psychologist. We shall disregard Case 3 for the time being, because it presupposes a knowledge of psychology that we cannot premise at this stage. And so far as Case 2 is concerned we have not learned very much from the reason Mr. A has given for smiling. Let us assume that he answered: "I have to laugh when I think that at this moment there are probably several people, breathless and bathed in perspiration, who have just rushed to the gate and stupidly watched the train they have missed." Now this explanation carries a direct index of Mr. A's character. Not everyone would be moved to laughter by the sight of people in such an unpleasant predicament. Furthermore, only a very few people would take such an every-day occurrence as the departure of a train, and fantastically complete the picture in this specific direction.

Popular psychology would make drastic conclusions as to Mr. A's character. The verdict would be: "This is a man who enjoys the pain of others." There is much to be said for such a conclusion, but it is not necessarily true. We must guard ourselves from making such generalized, far-reaching conclusions from a single act, if we wish to proceed methodically. The every-day psychologist, moreover—who concludes that Mr. A, having smiled at the departure of a train, is a man that enjoys the pain of others—mixes a certain moral pathos with his conclusion. Mr. A becomes the object of a somewhat pharisaic indictment. Moral evaluations, however, have no place in individual psychology.

In reality we are justified solely in assuming that Mr. A's smile together with his unique motivation of the act fits into his character pattern. We need not attempt to catalogue him as a cruel man because of it. It may well be that Mr. A does not express his satisfaction in *every* situation in which some fellow man has suffered; it may be, the only situation in which he is cruel is in the specific case of someone's coming too late for a train, and perhaps only for the reason that he has often been in the same situation himself, and has been able to train himself to punctuality by conscientious self-education. In such a case we cannot conclude that Mr. A is a man who enjoys the pain of others. We may conclude that, so far as Mr. A is concerned, punctuality is not an *objective*, self-understood matter, and that his punctuality is the result of a long inner conflict of whose final outcome he is not quite certain as yet. We may say that a pedantic punctuality is the weak point in his character pattern.

Whatever we conclude about Mr. A, we can see

that any real understanding of even such a comparatively simple act as a smile can be gained only when we understand more about the personality of the individual as a whole. We can build up a complete picture of his character only when we have fitted our material into the pattern of his personality.

Every personality is a purposive unity directed toward an individual goal. Every new bit of conduct which we may investigate must, therefore, incorporate the dynamic personal factor, if it is to be aligned in a meaningful relationship to the personality under examination. Our next problem is to show how the purposive striving for a goal (conation) is manifested in the life of the individual.

There are three fundamental types of purposive activity in the psychophysisic organism. In the first place, there is the biological conative pattern; this is the sum of all those inherited functions which seem to serve some biological purpose. Suppose some object comes close to your eye—you close your eyelids unconsciously. This reflex guards the sensitive organ of sight from mechanical injury; in other words, it is a purposive or conative mechanism. If the reflex which closes your lids proves inadequate, as in the case of a dust particle too small to see, the little foreign body falls upon the conjunctiva. Another reflex immediately occurs in your eye, just as if this case had been foreseen. The mechanical irritation that the foreign body sets up in the conjunctiva causes the tear glands to double their function, and the excess fluid which bathes the conjunctiva helps in most cases to wash out the foreign body. You have this purposive reflex because you are a human

being. You do not have to learn this reflex through long years of training. It is born in you. All these functions which help us to a greater or lesser adaptation to the conditions of life were developed in the course of hundreds of thousands of years of evolution. Mammals that are forced to live in the water adapt themselves, in function and structure, until they seem to be fishes. Other mammals that live in the air seem to have birds as a model. It is as if an unconscious plan of life, whose chief purpose seems to be the maintenance of life and the species, were working itself out during thousands of generations.

Changed conditions of life create changed functions, and changed functions condition the transformation of organs to further adaptation. Because this development is so gradual in the course of eons, we can always find rudiments of earlier phases of human development in the function and structure of the human organism. Much time is needed for the degeneration of organs and functions even though they have lost their usefulness. We still carry our appendix about with us, a rudimentary organ of ancient lineage. Although it was probably very important to our ancestors, it can be removed today without any injury to the organism. Some of the functions and reflexes that we inherit together with our other, more useful heritages seem entirely senseless today, for we cannot even guess what purposes these reflexes served in our ancestors. What useful purpose could be served by yawning, either in ourselves or in our ancestors? We waste a great deal of energy on a function we could well do without; yet this phenomenon does not refute the principle of bio-

logic purposiveness, for such a seemingly useless function is nothing more than a mile-stone along the way of evolution. It is a rudiment of a long-forgotten phase of adaptation in our ancestors, when yawning was as useful as coughing and sneezing are today—reflexes that eject foreign bodies from our respiratory passages. We simply haven't unlearned the yawning reflex.

The emotions are effects of a second type of biological purposive activity of great importance to psychology. Emotions are comparable to reflexes in that they were originally purposive (conative) phenomena, quite necessary in the archaic situations in which they originated. We find that fear causes a kind of paralysis in certain animals which prevents any further motion. As many carnivorous animals will eat living creatures only, the reflex paralysis that results from fear becomes an unconscious trick whereby the pursued animal escapes death by "playing dead." When a human being is so paralyzed by fear that he cannot move a limb, he is usually not helped by his condition. Yet this same reflex must have been useful to our ancestors, because it has persisted into the present. Darwin has called attention to the fact that when the hair on an animal's back stands on end it represents the animal's readiness to fight a larger opponent. When the hair stands on end, the animal looks larger, and the opponent may be intimidated. When a human being has "gooseflesh" as a result of hearing a gruesome story, the same reflex is at play, but it has become useless in the course of time. We haven't had time to unlearn it as yet!

The pattern of social conation or purposiveness is a division of the larger pattern—biological conation. It is manifested in every individual activity which arises out of the necessity of communal life. Since communal life is essential to man, all these activities, which we shall describe under the heading of the social feeling, are as essential to us as reflexes and organ functions. The reason that this is not immediately evident is that social conditions come into focus much later in the life of the individual than biological purposive patterns. All the conventions of social life, the morals, the customs, the limits and conditions of shame and modesty, but especially speech, common sense, and logical thought, belong in this category of social conations. These manifestations of the pattern of social conation vary, naturally, according to time and place. The social usages of the stone age differ from the customs of the South Sea Islands, or of New York City, but within the limits of the society in which they occur they are as important as biologically purposive activities.

The pattern of rational conation is the second large type of purposive activity. Rational purpose is a characteristic of the behavior of man and of those higher animals who act according to a conscious plan. The infant who reaches for an object for the first time has attained a mental level never achieved by the great majority of living organisms. When he looked at the object, weeks before, he was still obeying the laws of biological conation. The attempt to seize the object with his hands, however, presupposes that he has looked at the outer world *objectively*, and that the object is no

longer a mere sensory stimulation, but is experienced as actual *material*. The ego and the environment are distinctly divorced from each other; and it is on the premise of this distinction that the rational purposiveness is built. After this first discovery the infant understands the environment and tries to change it according to his will. Conscious thought, a product of our social conations, is nothing but an instrument of this rational conation. With the instrument of thought a human being can adjust himself to situations for which his reflex apparatus is entirely inadequate. The reflex is a typical response to a typical stimulus, whereas conscious thought enables us to give an atypical response to an atypical stimulus. The rational conation is characterized above all by the apparatus it employs to attain its ends. Its goal may be the biological, social, or personal goal, of which we shall now speak.

The pattern of personal conation is the third form of purposive activity. The goal of the central personality dominates the other two types of purposiveness, which we have named the biological and the rational conative patterns. Since the personality is a purposive unity directed toward a goal, and since each manifestation of its activity must fit into its pattern, every single act must allow of an interpretation as an expression of this personal purposive pattern. The pattern of personal conation must be implicitly contained within the pattern of every biological or rational conation. It is easy enough to prove the validity of this statement so far as rational purpose is concerned, but the proof is more difficult in the case of biological purpose. One of the most valuable contributions of individ-

ual psychology is the demonstration of the mechanisms whereby the central personality influences and affects biologic phenomena.

The boundaries between biological and rational conation are very vague. Any consciously planned act, for instance, upon frequent repetition becomes automatic after a time, and occurs reflexly according to the workings of a universal law of function. When a child learns to walk he does so in the beginning with great difficulty and with the conscious and purposive use of the appropriate groups of muscles. With increasing practice the process becomes easier, that is, the necessary movements become more and more automatic, and the act of walking eventually is quite liberated from the original rational purposiveness. We grown-ups make up our minds to walk into a certain corner of a given room, start the motions to accomplish our end, but no sooner have we started than the apparatus moves of its own accord; our sole conscious task is to stop the process when we want to stop walking. Thus a rational function is carried over into the realm of the biologic and the reflex. The purpose of walking is not really lost in this transformation, it is merely improved technically.

In the same way biologically purposive reflexes are pressed into the service of the central purposive personality. Let us take an example. We do not know what the original purpose of weeping, in the biological sense, may have been. An English biologist has offered the following hypothesis: when any animal that runs in a herd gets a particle in its eye, it is unable to see its course, and thus is separated from its fellows; such

separation is a great misfortune, and the oversecretion of the tear ducts in the presence of a foreign body in the conjunctiva came to have the significance of a great misfortune. To be sure this is a questionable explanation. But it is certain that children, as well as grown-ups, often cry to awaken the sympathy of their environment, and that this secondary purpose which originates in the central personality has nothing whatsoever to do with any biological function of the tear reflex. In other words a biological reflex has derived a new goal from the purposive patterns of the central personality; in the redirection of the biological pattern to fit the purpose of the personal pattern a "conative reconstellation" has occurred.*

In the case we have cited a conscious purpose to

** Translator's Note:* The term "conative reconstellation" can best be explained by an illustration. A passenger liner sets out from New York bound for Southampton. All arrangements on the liner—the various stewards who minister to the care and comfort of the passengers, the quantity of coal and supplies stored for the trip, the food served to passengers, the deck games, the swimming pool, the radio, concerts, and the like—are appropriate to the purpose of the ship: to transport passengers pleasurably from New York to Southampton. All these arrangements are part of the ship's conative constellation.

Now suppose that when our passenger liner is half-way across the Atlantic, war is declared between the United States and England. The status of the passenger vessel is immediately changed. It becomes, in fact, a warship. The lights, which served to illuminate gay masquerades, are dimmed lest the ship become visible to the enemy. Certain stewards who were employed to look after the passengers' needs are clapped into irons because of their allegiance to an enemy country, the course of the ship is altered, passengers are denied access to the decks, radio rooms, or engine rooms. The ship attempts to return to New York as speedily as possible. An external circumstance has forced a change of goal. This change of goal, in turn, compels the captain to reorganize the entire procedure of his ship. This process of reorganization, redirection, revaluation, I have called a conative reconstellation.

arouse sympathy need not be present; the conative reconstellation need not be routed over the rational system. A conative reconstellation usually succeeds in the degree to which the rational and conscious systems are excluded. The personal goal dominates the total reflex apparatus and utilizes it according to its needs; and conscious, purposive thinking occurs only when such thinking is necessary or important to the attainment of the personal goal.

The personal goal is a factor in every vital act, even in those activities which are purely biological or reflex, but this personal factor is of varying importance under various circumstances. Laughter is a case in point. There is little value in investigating the original meaning of laughter, for none of the many unproved hypotheses accounts for its existence. But we do know the conditions under which we are accustomed to laugh. If you are tickled, your laughter is purely reflexive, and its personal value is unimportant; reflex laughter has little or nothing to do with the personal goal. On the other hand, someone may tell you a story which is so funny that you are forced to laugh. Here the personal goal is present even though it would seem you were forced to laugh by the nature of the story. You laugh only if you have a sense of humor, that is if the tendency to laugh belongs in your personal conative pattern. Some people will not laugh at the very best joke. Again, you may have a sense of humor, yet not find this particular joke funny, perhaps because it ridicules a person you love, or because you are greatly depressed at the moment that the joke is told. Under such circumstances your failure to laugh is derived

from your personal conative constellation. There are people, on the other hand, who will laugh at any joke, bad or good, or whether they have heard it before or not. A man of this type belongs in a specific character category in which laughter is a constant factor in his personal conation, in contradistinction to the previously cited examples where laughter is determined by temporary moods or situations.

We may thus conclude that human behavior is the resultant of two conditioning sets of factors, whose interaction may be either contradictory or complementary. The first set of conditioning factors are the realities of life, such as the environment and the bodily constitution of the individual; these factors fit into the biological conative pattern and obey the laws of biological and social purpose. The second set of conditioning factors are those which fit into the pattern of the personal purpose. The phenomena of the first set are the more or less plastic elements which are the material for the process of "conative reconstellation" into the pattern of personal purpose.

This brings us back to those fundamental differences between the "causal" and the "final" (or conative) point of view. When the biological purpose is regarded from the standpoint of the whole psychophysical personality it is subordinate to the causal point of view. Thus you weep *because* you have experienced something sad. But your weeping becomes the object of investigation by individual psychology only when it has experienced a conative reconstellation and has been redirected by the personal purposive pattern, as when you weep *in order* to excite

sympathy. Whether you are conscious of the purpose of your weeping is of little consequence. It is the task of individual psychology to gain an insight into the tiniest ramifications of the personal conative pattern and to align what seems the most inconsequential and seemingly fortuitous act, with the continuity of the central personality.

Let us investigate mimicry, for example, as one of these expressions of the personal purposive pattern. All the facial and bodily movements which are the characteristic gestures of any individual may be considered as functions that have become automatized and reflexive. Every actor knows how well gestures express personality, but it has remained for individual psychology to show that gestures have a purpose. The purpose of gestures is not realized when they are employed, to be sure, for they have become automatic functions; but their purpose may be guessed when we know the personality of the individual who is making them.

Imagine a man who is small, ugly, and misshapen. He laughs whenever he talks with people, although his laughter is often in strange contrast to the theme of his conversation. His laughter and his smile seem to plead for extenuating circumstances; every gesture is a bid for a good opinion, as if our ugly man wanted to cajole his listener into assuming the pleasant gestures he desires from the person with whom he speaks. The purpose of such gestures is obvious when we realize how many people imitate the gestures of the person with whom they are speaking. The ugly man in our example is a man who has worked his way from very

humble beginnings to a position of trust and responsibility by virtue of his perseverance and shrewdness; in his present situation his ugliness is a distinct obstacle to his progress. All his life he has had to steel himself against insults and reverses. He dared not be sensitive, nor allow himself to be frightened by failure. Now that he has attained his goal he pays back with interest to those who are now dependent upon him the evil he has experienced at the hands of others. Yet he does this with the gesture of timid graciousness that he learned to use as an effective instrument to capture good will in the course of his rise to power. In this way his gestures betray his fundamental and undestroyed fear of human beings, although he need no longer approach strangers in servile fear of his position.

As this example shows, we are still far removed from a methodical science of interpreting human gestures; all too often our interpretation must have recourse to intuition and not to scientific exactness. On the other hand our interpretation is subject to constant control; it can be verified by other objective data, and we can make use of it only in the degree in which our intuitive results are thus verified. We may set up certain general rules if we always reserve our judgment in specific cases.

How does it happen that the Jews characteristically make an especially lively use of gestures? Individual psychology solves this riddle by considering the relationship of the Jews to the world in which they live. Gestures that accompany speech obviously have the purpose of underlining the spoken word. Gestures em-

phasize the spoken word until it compels the attention of the listener. Exaggerated gestures give an impression of a lively interest in the subject of discussion; they are therefore well adapted to produce a similar attitude in the listener. His receptivity is enlarged by increasing his emotional interest. The purpose of gestures in the speaker is to effect a friendly capture of the listener. Individuals who, like the Jews, have been forced to use the friendly instruments of shrewdness and of an elastic and evasive resistance in order to gain their point believe that they must make use of every possible adjunct to attain their end. Gestures are useful instruments in the process.

On the other hand the absence of gestures is considered in "high tone" in many quarters; the nobleman, the priest, the high officer, all believe that they can get along without gestures. As almost everyone is naturally respectful to them, they hardly need gestures to make conquests; everyone listens to their words attentively without any effort on their part to impress their opinion upon their listeners. The absence of gestures thus becomes the expression of self-confidence in one type of man, or the characteristic of an assumed godlikeness, which exaggerates and caricatures itself by immovability and reserve, in another type.

We are not in a position to say how far a science of physiognomy could be based upon the study of mimetic gestures. The statement, "As a man looks, so is he," is often true despite the fact that it is a false generalization. Kretschmer has maintained, and partially proved, that there is a relationship between physique and temperament, but Kretschmer's views are of importance

only in gross types. Those finer modelings of face and features, the sphere of the intuitive and much-practiced physiognomist, are probably nothing more than crystallized gestures. The countless repetition of stereotyped facial movements is capable in the course of decades of modeling every fold and feature. . . . The masklike face of old age, which appears when the elasticity of the facial musculature begins to wane, is the permanent crystallization of what once was a fleeting expression.

The consideration of an individual's attitude and posture in sleep is important for much the same reason that the study of gestures and physiognomy is valuable in character analysis. The posture which an individual assumes when sleeping is frequently a symbolic index of his contemporary attitude toward life. We frequently find anxious individuals who are afraid of life, pulling their sheets over their heads when they sleep, just as if they wanted to protect themselves symbolically against some danger. This posture is common among anxious children, and it is frequently retained even into old age, or it recurs after disappointments and failures. We know of a case of a newly married young man who used to hold his wife with outstretched hand while he slept, and this gesture was characteristic of his domineering attitude in life. Schalit has described a boy who assumed a heroic pose while asleep; during the day he is an actor, playing the rôle of "the king" in a school drama.*

Handwriting is a mimetic expression deserving con-

* Hellpach has recently discussed the physiognomy of racial groups from this point of view.

sideration at this point. Klages has pointed out that handwriting has one advantage over other forms of psychic expression in that it is permanent and can thus be analyzed at one's leisure. In the last decades graphology has almost assumed the rank of a science. The attempt of graphologists to interpret character from the handwriting alone must be sharply criticized as not only impossible but superfluous. Handwriting, like any other single expression of character, is capable of several interpretations, and the appropriate interpretation can be determined solely by *comparison* with other character indices such as gestures, dreams, erroneously carried-out actions, a consideration of the previous history of the individual, and the like. Individual psychology is concerned not with handwriting in itself, but with the *individual who is writing*; to isolate this single character index from its context is a valueless procedure. A graphological analysis becomes most valuable where most is known about the writer.

The habits and stereotyped movements of every-day life are important material for psychological study. Some people are always a few minutes too early for an appointment, while others always come too late. Whether they rationalize their behavior, or excuse themselves, is not important, for their real attitude toward life may be deduced from their habits. The fundamental reactions of the chronic early-comer may be the tendency to overpower his fellow men by his dutiful punctuality; he may come early just to provoke excuses from another who seems to be late, relatively. The individual who lets everyone wait for him unmistakably disparages and deprecates his appointment.

It is also worth noting how a man greets another or shakes hands with him. Some people have great difficulties in greeting; they worry whether they should greet someone or not, although the objective solution of this problem, always to greet an individual in case of doubt, is, it seems, the obvious solution. Some people shake hands by simply extending their hands passively and letting the other press it, believing, no doubt, that they have something to lose by being wholehearted. Other individuals will seize a hand with such exaggerated enthusiasm that it seems they wish to overwhelm the person they are greeting. Some people make a practice of this kind of conquest, especially those women who greet any man, whether they know him well or not, as though they were in love with him. And this is certainly a good way to make him fall in love.

The common rules of courtesy incorporate a considerable knowledge of human nature. Forgetfulness or distraction is no excuse for bad manners. Every country has its set formulas of politeness. The formulas are not always easy to remember—but when a person forgets a commonly accepted courtesy, he is put down as ill-mannered and uncouth. Even where uncouthness is the result of real ignorance or of a frigid misanthropy—both of which one is inclined to excuse—a great deal of feeling is associated with the implied slight of an impolite gesture. Obviously the oversensitiveness of individuals who are forever on the hunt for slights and insults (a corollary to a lack of common courtesy) is important in our study of character. When one person is oversensitive his entire

environment must be especially polite and considerate in order not to cause his unhappiness. The oversensitive person soon acquires that special and unique position in society which his lack of self-confidence demands.

Mistakes, forgettings, misplacements, and similar erroneously carried out actions show that even memory and attention are subject to dominant character tendencies. Memory is no photographic archive in which all mental pictures are filed immediately after they are perceived, and once filed remain open for inspection at any time. Semon's mechanical explanation of memory, the *engrams*—memories which have become a fixed habit in the brain—reminds us too much of the preparation of a phonograph record. Semon's theory has been the basis of much misunderstanding of memory. All the evidence points to the fact that, considering all the impressions which we perceive, forgetting is the rule and remembrance the exception. The number of memories reproduced in the course of a human life is infinitesimal when compared with the number of conscious experiences in that same life. If an extremely limited set of experiences is selected from countless existing perceptions, there can be little doubt that these selected remembrances fit into the personal conative pattern, and that the goal of the personality is responsible for the uniqueness of its choice.

In other words, every human being remembers what he *needs*, and forgets the rest of his experiences. This does not mean that only pleasant memories are retained. Personal interest alone determines the selection of remembered experiences, and this choice need not be

objective. Suppose that the goal of Mr. A's personality is directed toward the defense of his personal self-esteem; Mr. A will remember, for the most part, only those events which will reenforce his self-confidence. Suppose there is a pessimistic tendency underlying Mr. B's personality; his memory will select unhappy events for retention. Everyone attempts to defend his personal goal by a make-believe objectivity of the facts. We *make* the experience that we need.

Adler has emphasized the importance of the *first childhood remembrances*. There is an excellent reason why these early childhood experiences are retained in our memories much less completely than those of later life. Vital interest in the collection and reproduction of experiences begins when the child has developed an autonomous behavior pattern. When a man traces his steps over an unknown path under the leadership of a guide, he does not have to pay close attention to the signs along the way. The small child does not remember because he needs no memory while he is dependent on his adult environment. When certain events crop out of the vast sea of childhood forgetting, like isolated islands, they are extremely significant. These islands of recollection may be unimportant events when viewed objectively; but even when they are completely falsified, or secondarily revised and elaborated, the subjective significance of these recollections is indicated in most cases by the relation of their content to the goal of the personality.

We have seen a patient suffering from bronchial asthma who reproduced several early childhood remembrances all of which contained variations on the

theme, "I am afraid to be alone." Her first attack of asthma occurred when she was forced to spend the night alone—for the first time after her marriage. During her illness she has never been left alone. Another neurasthenic patient remembers a single scene from his early childhood in which he is lying on the ground being kicked by his father. His neurosis is definitely related to pessimistic thoughts of his own inadequacy: he disappointed the expectations of his mother, and never attained the greatness and capability of his father. The first childhood remembrance is frequently a dreamlike symbol of the entire behavior pattern of an individual. This significant relationship, to be sure, can be demonstrated only in the perspective of time, but the retention of one vivid recollection can be explained only by the fact that this vivid experience of childhood is used to reenforce and reiterate a pattern of conduct which has been definitely fixed.

Countless observations of the psychology of witnesses show beyond all shadow of doubt how our memory can deceive us, and how it is determined by the individual conduct pattern. We usually consider true what we wish to occur; all else is "repressed." The process of transforming objective facts begins with the very conception of what has happened, and is completed later by the memory. This transformation and transposition could be accomplished only by a lie, if apperception and memory were purely mechanical in their function. Yet, if the tendency to distort the facts is contrary to a personal tendency that prohibits lying, the deceptive tricks of memory are capable of reconciling both tendencies. You describe an occurrence as

you would like it to have happened, and if you believe the truth of your statement, no lie has been told. This mental trick enables you to attain your goal and yet keep your conscience clear. Some realization of the real truth, a presentiment that the whole matter rests upon a bit of legerdemain, usually remains, to be sure, in some distant corner of the soul. Repression may distort mental content, but it cannot destroy it.

These tricks of memory are characteristic of all the phenomena we call the psychopathology of every-day life. The waiter who adds up your bill in the restaurant is quite as capable of making mistakes as any other human being, but it is only in rare instances that his mistakes are to the advantage of the customer. You may have an average memory for telephone numbers, but in those numbers that you remember and those you forget your personal attitude will be clearly reflected toward the individuals whom these numbers represent.

An "illegitimate" desire which is accomplished by some erroneously performed action of every-day life need not deal with objective facts; it may be merely a demonstration of the desire where nothing is really to be gained by the mistake. The fact that you have forgotten a telephone number temporarily is hardly a valid excuse for avoiding a conversation that you dislike as long as you have telephone directories at hand. A mistake or erroneously carried out action may, in some cases, be the means of accomplishing some "illegitimate" purpose, but in other cases the mistake is inadequate and remains merely the expression of the underlying determining pattern of the personality, as

V. Frankl has shown. Thus we can say that people who forget to pay their taxes for weeks and months, until the assessor finally makes them pay a surtax as a penalty, are disinclined to look facts in the face. Their apparent neglect actually proves to be an outspoken hostility toward reality, upon closer examination, while a seemingly purposeless mistake, which serves no immediate or tangible goal, such as the saving of money, is in fact the expression of a far distant goal which might be formulated thus: "I have to prove to myself and everyone else that I have not been created for this matter-of-fact world, and, therefore, people must take care of me in order to keep me from being harmed." In this way an error which seems at first merely an expression of a tendency becomes finally a means to an end. A harmless slip or error, originally an expression of the personal conative pattern, becomes an instrument and means to the attainment of the personal goal. Demonstrations of the error or slip serve not merely as reiterations, but as reenforcements of the personal pattern. Künkel has coined the word "*Dressat*" * to describe personal goals that arise through a process of self-inflicted training.

Must every error and mistake be interpreted, and if not, what determines whether an erroneously carried out action should have an interpretation? Distraction, the customary excuse for errors, actually may occur. There is the distraction which is a temporary depression of concentration, occurring while one is concentrating his efforts under strong emotional tension in another direction. Distraction may also exist,

* *Translator's Note: Dressat* is an untranslatable word.

however, as a constant fixed quality of the character. Once the disposition to make mistakes is created by chronic distraction, any specific mistake may be determined by other factors such as the mechanics of habit. Suppose you climb one flight higher in your house to visit a friend who lives there, and attempt to open his door with your key, because his door looks like yours for example. Slips of the tongue, too, are often contrasts, because contrasting concepts are close to one another and easily exchanged for one another—since, etymologically, the contrasting root words such as above-below, high-low, cold-warm, and the like, are frequently based upon the same roots. Other slips follow the laws of condensation, amalgamation, and contamination, commonly utilized in dreams and jokes.

These and other mechanisms of slips of the tongue seem to demonstrate that whenever we lower our attentiveness, the laws of primitive thinking come to the fore, and we think and talk as savages or children usually do. A slip of the tongue is facilitated when the personal factor determines the depression of the level of concentration, but does not determine the specific mistake. The typical personally determined slip of the tongue, or erroneously carried out action, always has two points at which the personal conative principle is active: The personal behavior pattern first lowers the level of attention, and secondarily and at the same time determines the content of the slip in the intended direction of the personal goal. The first element produces a state of apparent personal irresponsibility, and the second effects the illegitimate goal.

It is well to warn against exaggeration at this point.

To interpret *every* accident as a case of "unconscious suicide," and every neglectful accident as an "unconscious murder," as the psychoanalysts do, is certainly false. This is too easy. Individual psychology, in contrast to psychonalysis, *never attempts to interpret a single isolated occurrence; we can interpret conduct and experience only in their contextual relation to the total personality*. Any single slip of the tongue or mistake, in itself, may have many interpretations; it is uncharacteristic and indifferent so far as the personality is concerned. Its values and interpretations originate when it is properly placed in the mosaic of a personal pattern. Only when this has been done can we say that a mistake may or may not be interpreted.

It is not only possible but probable that one and the same mistake, made by two different people, has a different interpretation in each case—that in one case it may be the result of a temporary distraction, whereas in the second case it may be the manifestation of a well-marked personality pattern. There are, to be sure, some errors that are unmistakable signs of personal tendencies: the lady who repeated the physician's permission to her husband "to eat whatever he wanted," "so he can eat whatever *I* want"—but these "beautiful" cases are few in comparison to the great number in which a personal determination is questionable.

The principle of the unity of the psychophysical personality may be demonstrated even in mistakes which do not bear interpretation. Thus it may be shown that personality factors facilitate the production of depressions of the level of consciousness and the distractions, whether temporary or habitual, which are the

basis of every mistake. There are people who are "fundamentally" distracted whenever they have any work to do, and therefore they carry their own excuses about with them, in the event that they make mistakes. Others attempt to prove their preoccupation with their work or their love affairs to themselves and their friends by seeming distracted. *Individual mistakes are not determined by these factors, but the underlying distraction, even where the interpretation of the specific error is impossible, is a resultant of the personal conative pattern.*

The mistake may well be the expression and means of a specific character tendency fixed in the personality, but not willingly committed by the bearer. Misanthropy, avarice, envy, jealousy, and the like, are such fixed traits, which result from self-inflicted training. On the other hand the mistakes may be the expression of an attitude determined by the situation and our unconscious tendencies to react toward a specific situation in a personal way. Many of the occurrences punished by the courts as criminal neglect may thus actually contain some unconscious criminal tendency, just as the courteous phrase, turned by a slip of the tongue into a vulgarity, may be the expression of some deeper wish which we have not allowed to break into consciousness.*

The interpretation and significance of dreams should not be difficult if you have understood the interpretation of the mistakes and slips of every-day life. The impos-

* *Translator's Note:* The interpretation of any slip or error must not be forced. Either it fits into the personality pattern easily, or it does not fit at all. When we know the nature of the personality pattern, the mistakes of every-day life almost interpret themselves.

ing achievements of Sigmund Freud in dream interpretation must be honored and respected. The unbelievable courage, with which he presumed to consider the dream as a meaningful phenomenon of mental life, and proceeded to solve that problem without any previous preparation, was followed by Freud's equally unbelievable success. Much of Freud's interpretation of dreams is no longer tenable today. Individual psychology has made significant contributions to the correction of Freud's mistakes. Nevertheless, we are only too happy to recognize Freud's accomplishments in dream interpretation, and admit that we have learned the most important elements of this science from him. In the study of dream interpretation we are all Freud's students.

A dream may be described as a "slip" of thought or a trick of the imagination. Similar "slips" occur in our waking life, and they obey the same laws as those governing slips of the tongue or other erroneously performed action. Forgetting, tricks and deceptions of memory, as well as that dreamlike phenomenon which the French call *fausse reconnaissance*, or the *sentiment du déjà vu* belong in a similar category. In *déjà vu* you have the feeling that you have been in the same place before, or that you have had the same experience in all its details, so that you feel as if you knew what was going to happen next. It is easy to understand the nature of this "slip": it is, in reality, the hallucination that you recognize something you have experienced once before; the experience of recognition seems to be bound up with a flashback that lacks the qualities of past experience. Fatigue from strenuous or exciting

experience is an essential factor in the occurrence of this hallucination. But it may also be shown that personal determinants play a part despite the undoubted fact that changes in the physiology of the brain are important factors. It has been experimentally demonstrated that exciting experiences often produce a special super-wakefulness, which is characteristic of the second "excited" stage of fatigue. This is the premise of *déjà vu*, for *déjà vu* usually occurs in situations of strain.

Suppose a critical situation that requires a significant decision arises. Suddenly you feel: "This is not new, I have already experienced it once before. Indeed, I can predict what is going to happen." This feeling of *déjà vu* is not without its purpose. The fictional identification with a previous experience produces a calm state of mind and resolves the tension of the situation. All the difficulties seem lessened when the mysterious feeling of *déjà vu* arises and the sense that all this which is occurring at the present time has occurred before. It is like a will-o'-the-wisp; and *déjà vu* like the will-o'-the-wisp is comparable to a flight from the pressure of reality. Just as any mirage is dependent upon a lowering of the intellectual functions by hunger and fatigue, so *déjà vu* can occur only under the pathological conditions of overfatigue. In both cases the goal of the personality avails itself of pathological changes in the bodily apparatus, so that its purpose of gaining temporary calm and consolation, in the manner of a primitive wish fulfilment, is attained.

The normal dream is similar to *déjà vu* in many respects. In the first place there is a lowering of the in-

tellectual level, produced in the case of the dream by the changes in the state of consciousness coincident with sleep. Thought and imagination assume a more hallucinatory character; the necessity of objective logic is largely lost—while superficial associations and relationships assume logical and rational values. It would seem that the vegetative centers in the mid-brain, those parts of the brain which are more closely associated with emotion, sleep less deeply than the higher cortical centers. Freud has demonstrated that the affective or emotional attitudes in the dream are closer to the real meaning, more “correct,” than the purely picturesque or verbal elements of the dream.

The material of the dream originates from the same mental and emotional elements that we utilize in our waking life. These contents are dreamlike—that is, hallucinatory, and constructed of quasi-logical relationships. This, indeed, is the physiology of the dream. If you attempt to interpret the dream by using the logical means and methods of waking life, you will not understand it. The dream must first be translated or decoded before it can be *made* understandable to our waking thoughts. But this translation cannot be made according to the method of the old dream-books where a waking concept was simply substituted for each dream concept and dream picture. We are not dealing with a constant and fixed dream language, but with a language which varies with each individual, and even from one dream to another. In order to understand how a dream is decoded we must reconstruct the process of dream production.

To this end Freud developed a technique based upon

the purposiveness of free association. We have already made our premise of the universal validity of the personal goal, and we must admit further that seemingly fortuitous thought associations also are dominated by this personal goal. According to Freud if you decode a dream, you bring the hidden meaning of the dream, previously expressed in language unintelligible to your conscious thought, closer to consciousness. But dreams presumably concern themselves with important events in the life of the dreamer, and therefore we must assume that the dream thought processes are related to the personal goal even though the content is not in consciousness. Free associations which arise after some introspection on the part of the dreamer must, consequently, be closely related to the thought complex hidden behind the dream. Therefore, we let the dreamer associate freely; that is, we ask him to concentrate on each separate element in the dream, and to tell us whatever comes into his head, without exercising any critique. We develop more material for our interpretation in this way. Associations are not gathered for some single aspect, but for each element of the whole dream. In favorable cases, that is in dreams which are not too difficult of interpretation, certain crisscrossing, complexly interwoven associations and images are developed from the sum of the dreamer's associations. These are the ideas which are "hidden" in the dream, although they are represented only by symbolic pictures or by vague innuendos.

The intimations, innuendos, and symbolic representations of the dream are determined by the psychological law of the most picturesque representation possible.

Because there is no necessity to represent things in their true light, or according to their objective logic in the dream, it frequently happens that a part appears for the whole or that the metaphor is taken literally, as when a "social lion" actually appears as a lion. A given idea may be represented by some form of a very superficially associated picture. In a way a dream is constructed like a picture puzzle. On the other hand, however, dream thinking is comparable to primitive thought processes of savages and children. The fact that the actual experiences of waking life, together with the associated waking logic, are occasionally carried over into the dream, is not a contradiction of this principle. These waking experiences are not so much products of the dream thought processes as they are picturesque reminiscences of the waking life; their logic is simply a part of the waking experience as detailed in the dream.

By using the Freudian method of free association you may discover the actual thoughts and ideas that constitute the true content of the dream and have produced it. Even an incompletely reproduced, partially forgotten dream may lead in this way to a complete interpretation, if the associations arising out of the remembered portion lead you back to the essential thoughts underlying the dream. For the most part, to be sure, you discover only the themes of the dream, and these themes are expressed as mottoes or slogans. A definition: a dream is the continuation and projection of the thought and ideational processes of the waking life, carried on with the means of more primitive thought processes.

The next step is to discover that a dream is often a trial solution (Adler), a simplification of reality by comparison. The very fact that the physiology of the brain compels the expression of dreams in the form of pictures, makes every dream a metaphoric abstraction so far as the dream pictures are related to latent meaning. To the degree that you can translate the symbols and intimations of a dream into the speech of waking life, you will find it is a representation of reality, sometimes more complicated, more often an abbreviation. One of the characteristics of the economics of dream thinking is that one and the same dream element, the very nucleus or kernel of the dream, is approached from several points of view at the same time. Freud called this phenomenon "condensation" and considered it to be the result of the overdetermination of single dream elements. One and the same dream may thus allow of more than a single interpretation; indeed, several interpretations may be necessary if the complexity of the associations indicate that a high degree of condensation has occurred. But you will find that these various dream contents are usually connected by some inner relationship.

Personal conative constellations and patterns present in the waking life of the individual must necessarily recur in his dreams. If you know an individual precisely and his actual situation in life, you can guess the essential purpose of the dream more or less correctly simply by virtue of the fact that, with a little insight, you could guess the things that the dreamer would dream about. If the approximate solution of the dream is known in advance, it is not too difficult to un-

derstand the dream symbols and the dream work. You must remember, however, that the continuity of time and space are broken in the dream, that what follows in the dream may have actually preceded in fact, and, as one might expect in the vague blurred manifestation of the dream, one and the same person or one and the same object may appear in various forms.

Experience teaches us that the greater proportion of dreams concern themselves with the immediate or more distant future of the dreamer, and any of the old recollections, which may reoccur in the dream with amazing clarity, do so only because of their bearing on the future. It is obvious that this must be so, for a dream is but a projection of our waking thought processes expressed in a different manner, and with different symbols. Most of our waking thought, indeed, is concerned with the future, except in so far as we are forced by necessity to think of the past or of the present. This vital necessity of living in the present plays a very little rôle during our sleep, when we have withdrawn ourselves from reality and the objects of our immediate personal interests. It is quite natural, therefore, that dreams lie for the most part in the realm of the future. Thoughts of the future play the chief rôle in our thinking when we allow our thoughts to wander, as is so often true in the case of so-called day-dreams. Day-dreams are little more than an indulgence in uncritical and optimistic fantasies of the future on the part of ambitious men and children. The dream points to the future and attempts to break a trail into future possibilities, to master dangers, and to concretize future hopes. Since the purpose of

thought, in general, is foresight and prevision and the preparation of defenses against future dangers, we may conclude that the dream is no more than a special form of ordinary thinking.

In dream psychology there is little difficulty in demonstrating the thesis that a personal goal dominates every expression of an individual's mental life. A strict critic of nature might ask whether it is not a defect of our organisms that such a large portion of the time devoted to the regeneration of our bodies during sleep is lost in worthless dreaming. Problems admitting no solution in our waking life will hardly be solved in our dreams, although this may have happened occasionally. On the other hand we wake up from some dreams deeply frightened or entirely fatigued, when sleep ought to be a period of restoration. What then is the purpose of the dream?

Individual psychology teaches that the dream is a form of preparation for the future, other than the preparation which is effected during our waking state. We already know that sleep seems to inhibit the higher psychic functions much more radically than it excludes the primitive emotions. For this reason the emotions of the dream are usually more "correct" than the pictures of the dream. Emotion predominates over intellect in the dream. The emotional attitude of the dreamer to the problems of his daily life is expressed more clearly and intensely in the dream, because he is rid of the necessity of thinking logically and objectively. Dreams, therefore, are better adapted than waking thoughts to the task of preparing emotional attitudes. In your dream you prepare the atmosphere,

set the emotional tone, so to speak, for the desired solution of future problems. This assumption can usually be demonstrated if you investigate the dream in relation to the past, present and future situation of the dreamer, and not as an isolated phenomenon divorced from the personality of the dreamer. Dreams preceding decisive events, tests, or decisions are excellent proof of our thesis, for these are the situations that give origin to the so-called typical dreams. Dreams of having to take examinations commonly occur before great decisions. The dreamer dreams himself in the examination hall, anxious and afraid, being asked his questions, and has a feeling that he is bound to fail. Usually the examination that appears in the dream is one that he has actually passed with great difficulty. The reminiscence serves the purpose of recalling a mood that existed before a previous examination because it is analogous to the actual present situation. The fear of the examination in the dream allows the anxious dreamer to realize the danger of his present problem, stimulating him to do his best. "Don't take it too easily," the dream seems to say. And the dream says it by reproducing a former anxiety situation in the shape of a hallucination. Thus armed, the dreamer is spurred on to meet his decision that next day, or, if he follows the warning of the dream, he feels justified in avoiding it.

Dreams of falling and of flying are transparently the creators of moods. Dreams of falling are similar to dreams of examination. The sensation of falling is always symbolic, because there is no more common symbol of human effort and striving than the symbol

of above and below, of success and of failure. The dream of falling is appropriate to its purpose: to intensify the dreamer's efforts at striving for security. Warned by the attitude produced by the dream of falling, the dreamer approaches the problems of his life with greater precaution on the following day. The effect of the dream is felt even when the dreamer attaches no significance to the dream, and even if he has forgotten it, or failed to understand it, consciously. The forgetting of dreams, for which physiological reasons are usually given, affects solely the manifest contents of the dream, and this part of the dream is quite unimportant so far as the purpose of the unit personality is concerned. On the other hand the mood the dream has produced remains, although the dreamer is not conscious of having dreamed at all, and it is this mood which is the most important aspect of the dream to the psychologist.

Dreams of flying are dreams of ambition. They prepare the stage and the setting for the immediate future, especially when the future presages a situation that will demand courage and activity of the dreamer. If dreams of anxiety warn the dreamer to be precautionous, then dreams of flying are calculated to encourage him by giving him a taste of the intoxication of success, achieved in some daring dream exploit.

To a certain degree this interpretation fits sexual dreams as well. Stimuli from the body play a considerable rôle in the sexual dreams, just as physiological tensions are important determinants in other dreams, such as nightmares and the dreams of urination, hunger and thirst. There can be little doubt that the sexual

tension plays an essential rôle in the production of sexual dreams, and yet in many individual cases the dream also prepares the stage setting and stage atmosphere for the future. The wish for an erotic experience, together with thinking about it, is capable of producing the required sexual tension; this fact makes our explanation very reasonable. The neurotic dialectic, which often is very intense where sex is concerned, comes to the fore, so that wish and anxiety often become strangely confused. Frequently patients suffering from psychic impotence—that is, individuals who are afraid of sexual experiences—have dreams that are accompanied by pollution.

In the Freudian technique of dream interpretation the rôle of the “censor” is very important. Freud assumes that innumerable forbidden tendencies, especially those of a sexual nature, are expressed in an uninhibited manner in the dream, because the controlling presence of the moral personality, the super-ego, is partially asleep. Even if the moral censor is lessened, say the Freudians, it is still present, and thus it is explained that the “forbidden” tendencies are expressed but in a distorted or symbolic form, or they are condensed, or actually changed to the direct opposite by this half-sleeping censor. In this way the dreamer succeeds in enjoying undesirable and prohibited tendencies in a dream, but in such a manner that he, himself, does not understand what is happening. His super-ego is thus saved from offense and insult. Forgetting of the dream is also the work of the censor, according to Freud.

The Freudians have never answered the insuper-

able objections that have been raised against this important point in their dream theory. For one thing, shameless, undisguised sexual, perverse, or criminal dreams are not at all infrequent in the dreaming of moral and ethical people; another objection is that these dreams are not always forgotten, and although the dreamer may be ashamed of them in his waking life, he justifies their occurrence by saying he "just dreamed them." On the following night the same dreamer may produce a perfectly unintelligible dream from whose interpretation a far less harmful sexual wish, which could not in any way have offended the censor, comes to the surface, although on the previous night an outspokenly perverse dream has slipped by unchallenged. To make a general rule, the degree of dream distortion has no direct relationship to the "illicitness" of the dream content. If distortion in the dream were actually the work of a censor, we should be forced to prove that the more "forbidden" the latent content, the more distorted the dream becomes.

We may conclude, therefore, that the distortion of the dream has nothing to do with the "censor" and that the censor plays a less important rôle in the formation of the dream than Freud would assume. Nevertheless, the question of a "moral censor" and the related question of responsibility deserves further consideration in dream psychology, as in the psychology of erroneously performed actions. There is no doubt that we feel ourselves less responsible for our dreams than we do for our waking thoughts. The method of dream thought is so fundamentally different from that of waking thought that we are inclined to regard the

dream as something quite foreign to the personality. Added to this is the fact that the dream is hallucinatory in character. The dream is comparable to the fiction of an actual experience—our thoughts, wishes, fears, have seemingly acquired flesh and blood and act quite independently of us. And although we know very well theoretically that every aspect of the dream is a product of our own thought, nevertheless we are still inclined to be deceived by it, and to react to the dream as if it were something sent by some extraneous god. And thus it may occasionally happen that thoughts and tendencies we should not dare to express in our waking life, because they are inadmissible to our waking personality, dare to obtrude themselves into the consciousness of the dream.

The fact that we may count upon a certain degree of greater sincerity on the part of the dreamer makes the dream valuable psychological material. This is true, to be sure, only when we understand not only the content of the dream, but also its underlying tendencies. This is not always so easy. You may succeed, for instance, in understanding that the dream is concerned with the possibility of the dreamer's marriage, but whether or not the dreamer is affirming or negating marriage in his attitude is not always so clear. Two factors are of value in helping us to understand a dream. In the first place we pay close attention to the underlying feeling-tone of the dream. If it is true that the purposive function of the dream consists in producing a mood and setting for future action, then we should be able to determine whether or not the dreamer is prepared to be married from the emotional atmos-

phere of the dream. The second aid to our interpretation is the fact that the dream follows the same laws that govern other expressions of mental life: taken as an isolated fact it is meaningless, but once it is aligned with other expressions of the individual's behavior pattern, it becomes significant.

No really valid interpretation of a dream is possible unless you know the personality of the dreamer quite fundamentally. When this premise is fulfilled it is not difficult to understand the underlying tendency of a dream, for the dreamer, whether he believes it or not, is not different in his dreams from what he is in his waking life. The melody that is the theme of his waking life appears also in his dream life. To understand this melody is the task and problem of understanding human nature. The interpretation of dreams is but one means of attaining this understanding.

The interpretation of dreams is not an end in itself, and the psychoanalytic vogue of making the interpretation of dreams a social game must be characterized as bad taste. Indeed, this is a good opportunity to warn against the misuse of psychological knowledge. If you use your knowledge of the significance and meaning of mistakenly carried out actions or of dreams in order to "see through" people and to show them that you can see through them, you commit a piece of ill-mannered tactlessness, which is the worse if your interpretation is right. Every man may apply individual psychology to himself, but he should apply it to his fellows only in so far as it is his task to influence them as an educator, or as a physician. Every other use of individual psychology is a misuse of it. The finest human relation-

ships may be disturbed by an unthinking use of individual psychology. When two people are close to each other, psychological interpretations of the actions of one by the other prevents these interpretations from being judged according to their rightness or wrongness; in such a case, every uncalled-for interpretation is considered, and quite rightly, as a belligerent attack on the person whose actions have been subjected to the psychological spotlight. That friend, that husband or brother, who tries to impress you with his knowledge that you are showing tendencies you will not admit to yourself, succeeds only in impressing you with his vaunted superiority. This disturbs human relationship. Let every man think what he will—but let him keep anything that will injure others to himself. He is neither your physician nor your teacher.

Before we leave the subject of dream interpretation let us consider an illustration. A woman dreams: "My husband and I are setting a table because we are waiting for guests. It is the table in the dining-room of my parents' home where I lived in my childhood. The table is already set, but it is so placed in the room that the entrance is blocked by it. We therefore decide to change it around. This is rather difficult because the leaves of the table and the legs supporting them have been pulled out. With some care and effort we are able to move this table into the long axis of the room, so that the entrance is free."

This patient has the following associations for this dream:

"Yesterday I got a letter from my husband in which he assumed an attitude to something I had said in a

previous letter that was very unpleasant to me. I had asked him, in a very friendly fashion, how he could get along without a woman so long, and had generously given him the right to be unfaithful if abstinence was very difficult for him. On previous occasions, when I had given him similar permission, he used to answer that he wasn't even considering such a thing. Sexual abstinence was only difficult for him in the first few days and after that he didn't think of it any more. But this time he wrote: 'It is true that it is very difficult for me to get along without a wife, but before I decide to assume any relationship with some strange woman [and others do not come into consideration because he is on a foreign journey at present] I shall try to worry through as best I can.' In other words on this occasion he leaves the possibility of using my generous permission theoretically open, and, of course, I had awaited the same answer as on former occasions. My generosity was not nearly so serious as he thought, and I found it distinctly unpleasant that such a possibility could even be discussed.

"The dining-room in my parents' home was one of the front rooms. The playroom, in which we children grew up, was at the back. We children were not allowed to play in the dining-room except at meal-time. For this very reason it had the charm of the forbidden, and so I remember that I sometimes secretly entered it, and lay down on the dining-room sofa. Once when I was on this forbidden sofa the maid came in to set the table, but did not notice me. She thought she was alone, but I saw very well that she was tasting the dessert that she was putting on the table and that she

drank the foam from both of the beer glasses at my father's and mother's places. I had a great fear that she would see me, but she went out of the room without noticing me.

"Another recollection is connected with this dining-room which I have remembered today for the first time in many years. For almost ten years it was my custom to tell some story that seemed extraordinarily important or interesting to me, in order to gain the attention of my parents, whenever I came into the dining-room. It always happened that after the first two sentences my parents would say, impatiently: 'Oh, keep quiet, don't tell the stupid story; it really doesn't interest us.' I would be quiet, but the next time I would try again, always ambitious to find something that would interest my parents and to which they would have to listen.

"I have always reproached my parents for their lack of interest in me and my affairs. Neither my father nor my mother cared much for us children. We were left to the mercies of servants. I believe I had a very unhappy childhood. Strange to say, however, my brothers and sisters do not share my feeling although they were distinctly not treated any better than I was. On the contrary I, the oldest, was always a favorite child."

The following facts about the sexual life of the patient are important:

She is very much in love with her husband and still she can never agree with him about their sexual life. She is usually frigid. At other times, however, she has a desire for sexual intercourse, but usually in those

situations in which her wish cannot be gratified, such as on a train journey.

Her behavior seems to say: "I am not frigid at all—it is only an unfortunate occurrence that I can't have intercourse when I am prepared to enjoy it." In this way she feels that she is the victim of the brutal sexual appetites of her husband. Behind this hidden disinclination for sexual intercourse lies a strong moralizing tendency. For she believes that all sexual matters are "dirty" and forbidden. Her mother was frequently unfaithful to her father, and—she learned later, after the death of her father—had one affair after another with all manner of men. In addition her mother was very hysterical, and inclined to nagging. Her husband had often warned her: "You are getting to be like your mother."

This dream, which was dreamed during her treatment, seems to signify that she is prepared to put an end to the difficulty that obstructs her sexual intercourse. That this is not easy for her is shown by the fact that it is difficult to turn the table, which had already been set, in another direction. The inhibitions are to be found in the realm of her insecure self-esteem, and for this reason the table legs—the supports—play a rôle. She is afraid of the superiority of her husband. It is as difficult to impress him with her validity, as it was to impress her parents when she was a child. And for this reason the arena of the dream is the dining-room of her childhood home where she had experienced the severest insults to her self-confidence. In addition this is the room in which she did forbidden things and saw forbidden things done. The dream,

therefore, signifies her answer to the letter of her husband, and is a demonstration of her good will and her readiness to remove whatever stands in the way of a happy married life—not without calling attention, however, to the fact that she must overcome many obstacles to do it.

In the study of dreams as well as of mistakenly performed actions, the discovery of a duality of psychic powers, hostile to each other, was made. It was further seen that the conflict between these two elements was bridged over by the mistake or the dream. On the one hand there is an “illicit” or “forbidden” tendency, on the other, a moral sense of responsibility. We have demonstrated that these mistakes in actions with their “illicit” underlying tendencies can be effected only because they *seem* to lie beyond the sovereignty of our sense of responsibility. In other words, the mistake or “slip” is a detour around our moral sense. You might well raise the objection at this point: if there actually are conflicting tendencies in the psychic life, which may war with one another, what becomes of the unity of the personality?

The subjective experience of mental conflict no doubt does occur. We can describe this conflict, we can experience it, and we can even be partizan to one side or the other when we see the conflict in another person. It is apparent that every conflict of this nature is concerned with the antagonism of tendencies from various moral levels. We use the word “moral” in its widest sense. You may well be in doubt whether you will travel from San Francisco to New York by way of Chicago, or by way of St. Louis, and eventually some

objective factor, such as the time of departure or the length of the journey, will determine your choice. But your doubt can hardly be called a mental conflict even though you cannot make the decision.

Difficult decisions that are alternatives at the same level are not experienced as mental conflicts. If a general questions whether he shall use Regiment A or Regiment B to attain a certain strategic point on the battle-field, the fate of the battle may hang on his decision. Yet this is not a psychic conflict, it is merely a difficult alternative, because the decision must be made objectively and lies, so to speak, outside the personality of the general. The relative strength of one or the other regiment, the facilities for transport, and the like, will help the general to make his decision. As soon as he has gathered all the necessary data, the decision practically makes itself.

But let us suppose for a moment that the general has some personal relationship to one or the other of these regiments—that Regiment A is his favorite regiment—and the objective which must be gained is an especially dangerous one. In the moment that this subjective factor enters into the decision, the purely objective alternative becomes a psychic conflict between factors of different moral levels. A decision of lesser moral value would read thus: "I will protect my favorite regiment and send the other into the battle." A second decision, morally more correct, would be: "I must not allow myself to be influenced by my sympathies in this matter. My decision shall be made as if I liked both regiments equally well." A third decision is possible, also of lesser moral worth: "Just because

it is my favorite regiment I must give it this dangerous duty, so that no one will believe that I have been prejudiced in my choice." The second and third solutions are ethically higher than the first. Doubt can exist solely between the second and third solutions. Although the second solution to treat both regiments as if they were equal has the ethical advantage of absolute objectivity and justness, a critical observer might still object that the general was not quite capable of objective choice, for under the domination of his personal inclination the wish would be father of the thought. Yet our general, without a scrupulous résumé of the objective factors, decides on the third solution, that is, to send his favorite regiment into action. He does so against his own feelings, believing that this decision only frees him from any taint of reproach.

How shall we judge the decision, once it is made? Several possibilities present themselves. If you take the first decision, and protect your favorite regiment, you may do so without recourse to any moral scruples. You may convince yourself that the decision you have made is the best under any circumstances and thus drown any remaining scruples. Finally, you may regret your decision and be haunted by remorse.

If you make your decision objectively, according to the second plan, you may rest easy in the consciousness that you have done your full duty; but it may also happen that, having made the objective decision according to an unconscious tendency, you wonder whether you have really been objective in your choice. On the other hand, if you decide against your unconscious tendency you may later be seized with remorse

and regret that you were so stupid as to have lost the opportunity of bettering your fate. Similarly, three possibilities exist in the case of the third solution, whereby the favored regiment is sent to the front. You may rest quietly in the consciousness of a fulfilled obligation, you may regret having decided against your secret inclination, or, with a certain about-face of the moral standard, you may have pangs of remorse because you have done an injustice, having been actuated by an exaggerated ethical sense, by entirely excluding objective factors.

According to our own thesis of relativity, we must consider the whole matter—the onset of the conflict, the decision, and finally the subsequent emotional attitude—as a unity. With so many possible choices, how is a course chosen? Three groups of factors determine the choice:

1. The objective situation, with its previous history, and all the aspects of the actual state of affairs. These factors may be excluded because they lie outside of the realm of psychology.
2. The contemporary mental situation in which the decision is made.
3. The sum of constant characteristics and personality traits of the individual who is making the decision—in other words, the character of the individual.

The factor of the mood in 2 is related to the character in 3. For the attitude in which one approaches a situation is nothing more than the response of a given personality to a specific situation in its environment. To be sure, there are external factors—the climate, the weather, previous and contemporary experiences—as

well as internal conditions such as the contemporary physical state. Factors of experience, however, are to be considered together with the purely objective factors mentioned in 1; they are not truly psychological. They derive psychological interest only when the personality reaction to these experiences is investigated, and this again is a function of character.

We may now conclude: *The pattern of behavior from the onset of the conflict, through the decision, and including the subsequent emotional attitude toward the decision, is determined essentially, so far as psychological moments are concerned at all, by the character of the individual.* Not only the decision itself, but also the previous inner conflict, as well as the subsequent remorse or satisfaction, is part of the individual's behavior pattern and is predetermined by what we call the individual's character. The fact that a simple decision is not possible and that a conflict is present is also determined by the behavior pattern of the character. For character is nothing more than the individual expression of the purposive constellation of the personality. Nothing is gained by considering the two parties—that *seem* to be fighting in the arena where an individual is fighting with himself—as separate individuals. Such a procedure might fit our subjective experience, and the phenomenological description of the event might thereafter seem like a final fact; but we should have gained no understanding of what was going on in the soul.

We are far more justified in maintaining that very *conflictiveness of the experience as such* is part of the purposive constellation of the individual. In other

words, the manner in which a decision is prepared for, according to some moral alternatives, the manner of making the decision itself, and the quality of the subsequent emotional attitude after the decision has been made, are all expressions of the individual character. So far as individual psychology is concerned the real question is: What is the meaning and goal of this behavior reaction? You might be inclined *a priori* to assume that with the given character and given situation the decision would have to follow as a matter of course, more or less automatically, without conflict and without remorse. What is the meaning of these accessories and important concomitant circumstances of a decision?

This question will be answered in our future discussions. At this point we simply want to state that, according to the premises of individual psychology, and according to its method of approach, a real splitting of the personality can never be an actual fact, but must remain forever only a phenomenological occurrence; that not only the decision, but also the previous conflict, and the subsequent emotional tone coincident with the experience of an inner conflict must all be contained within the personal character. The central personality simply does not *will* a definite decision. It desires also the conflict of making a decision. If no decision is made, it is this indecisiveness which is the goal under the given circumstances. If our general cannot decide either for A or for B, but wishes to vacillate between A and B, that vacillation between A and B, and the evasion of all decision, must be his personal goal.

You can demonstrate a seeming conflict between a

“good” and a “bad” principle in every experience of conflict, even when this conflict is veiled. If you buy a pair of shoes and find it hard to make a decision, it will be a conflict between your desire to save money, and your desire for luxury. Your thrift will play the rôle of a “virtue,” and your desire for luxury that of “vice.” If you begin a battle with yourself in order to give up smoking, the obvious contestants are your desire to control yourself, and the useless desire for self-gratification. If you seem to vacillate between your love for two women, the representative of the “good” principle will be the obligation to fidelity, whereas the anarchy of passion will represent the “bad.” And even when there is a conflict between two duties, as for instance your duty to maintain contact with your own family, as contrasted with your obligation to spend evenings at the office, one category of duty will always be the “higher” one, whereas the other will always be contrasted as a “baser” one. What you are always dealing with is the maintenance of your moral self-esteem. Whether you make a decision or not your ethical ego has been expressed. *Magnis in rebus voluisse sat est.*

Nowhere else is the validity of the thesis of individual psychology—that the personality is a purposive unity—proved more conclusively than in the problem of psychic conflicts. And nowhere else does it encounter such profound resistance from common sense, and from academic psychology. At the same time there is hardly a single phenomenon in our psychic life in which an analysis of goal and means is more fruitful.

The emotional attitudes forming the individual

stages of the conflict, the experience of vacillation, of victory and of defeat, as well as of remorse, become meaningful only when they are incorporated into the conative constellation of the individual personality, when we can fit these elements into the mosaic of the personal behavior pattern. If we can prove the validity of the teleological point of view for the conflict (where it is most difficult), then it will prove valid in all the other phenomena of mental life. Obviously the next thing we must prove is that the purposiveness of the personality completely dominates every gesture, every glance, every word and every action, every thought and every mood. In this microcosm, in truth, no leaf falls to the ground without the will of God—that is, without the will of the autonomous central personality.

Chapter II

The Evolution of the Personality. The Feeling of Inadequacy. The Striving for Significance. The Social Feeling.

IN our first chapter we stated the law of the conative or purposive unity of the personality, which is the first premise of individual psychology, and discussed the formal technique of psychological investigation deriving from this premise. As soon as we attempt to develop this fundamental law, and the psychological method which follows its assumption, we must, obviously, take a genetic point of view. If our premise is correct the technique of individual psychology must succeed in giving us a complete understanding of the structure of the personality from its first beginning in the newborn infant, up to the time of its full development in adult life.

The newborn child is the clearest example of the biological purposive constellation. The child is an organism perfectly adapted to its functions, growth, and metabolism; it performs only three functions, but it performs them perfectly. The child's first breath is stimulated by the interruption of the placental circulation and the consequent oxygen deficiency and carbon dioxide excess in the blood of the newborn. After this

the chemistry of the blood directs the respiratory functions. Breathing need not be learned because previous generations have learned it, and made it a reflex with which every child is born. This is equally true of the sucking reflex. The mouth of the newborn child is an efficient sucking apparatus, and this functions from the first hour of his life. Any object that comes in contact with the infant's lips causes him to open his lips. The primitive snapping reflex is lost in later life, reappearing in certain brain diseases, when the more highly developed functions masking this infantile reflex have been severely deranged. When an object is put into the child's open mouth, rhythmic sucking movements are instantly begun. All other reactions of the infantile organism show a similar elementary purpose.

What we call the "soul" in an older child or in an adult does not seem to be present. In a narrow sense, we may well assume that psychic functions (what we call "soul" in the broader sense in the purposive unity of the individual) do not exist in the early stages of the child's development simply because they are not necessary. When a newborn child begins life he needs only his metabolic and respiratory reflexes, that is, the ability to perceive certain stimuli from the environment and from his own body, and to directly translate these stimuli into motor activity.

It is not true, however, that the onset of higher and more complicated nervous functions is primarily dependent upon a preliminary change in the situation. We might expect this to be the case if each child were the first experiment of nature, and if each newborn individual entered life without any biological tradition

and had to make his way alone. The law of biological purposiveness, that an external necessity creates the function and the function creates the organ, can be accepted so far as the history of the race and the development of primitive human ancestors into modern men are concerned.

It is a fundamental biological law that the development of the individual is an abbreviated recapitulation of the progress of the race; but this law does not entirely govern the development of the single individual. So far as he is concerned, the goal of his development is fixed in his constitution, and he advances toward this goal according to the individual mechanics of his evolution. Thus certain functions have been prepared and are almost completely developed before the child actually needs them. In our present civilization a child of one or two or even three years could live quite well without being able to talk, yet the average child has learned to speak by the time he is two or three years old. Other functions, such as the control of the anal and bladder muscles, the use of hands, crawling and walking, are similarly developed before they are actually needed.

The fact that functional capability precedes necessity in human beings justifies the assumption that these functions began earlier in our ancestors because the need for them was apparent earlier. The gulf between the beginning and the end of individual development is enlarged from generation to generation by the progress of culture. The consequence of this is that every child requires a relatively longer period to reach a contemporary standard of culture, and become cap-

able of approaching the problems of his life independently. If you compare the behavior pattern of a country child with that of a city child of the better classes, it is obvious that the country child reaches independence and acquires an autonomous life pattern sooner and more readily than a city child. A nine-year-old farmer boy partakes in the work of his adult environment so far as his powers allow, is regarded seriously as a worker, and is not far behind his elders in his intellectual level. At the same time the nine-year-old city boy of the culturally advanced classes is still a little child, he knows no work except school and play, and he is far behind the stage reached by the farmer's son—both as regards his relative advancement toward the standards he will eventually attain, and as regards his absolute advancement. In these two types of life the rhythm of development is quite different. In the case of the country boy there is a relatively quick ascent to a moderate plateau which does not develop very much higher. In the second case there is a very slow ascent in the beginning and then a rapid rise to a high level.

If independent life marks the beginning of adulthood it is evident that modern civilization effects a great extension of childhood. Intellectual development, however, adapts itself only hesitatingly to this change in the style of man's life. While it is true that the child of today learns to move about independently much later than his primitive ancestors, he acquires this independence all too early so far as the necessities of his life today are concerned. Since an average child is economically dependent upon his parents until he is at least fourteen years old, the evolution of the func-

tions necessary to independence might indeed be more leisurely. Almost everywhere in nature a parallelism exists between demand and supply, between the organism's capability to function, and the need to function. In the case of the child this parallelism is seemingly abrogated. A young bird leaves his nest and seeks his own food as soon as he can fly. Cats and dogs do not trouble themselves about their young after the first few weeks, yet the human child can walk, speak, and think long before he can be left alone for a moment. The fact that a child is still dependent on his parents for guidance, shelter, and food, long after he has learned important functions, is one of the most fundamental and important factors in the development of human character.

How does a child acquire his soul? Simple reflexes will explain the behavior of the infant. These reflexes continue to exist in grown-ups parallel to the mental functions, but they are distinctly separate from mental processes. An infant's mother is all too prone to assume the existence of mental phenomena in her child when there really can be no talk of such a thing. The screaming of a baby is not equivalent to the crying of a grown child. In the case of the grown child, crying is the expression of a conscious emotional state, whereas in the infant it is simply a reflex. Similarly the smiling which a child may have learned by the time he is five or six weeks old is in no way related to the smile of an adult. Even if an infant has learned to follow some object with his eyes and his head, whether a face or a light, we have no right to assume the occurrence of more than reflex phenomena in his brain.

On the other hand, it is highly probable that a higher function, that is, something mental, exists when a child *reaches* for an object that he has seen for the first time. For the fact that he identifies a visual impression with an intended touch impression by means of a grasping motion is the first indication of an *apperception* of an object as an object. Whether or not the experience of "object" emerges from the chaos of elementary sensory impressions before this, we have no way of knowing. The perception of objects begins with the identification of objects through one or more sensory organs.

This is a very important step, for the fundamental severance between the ego and environment begins at this point, and marks the first phase of ego discovery. The process of ego discovery proceeds step by step. Even after a child has learned to grasp for objects, he may grasp for his foot just as if his foot were an object of the outer world. Countless every-day experiences are necessary to complete this severance between ego and environment. Even in the second and third years of life, when the process of ego discovery should have proceeded very far, a child may speak of itself as of a third person, if it speaks of itself at all, which is not often the case. Great vistas of mental development separate the phrases "have dolly," "girlie have dolly," and "I want to have my doll." It is important to observe that the goal of these first mental reactions is almost exclusively toward the conquest of environmental objects. The expansion of the ego proceeds at the cost of the environment.

The process of ego discovery is not completed with

the emergence of the word "I" in a child's vocabulary. This "I" temporarily exists only as the subject of action, of wishing, of perception, of imagination, and of suffering. The fact that children of six or more years cannot localize pain, as any physician knows, shows how little the young child knows about his own person. It is not at all seldom that a child localizes the pain from an abscess in the ear in the stomach. A long series of experiences is necessary before the child develops an inclusive idea of his own body or—as Schilder calls it—his body scheme. Only when this has happened does his physical ego become the object of experience.

The close of this process of ego discovery, or individuation, occurs at the end of childhood—at the time of puberty. It is at this time that the inner life becomes the object of experience. When a human being first begins to "look into himself," a seeming split of the personality between an acting and wishing "I" and an observing "I" occurs. As self-observation and self-analysis complete the process of individuation, the experience of the individual's own ego becomes conscious experience, fundamentally different from every other experience.

The process of individuation in its widest sense, therefore, begins with object discovery in the first month of life and is completed with the experience of the ego as object, in puberty. Object discovery characterizes the beginning of the mental function, while the experience of the ego as object marks the close of childhood. The phases that lie between these two points, the experience of one's own body (construction of the body scheme), the experience of the You (there are

beings who are like me), can only be indicated in this book. They are the special field of child psychologists.

But we are interested in one aspect of childhood experience which is closely identified with the beginning of ego discovery. We have noted the inadequate parallelism between the child's capability and the problem he must solve, and we have described man's protracted childhood, which differentiates him from all other species of animals. We noted the fact that as a result of his highly developed domestication the human child continues to live in a condition of complete dependency and helplessness at a time when he has attained a psychic development beyond the highest peaks reached by any other animal. Very young animals, to be sure, are helpless. But their helplessness antedates the process of their ego discovery. As soon as the first step of individuation has been attained, most young animals are capable of approaching their life's problems independently and with adequately developed powers. Young animals never *experience* their helplessness and their dependency because they are not capable of experience while they are objectively helpless.

Not so with man! Suppose a child has learned how to distinguish between himself and his environment, and he has also learned how to conceive of objects as such. Sooner or later he will realize that the tendency to master a given object is not always followed by the desired success. The means available are inadequate to his end. The child experiences the fact that crying, fundamentally not a mental reflex, results in the satisfaction of his hunger. At other times his hunger is not satisfied as the result of crying. The child discovers

that the bodily sensations which give occasion for crying can occasionally be satisfied temporarily, but that the desired stimuli that inhibit unpleasure, or excite pleasure, cannot always be produced by crying. In other words, the means at the child's disposal do not always function to the desired end. Thus the child gathers a whole series of experiences in his first year of life that teach him the inefficacy of the instruments he possesses (experiences of negative means, Künkel). The growing tension between desire and ability produces in the child the realization of his own helplessness.

In that first phase of childhood when rapid growth is most evident the feeling of helplessness is an important psychic factor. During this period the bodily powers and potentialities of the child develop rapidly; his parents note the increase in weight from week to week and the increase in height from month to month, with evident satisfaction. Presently parents realize that the child can hold his head up, that he can recognize objects, and can hold objects in his hands with greater security. But the child does not understand his progress very much. On the contrary, the more his mental powers develop—the better he is able to understand his environment, to measure objects according to their worth and value, to distinguish between edible and inedible objects, and understand the difference between toys and household objects—the more often and more clearly does he experience a sense of his helplessness. His feeling of helplessness parallels his growing strength, for the feeling of helplessness is not dependent on the absolute power of the child. It is derived

from the relationship of these powers to the child's desires. A child's desires grow more rapidly than his powers, and therefore his feeling of helplessness also increases. The ability of the child to understand his experiences grows apace simultaneously, and the older he grows the more deeply does he understand his own helplessness.

The experience of the "you" is another phase in his development. Once the child has progressed to the point where he can distinguish not only between himself and his environment, and between various objects in the environment, but also between himself and other human beings, daily observation teaches him that the unfavorable ratio between desire and the means of attaining desire does not exist for his father, mother, older brothers and sisters, to the same degree to which it exists in him. His parents seem relatively omnipotent. As soon as he can compare himself with another, the feeling that he is weaker than someone else is superimposed on the previously existing feeling of helplessness. The expression of helplessness is the expression of an actual state of affairs, but the feeling of being weaker, viewed in an objective way, is an illusion, or at least an exaggeration. The child does not understand that grown-ups as well as children harbor desires which are unattainable with their available means. The child has no conception of the goals of his grown-up environment. He sees only his parents' relative omnipotence as compared with his own weakness, and measures their ability only in the light of his own desires and goals. Thus the child's conception of omnipotence is developed.

A third important factor in the experience of the child appears contemporaneously with the experience of the "you." The child learns that he is served and cared for by these other human beings who are like himself but seemingly omnipotent. He realizes his dependency on the grown-up world, and he realizes further that most of his desires can be attained solely through the intermediation of his parents' greater powers. And now crying, originally a simple reflex evoked by certain bodily tensions such as hunger and pain, becomes the expression of a psychic tension: "I want something!" Little by little crying loses its reflex character, and a purposive reformation occurs whereby an element of the biological pattern is incorporated into the personal behavior pattern. From now on the infant cries in order to get something, whereas formerly crying meant simply the reflex expression of an unpleasant bodily tension, a method of getting rid of a discomfort.

The fundamental component of the mental life of the child, which Adler has called the feeling of inferiority, is built up from the three groups of experience: the feeling of helplessness, the feeling of being weaker than adults, and the feeling of dependency upon adults.

How do we know this? You cannot ask a two-year-old whether he has a feeling of inferiority. Older children, indeed, would hardly understand the question. Even though you observed the activity of older children and deduced their feeling of inferiority, and even though you could find confirmation for your deduction in their own words, you would not be justified in bas-

ing so far-reaching a theory as the theory of inferiority upon your experiments.

You cannot discover the feeling of inferiority by introspection, it is solely the result of *interpretation*. We discussed our method of interpretation in the first chapter. We proceed from our fundamental thesis of the purposive unity of the individual and attempt to interpret the goal of a child's activity by utilizing his reactions to life. If we find that the child's purposive pattern reaches its goal in the feelings of superiority, and if this goal is indicated in every reaction and mental attitude, to say, "Anyone who wants to be superior must feel himself inferior," is the logical corollary of our experience. The striving for superiority is an attempt to remove the feeling of oppression, or inadequacy. It is its compensation. This is our first use of the concept of compensation—a conception which we borrow from biology; and we shall reserve further discussion of the laws of compensation for a later chapter.

We deduce the child's dissatisfaction with being inferior from the signs which manifest his desire to be superior. This wish to be "on top," this striving for significance, is an irrefutable psychic reality. The purposive constellation of the striving for significance has an imaginary goal of absolute validity and significance, a goal that no human being can ever actually attain. This pattern originates in an equally imaginary focus, the primitive feeling of inferiority about whose mental reality we know nothing and can know nothing.

An older child or a grown-up, to be sure, occasionally becomes conscious of a feeling of inferiority, but this is not the primitive feeling of inadequacy; it is not the starting-point but a way-station on the road

to the goal. The primitive and original feeling of inferiority may be compared to the focus of light rays reflected from a convex mirror, or to the image which lies behind the mirror. We *assume* its existence because we can best understand the conative pattern of the child, the purposiveness of his actions and reactions, when we have premised a fundamental feeling of inferiority antedating these reactions. We assume its existence because we can indicate its origin in the situation of the child in infancy. But we cannot *see* it.

The child, striving for significance, may proceed along various paths. One way is the way of veritable achievement, and this is derived by processes of easy transition from the blind evolutionary mechanics of primitive biological purposes. A child learns to walk because he is a human being and because upright posture and gait are essential human characteristics. But the individual child, taking his first step, is doubtless under the influence of his desire to be on top, striving for significance in the first phase of his individuation. The desire for significance in this instance is a servant of natural development; the biological purposive trend and the personal purposive constellation are identical, and the desire to be "on top" reenforces the natural process. When a child succeeds in walking, his success is accompanied by a feeling of pride and satisfaction; his failure similarly is accompanied by anger and shame. In this way the individual appropriates the goals of natural development to a personal end and effects the conative reconstitution of the biological trend into his personal behavior pattern. His ego-consciousness assumes an interest in achievement.

All the mental expressions of the individual that are

subordinate to the personal goal are related to this sense of ego-consciousness. Ego-consciousness is the direct result of the process of individuation, and to a certain extent it is the simplified pattern into which all the individual's actions and reactions are reduced. Ego-consciousness or the sense of self-esteem is the unit and standard by which the personal behavior pattern, in its never quiescent striving for a personal goal, measures both quality and quantity in life. Simplification of life's problems, and orientation in the world, are gained by the individual by means of a quantitative analysis of all phenomena in terms of his self-esteem. The important thing in any experience is not qualitative. The individual is interested in the plus and minus which fits into his personality pattern, in its course from an imaginary starting-point in the primitive feeling of inferiority to its unattainable focus in the striving for individual significance, in godlikeness. Every experience is either gain or loss, or a little of both. All of us make biased simplifications of the world in which we live. It seems necessary for the maintenance of our lives as individuals; and to a certain degree this simplification is desirable and useful, as we have shown in the previously cited example of the child's learning to walk.

What holds for learning to walk holds equally for learning to speak, for the attainment of manual dexterity, for studies, and for all other childhood activities that lie along the line of actual achievement. The confluence of the individual striving for significance with the natural tendency toward growth guarantees the greatest attainable maximum of objectivity in develop-

ment. Imitation, a fundamental psychological factor which we must not overlook, plays an essential part in this process. Imitation is probably one of the most primitive functions of the brain. A two-month-old infant will imitate a smiling parent. As soon as the brain becomes capable of complicated motor achievement, its newly won functional capabilities are translated into actuality with the aid of imitation. In the beginning, imitation is purely reflex in character: apperceptions of movement are translated into corresponding motor activity in the appropriate motor centers of the brain. We do not know how this happens. We do know, however, that it is a very primitive function, which is not only greatly inhibited but considerably disguised by the higher brain functions in the course of development. In certain brain diseases, tardily developed inhibition is lifted, and the primitive tendency to imitate reappears in its full strength. This happens in speech disturbances caused by cortical lesions. The phenomenon of echolalia, or compulsive imitative speech, occurs in such cases.

Yet, even this purely biological function of imitation becomes redirected into the personal behavior pattern. The reconstellation originates in the child's feeling of being weaker than his parents, and of his comparison of his puny "I" with a powerful "you." The child, feeling that he is smaller, more helpless, and more dependent than his adult environment, derives a strong stimulus to his imitative function to appropriate what he has seen others do, to the completion and perfection of his own apparatus. The childish striving for significance is thus concretized in the desire to walk,

speak, read and write, as a grown-up. Pedagogy, to a great degree, avails itself of this childish attitude.

Training is another physiologic factor which the child utilizes in his development. It has been known for a long time that brain functions can be made more or less automatic by constant repetition, and that after repetition they occur more quickly and easily. Movements, at first made consciously and with premeditation, are thus carried out slowly and painfully; later they become automatic, and finally occur almost as reflexes, without the intermediation of consciousness. Playing the piano is an excellent example. To learn to play the piano is to make various movements automatic. The single premise for success is the repetition of the activity to be learned. The stimulus for the repetition of identical movements, therefore, has a physiological prototype. You can observe it in children in the second half-year of life, when they are making their first attempt to speak. At this time a child will frequently repeat meaningless syllables for minutes at a time. The urge to repeat is one of those most primitive mechanisms, which are partially veiled and partially inhibited by the higher cortical centers in the course of development. Injury to certain brain centers causes this urge toward repetition to reappear, and in the case of organic speech disturbances, caused by cortical lesions, such repetition is a clinical finding. A single word or syllable is stubbornly maintained in such cases, and the sick individual answers every question with the same word and cannot, even if he realizes he is repeating nonsense, overcome this compulsion, which we call perseveration.

The personal purposive constellation, once it has assumed the dominant rôle, incorporates the mechanisms of training and repetition in much the same way that it incorporates the mimetic tendency. All the functions that lie in the direction of actual progress (and not only these as we shall have occasion to show later) are made a part of a systematic training, by the utilization of the primitive urge to repeat. The personal will to be significant, which is ceaselessly occupied in overcoming the head-start of the grown-ups, supplies the stimulus to development. Imitation and training are appropriate methods to this end.

The more zealously a child trains, the quicker is his progress and the more completely is his objective helplessness overcome. Every teacher knows that you cannot make children practice useful activities for a long time, except under specific conditions. A child may well wish to learn arithmetic, but he will find hours of practice with abstract figures very boring and as a result he will refuse to practice. This seeming contradiction is easily understood. A child works only when his goal is in sight. If the path to superiority is so devious that the goal is hidden, the will to superiority fails because a child has neither the foresight nor the confidence to believe that he will ever attain a too distant goal. If a child had the indestructible self-confidence to overcome every obstacle he would also have the power and patience to carry on systematic work. But self-confidence is a function of ego-consciousness, and, as we have explained before, this ego-consciousness is still overshadowed by the dominant feeling of inferiority during childhood. For this reason many

children lack the stimulus to systematic training and are "lazy" or impatient because they have not enough self-confidence.

Pedagogy overcomes this difficulty by setting up temporary goals along the way to the final goal. If you ask a child, "How much is five times nine?" he may calculate for a while, but if he does not get the answer immediately he will become impatient and refuse to answer at all. Put the question in another form. "I am giving you nine pennies. What do you want to buy with them?" "Marbles." "Very good, how much do they cost?" "They are five for a penny." "Are they that cheap? You must get a great many for all this money. How many would you get, fifty or sixty?" The child will make his calculations and give you the right answer. Why does this work? Because the child is not thinking, "Now I must learn how to do arithmetic"—but is thinking, "Now I can buy some marbles. How many can I get?" Marbles and not arithmetic are the goal. The method of learning by play (Montessori) approaches the child half-way by shifting the accent and allowing the child to make progress without actually knowing that he is doing it. The results gained in this easier way are permanent and help to build up a child's self-confidence.

This brings us to the significance of play. At the infant level, play is no more than bodily movement. It is the expression of a primitive rhythm, and is part of a purely biological pattern. The roots of the dance, of music, and of poetry lie in these primitive rhythmic functions of the organism. In the process of individuation the play function undergoes a change and be-

comes part of the personal behavior pattern. The pleasure of bodily movement remains secondary to the chief purpose of the play. A child plays "mother and child," rider, chauffeur, street-car conductor, and "cop and robber," because these games are fantastic fulfilments of the childish wish to be great and big. This wish remains essential, while the rhythm of bodily movement recedes farther and farther into the background.

Another secondary dividend of play is derived from the training of real functions, which the child must learn sooner or later. Motherhood, the sense of responsibility in important positions, the ability to organize, to command, as well as discipline and adaptation to communal activities, are all prepared for in play. All these functions, which lie along the way of actual progress, can be exercised only when the central desire of the child—to be big—comes into play. This is another indication that the striving for significance originates in the feeling of inadequacy.

We must admit that some children do not want to be big and grown-up, in which case the two paths toward significance, that of achievement and that of play, are antagonistic. This is the case of the "play boys" who lose no opportunity to evade the work of school in order to spend their time playing. These children are protecting themselves against growing up. They reject the method of veritable achievement, preferring to play because play seems an easier approach to significance. Such children are not interested in the value of independence, knowledge, and ability, but prefer the fictional satisfaction of their ego-consciousness in games. The fact that the method of real achieve-

ment seems too difficult for them—and this is the actual meaning of all childhood laziness—indicates an insecure sense of personal value. Children are always “lazy” in difficult schoolroom tasks. If some children feel that they will be made ridiculous they evade school entirely. There is less danger of appearing ridiculous in games and play. A child’s choice of method is an indication of his courage. To grow up is an end devoutly to be wished. Grown-ups have courage—but to grow up you need a certain initial capital of courage. All pedagogical problems can be reduced to this vicious circle.

Childhood dependency and childhood anxiety are another aspect of the same problem. Anxiety is the child’s way of expressing his wish not to be left alone. A boy who is braver and more daring than his comrades in a street fight will be paralyzed with fear when he is left alone in a dark room. It is not a real question of danger, but a choice of paths to significance. In the street fight, the probability of triumph by defeating your opponent is in sight. Bravery is the best method for victory. In the dark room, however, the question becomes: “Ought these grown-ups leave me alone here?” The idea of being alone awakens a childish feeling of inadequacy. The utter security of grown-up protection is a childhood paradise. And to forego this paradise signifies an insult to the ego-consciousness, which the child will not countenance without a struggle. The willingness of adults to serve the child solaces his constant feeling of helplessness. The necessarily related dependency of the child is part of the bargain. A feeling of security is something very worth while to a child who hasn’t the confidence to be strong.

The very dependency of the child makes slaves of his parents. It is their function never to leave him alone, to help him constantly, and to be at his service always. The seeming desire of a child to remain a baby, and his voluntarily assumed dependency on his parents is nothing but a trick to dominate them. Thus a primary defense mechanism becomes a weapon of offense against an adult environment, and when it is effective the triumph of the child is assured. It is the child's way to make strength of his weakness.

The child knows nothing of all this. When he is alone he senses only a vague insuperable anxiety. Tell such a child that he "makes" anxiety in order to chain his parents to him, and he will honestly deny it. The child has no such conscious thought of enlisting his parents, but we must draw our conclusions from his objective behavior, not from his thoughts. If the child's actions transform his dependency into a dependency of his parents, the significance of his behavior is clear, whether the child is conscious or unconscious of what he is doing. On the contrary, we know the child dares not become conscious of the purposiveness of his behavior. If a child knew what he were doing he would not do it. The feeling of anxiety is not derived from his relationship to his parents, but from his more or less well-defined imagination of danger. This feeling of danger is necessary for the production of anxiety. But appropriate situations are easily imagined when you want to produce anxiety. Anxiety is the best argument the child can find to compel his parents to serve him. The child elevates this anxiety to a supreme law, and everything else—logic, conscious and unconscious thinking, fantasy—becomes subordinate.

Just as you can deduce an aggressive trend against the environment from the attitude of the anxious child, you can recognize the secret fear in the behavior of aggressive children that drives them to aggression. The gnawing feeling of weakness and smallness compels the child to use more violent methods to gain significance; he must terrorize his environment to gain the impression of having strengthened his own self-esteem. Bad children immediately lose their courage when you entrust them with real tasks and useful accomplishments. It is apparent that their aggressive behavior is an indefatigable attempt at overcompensation for a feeling of inferiority. The child's unruliness drowns out his feeling of inadequacy, but it never blots it out completely. The behavior of unruly children is plainly an attempt to realize a secret heroic rôle, some personal ideal modeled according to stories or moving pictures. Such heroic rôles contain the would-be hero's concept of nobility, wealth, or power. Day-dreams of an ideal state clothe the child in all the attributes of completeness. The more pomp and ceremony in his day-dream ideal, the more the child is removed from objective reality. Nothing but the gesture and the pose of the hero remains in his daily life. The obligations of school and home are viewed with haughty deprecation. Unfortunately this tiny sphere of real obligation is his sole opportunity to learn real heroism. The child wants to know nothing of this. His attitude toward the calm success of every-day life is that of the fox and the sour grapes. Success in fantasy is cheaper and easier.

The most extreme individualism characterizes these instances of the development from the feeling of in-

feriority to its annihilation in a fictional ideal. Were there no other way to live, all the useful activity of the child would disappear in the anxiety and stubbornness of a perplexed adult striving for significance. You must not forget that we have shown only the one side of psychic development which develops from the experience of objective helplessness and produces the most highly developed type of individuation. We must complete the picture by returning to biological premises.

All that we know about the primitive history of man indicates that man always lived in a community of his fellows, never as an isolated individual. Our bodily organization points in the same direction, for an organism so poorly equipped for defense and offense as a cave-man could never have survived without society. From the standpoint of biological purposiveness, all cultural activities, such as speech and the use of tools and fire, are compensations for the cave-man's inadequate adaptation to life, compensations which never would have occurred had there been no need for them. Peoples that live in tropical regions, where Nature gives them the necessities of life in superfluous bounty, remain at the lowest levels of culture because they need not develop anything better. Civilization and culture are the products of communal life. It is obvious that speech and ideational thinking were developed so, for only a communal human being could and would have to evolve so complete a means of being understood.

Technical knowledge cannot be advanced except in communities, because the continuity of tradition is the essential premise of its perfection. The first man

who put two disks of wood on a rod, and so discovered the wheel and axle, advanced humanity a long way. But his invention would have died with him and his children if a growing circle of human beings living in his community had not become the bearers of his technical tradition. It is this technical tradition which made possible the evolution of the wire wheel for automobiles, and the powerful locomotive wheel, out of the disk of wood. Were it not for communal life every human being would have to begin from the beginning. The ax and use of fire would have to be invented over and over again, and man today would not have progressed far from the state of human beings who lived a hundred thousand years ago.

The social connectedness of mankind is inseparable from his biologic constitution; and this circumstance must be echoed in some way in his psychic life. The real necessity of communal life must produce a psychological need for society, and it must also develop a social feeling in each individual. It is preposterous to think that every human being would have to learn the idea of communal life from his environment and by his education. At the very least such social education would hardly be possible if congenital dispositions did not pave the way for it.

We may postulate a primitive social and communal feeling as a congenital instinct in all human beings. This social feeling is nothing more than a special part of the biological purposive pattern which we name the social conative pattern. Now let us sketch the history of the social feeling in the individual, and describe its relationship to the personal behavior pattern.

You may search in vain for any sign of a social feeling in the expressions of a small child. The infant and small child are completely egocentric. The relationship between the child and its environment is maintained entirely by the environment. It is only in the second phase of childhood that the signs of an actual social feeling begin to appear. Up to this time the child is entirely the object of its parents' care, and the child demands this care by right of tradition. His dependency so far as we can prove anything seems to originate entirely from egoistic motives. You might easily believe that those theologians who claim that human beings are born bad and must be forced to respect the rights of their fellow men, and to love them by moral education, are in the right.

Without discussing the value and importance of ethics in this connection, we must specify that we are interested only in the biological aspect of the question and oppose all the moral concepts of our problem. If there were no important biological reasons for postulating the congenital presence of the social feeling, nothing would hinder us from believing that it was exclusively the product of their education. But, if our postulate is right, we must explain why there is no evidence of the primitive social feeling in the child.

The explanation is much simpler than one might believe. Reciprocity is an essential of all communal life. We know of the examples of partnerships in nature, in which two neighboring organisms live for the mutual benefit of each other—as in the case of lichens, in which an alga and a moss live together; and we know further examples of parasitism, in which one organism

lives entirely at the expense of another and becomes, so to speak, a disease of the host. In the human organism there are examples of both forms of communal life. There are bacteria in the intestine of the human being that are essential to the process of digestion: this is a partnership between man and useful bacteria. There are, however, other bacteria living in the intestine which occasionally, or always, lead to severe diseases: these are the intestinal parasites. Our concept of communal life is usually one of partnership, not parasitism.

But the child grows up as a parasite in his mother's womb, and lives a parasitic existence for the first years of his life. Because of his organization, and because of the slowness of his development to independence, during his infancy he can only take and not contribute. Appropriately enough, the child's mental structure reflects his parasitism. The child's egocentric behavior must of necessity parallel his parasitic situation as a child, and inhibit the appearance of a social feeling appropriate to a partnership. The child can be social only in the degree that he acquires independence and overcomes objective inferiority.

The psychological behavior of the growing child reflects his biological condition. There is an inverse proportion between the feeling of inferiority and the social feeling. For the lower the opinion an individual has of himself, the more egocentric he is; the more self-confidence he has gained, the more he may interest himself for his fellow men and feel himself a member of their community. Only that individual who realizes he is in a position to contribute something to society is

prepared to contribute. The essence of communal life is based on this reciprocal give and take.

This explains the slow and hesitating development of the social feeling in children. We may assume that it is present in an embryonic form from the very beginning, for otherwise it could not develop; but in the beginning the primitive social feeling is masked by the childish egoism that is the psychological equivalent of a biologically conditioned parasitism.

What is the first social experience in the life of a child? This question must be answered with reservations, but in most cases it is the child's relationship to his mother that gives him the first occasion for social contact. The opportunity for the appearance of the new quality of social feeling most readily occurs in the very place where the child's parasitism and egoism find their strongest expression. At some time and in some way in the course of their relationship and in the experience of her love, the child realizes that his presence is significant to his mother and that his mere existence gives value and happiness to her life. This first reinforcement of his ego-consciousness and self-esteem gives him the courage to respond actively to his mother's love, and to make her love greater by doing something for her sake. With this gesture the reciprocity of their relationship is established, even though the child's psychological parasitism and egoism are temporarily in the ascendent. The establishment of this relation of child to mother effects the first breach in the boundless egoism of the child.

The social feeling is a part of the biological purposive pattern. It may, however, be reformed into the

personal pattern and be indistinguishable from it without losing its biological character. The essential biological component of the social feeling lies in its natural antagonism to individuation, which is never completely resolved in any human being. The process of individuation is not reversible, either in the history of mankind, or in the history of the individual. There is no retreat for it. It can only proceed farther. We would never preach the ideal of back-to-nature even if we knew that human beings who were not "individuals" at all, but were completely communal beings, such as the bees or the ants, existed at one time. On the other hand we know that the social life of today as of all time is an indispensable condition of human life, and therefore we have every reason to foster the development of the social feeling of the individual, as well as that of humanity. We need to develop this social feeling to its highest possible state. The two antagonistic lines of development, increasing individualism, and the cult of the personality on the one hand, and education to the communal life on the other hand, are part and parcel of a problem that can never be entirely solved. And this problem occurs not only in the life of every individual, but in the life of every race and people as well.

The gradual growth of the social feeling in the individual child is the result of correct development. It has a distinctly positive value. The goal of all education, whether conscious or unconscious, is the closest possible amalgamation of the personal purposive pattern with the biological purposive pattern, in the form of social feeling. This amalgamation is identical with

the progressive conquest of childish egocentricity. We must batter down the walls of the ego (they become all too high and narrow because of the feeling of inferiority) and encourage the child to leave the fortress of his egoism and to seek the closest possible contact to his fellow men. It is because the bulwarks of this fortress oppose not only one's fellow men, but the whole outside world, that the social feeling attains a significance far beyond that of mere human fellowship. The social feeling further signifies:

Objectivity: To be objective you must see all things, and the relation between things as they are, that is, quite apart from any immediate personal interests in them. Only an individual who is sure of himself can be objective, and then only in so far as he is not egocentric. Anxiety distorts reality, allows dangers to appear greatly exaggerated, and builds up delusions of danger where no dangers are. Anxiety narrows the field of vision and precludes your seeing things for their own sake. Egoism falsifies not only memory but also perception; and the world in which the egoist lives is entirely too subjective.

Logical Thought: Only that individual who is courageous is capable of understanding unpleasant things and able to make rational conclusions without errors in logic, to the very end. That individual who is afraid is incapable of understanding objective truth as such.

Willingness to Work: We do not mean absolute usefulness for society, because this usefulness cannot be indisputably determined. How many contemporaries of Beethoven would have called his labors useful? By willingness to work we mean the willingness to do as

much as you can. The approach to a task is in itself a giving-out-of-oneself, which only one who believes in himself, and in his ability to accomplish something, will attempt.

Willingness to Experience Nature and Art: You can make a breach in the fortress of the ego in many places. If you are prepared to contribute you will also be capable of forgetting yourself in nature and in art. In the last analysis there is a communal feeling for things.

Finally, the social feeling signifies:

Willingness to Assume Responsibility for All Actions, Thoughts, Ideas, and Sentiments: This sense of responsibility has nothing to do with any moral responsibility, determined by a mundane or divine judge. It is the recognition of the fact that everything you do or experience, with all its premises and all its consequences, is your own work, and not the work of Providence, Destiny, or God.

If you want to know how far the development of an actual social feeling in any individual has proceeded, you must use the principles of objective psychology. Do not inquire what the man thinks, or feels, or says. Watch what he does. Life's problems are the only practical tests of a man. These problems may be divided essentially into three groups. Each group has its special realm of contents, and allows of a variety of possible behavior reactions.

1. *The Problem of Work:* Work is a direct development from that childhood activity described as veritable achievement. Work and the problem of occupation are not solely the private concern of an individual, because

society is directly interested. Individual psychology issues no categorical imperative, nor does it postulate "moral" obligation to work. On the other hand, it is apparent that the failure to work inexorably reacts on the fate and happiness of the individual himself. It is because of this natural law of reciprocal reaction that really no one refuses to work without having at least a specious excuse. One of the surest indications of any individual behavior pattern is to be found in the observation of that individual as he works, whether slowly and systematically, or quickly and overenthusiastically, whether quietly and objectively, or under constant emotional excitement; you can tell a man's character by learning whether his work is hesitating, overconscientious, and pedantic, or disorderly and superficial.

2. *The Social Task*: The ability to make contacts with other human beings is the natural result of courage and a feeling of inner security. The ability to make contacts is originally learned in the family group; the difficulty lies in extending contacts to the larger sphere of human society. By human contacts we mean genuine living contacts—that warm interest in one's fellows, the capability of feeling friendship, sympathy, and even joy in another's success, together with the willingness to be helpful to others. The reciprocal nature of social contacts is apparent: anyone who makes no social contacts soon finds himself isolated. Society makes the same mistakes toward the isolated individual as he makes toward society. If you approach people coldly they will be hard and cold with you. Do not be deceived by talk about general love for mankind and

universal brotherhood. It is much easier to love the whole of the world than to cultivate the deep friendship of two or three close friends. The love of humanity imposes no obligations beyond the pretty words used to describe it.

The attitude of a man to his fellow men is an essential index to his character. The timid souls, whose inner insecurity is palpably a defense against closer contacts with their fellows, actually avoid real contacts. The hypersensitive and irritable individuals, who throw up barbed-wire entanglements about themselves in order to maintain a special position in life by compelling everyone to take cognizance of their sensitivity, have little love for their fellow man. The egoists understand human contacts only in terms of the infantile parasitism of child life. The false altruists parade their virtue in order to maintain a false moral superiority. Such examples might be multiplied indefinitely. It is the task of individual psychology to give us an understanding of the evolution of any individual behavior pattern by correlating individual development with the fundamental evolutionary formulas—the feeling of inferiority, and the striving for significance—which govern human life.

3. *The Sexual Problem*: Sexual love is a special aspect of social life, but for reasons which will appear later, it is much more difficult to solve. It is the fear of intimacy, and the fear of capitulation to the sexual partner, which hinders proper development in this realm. Only that person who believes implicitly in himself approaches the sexual relation without fear of losing prestige thereby. The fact is that sexual activity

is not one of the indispensable vital functions, for it is possible to live without it; for this reason the sexual sphere is, so to speak, the point of least resistance, and any abnormality in the evolution of the social feeling appears first, and most clearly, in the realm of sex. To a certain extent the sexual life is the most delicate indicator of the mental health of a human being. In our civilization the sexual problem is concretized in that of marriage. Under existing conditions marriage, in whatever legal form it may appear, is the best solution of the question. That part of the social feeling which we call the sense of responsibility is best tested in the attitude of the individual to the problem of marriage and in the problem of educating children.

Another problem, hardly less important in real life than the three fundamental ones we have stated, is the relation of the individual to nature and to art. This might seem to be of secondary importance, especially if you divide all life into useful and useless activities with the calm rationalism characteristic of individual psychology. There is no question whether the appreciation of nature and art are valuable, although it is impossible to call them utilitarian except under certain conditions and with due recourse to rationalism. We shall not discuss the significance of art and nature as transcendental modes of experience, because such a discussion does not belong in a book on psychology. One thing is certain: every human being is capable of appreciating art and nature only in the degree to which he can surrender his ego, that is, only in the degree to which he possesses the social feeling. You must be extraverted in order to experience values in nature and

art. If you can do this you can experience values in other human activities, even though you are not conscious of your powers, and withdraw anxiously from reality. Nothing, to be sure, is so misused as nature and art, the twin asylums for the deserters from the battle front of life. Yet anyone who understands human nature will be able to distinguish those courageous devotees of art and nature whose devotion signifies a higher intensity of life, from others who are finding in art and nature a line of least resistance. In their attitude to art and nature the second group abjure reality just as they do in their other attitudes.

We designate the social feeling in general terms as the "courage to be interested," and consider it a task the ego imposes upon itself. But we must not believe that the extreme goal of maximum social development contained in our definition is an exaggerated demand for "all-or-none" behavior. On the contrary, it is never a question of "all or none," but always one of "more or less." The amalgamation of the social and biological behavior pattern into the social feeling is an endless task, which we may only approach as a limit during our lives. On the other hand that germ of social feeling present in the conduct of every human being, no matter how egocentric, is always capable of further development. All pedagogic and therapeutic measures are based on this fact.

Individual psychology, using the conative point of view, attempts to arrange the manifold activities of human behavior in a scheme in which two (more or less antagonistic) tendencies are present. The first is a centripetal tendency, the personal purposive trend

toward a personal goal—personal defense, striving for personal significance, egocentricity, and individualism. The second is a centrifugal tendency, the biological purposive trend toward a biological goal—the social feeling, objectivity, and the willingness to be devoted to something. Is the relation of these two tendencies to one another comparable to the antagonism of the evil and good spirits of a religious system? Not at all! This antagonism occurs solely during a certain period of development. In the beginning there is no conflict, for, as we have attempted to show, the personal purposive pattern evolves from biological needs and from biological predispositions, such as the relatively inferior status of the child; and the personal purposive constellation becomes a special instant of the biological purposive pattern. Nor does the conflict occur at an imaginary point because a final “victory of the good principle” were impossible. No autocratic despotism of the social feeling is conceivable. The goal is a synthesis between individualism and social feeling, their unification at a higher level. In the transitional phase of development in which we all are living today, the social feeling and the striving for personal significance may, however, seem antithetical.

The antagonism of social feeling and individual significance will be apparent wherever the social feeling is absolutized in the laws of some ethical system. This gives rise to psychic conflicts between the tendencies at various moral levels, as we have shown in the first chapter. The ethical formulation of the theory of social feeling is nothing more than a complex and unavoidable compromise with individualism. The striving for

moral completeness, that is Godlikeness, is all too clearly an individualistic personality cult. Anyone who is striving to reach heaven, no matter in how sublimated a form, and even though it is simply a heaven of his own goodness, is still clutching his ego and holding on to his desire for significance. Where mental conflicts are experienced on this basis, there is really no conflict between good and bad, but a conflict between various methods of achieving significance, a "higher" one which is closer to the social feeling, and a "lower" one which is more egocentric. Not only the end result of the conflict, but also the preparation for conflict in trial, error, and vacillation, together with the after results of the conflict with its echoes of satisfaction, remorse, or guilt, are determined by the character and by the individual purposive constellation of the personality. As we have shown before, the conflict possesses a phenomenological, but no objective reality.

Chapter III

Organ Inferiority. Its Compensation and Over-compensation. Genius and Talent.

IN our second chapter we described the fundamentals of the structure of the personality according to the concepts of individual psychology. In the following chapters the abstractions of the theoretical outline will be amplified and vitalized by the description of special forms of character development.

The child's feeling of inferiority is the starting-point of the behavior pattern, and what we call character is the external expression of the individual purposive trend. We have shown how this feeling of inferiority originates necessarily in the situation of the child, and develops as a result of the incomplete parallelism between the problems the child must meet and his ability to solve them, and from the protracted childhood of human beings. What special conditions determine the quantity and quality of the feeling of inferiority in the individual? The conditions which determine the nature of the feeling of inadequacy are as complex as the life of the child, yet, for descriptive purposes, we may divide them into five large groups, which we shall subsequently discuss separately. These five groups are:

1. The bodily constitution of the child.
2. The social and economic situation of the child.
3. Sex.
4. The family constellation.
5. Education.

Let us begin with the significance of the child's physical constitution as a determinant of his future personality.

The first question is, "Are mental characteristics, such as temperament, character, or talent, inherited?" If we want to consider the personality as the result of experience and environment, and if we want to interpret all the expressions of that personality in terms of an understanding purposive behavior pattern, we come into immediate conflict with the existing theories of heredity and predisposition. A compromise between the two points of view seems impossible. If there were a highly developed science of brain topography, competent to predict the character and talent of any individual from the anatomical findings of the brain (which is far from being the case), such a compromise could be considered. In any other case it would be superfluous for individual psychology to explain character and talent if its researches were stopped at this or that point by proof of the existence of congenital bases (*anlagen*) for character traits.

Could we not be satisfied to say that a human being is the product of *both* hereditary predisposition (*anlage*) and individual experience (and no one will deny that this is so), and content ourselves with setting individual psychology the task of discovering the limits of the quantitative and qualitative influence of the in-

dividual experience? For this purpose let individual psychology assume the fiction of the non-existence of hereditary predisposition as a working hypothesis. Let us further assume that the theses of individual psychology are valid as long as they can be maintained logically. Beyond this let the investigators in hereditary predispositions make their own researches.

Individual psychology has extended its researches to their limit, and as a result nothing is left for the investigator of hereditary predispositions to find. No one who grants the purposive unity of the personality can go just so far and then stop to exclude some special part of the total reactions of the psychopathic organism from his point of view. But certain hereditary factors directly related to the physique of the individual can be demonstrated by the geneticists beyond the shadow of a doubt, and we must explain this seeming contradiction before we can continue with our discussion.

The findings of the geneticists can be incorporated in the scheme of individual psychology. The hereditary organ functions and reflex mechanisms are, as we have already shown, the elements of the biological purposive pattern and as such are capable of reconstellation into the personal purposive behavior trend. The personality results from this reconstellated material in so far as the elements are revaluated in the process of personal individuation in being incorporated into the personal behavior pattern. It is apparent from the beginning that the specific nature of this hereditary material is not an indifferent matter in the process of conative reconstellation. Imagine an individual who is more "lively" than the average as the result of the

inheritance of specific reflex mechanisms. His personal purposive trend will be dealing with much more sensitive material than that of the average human being when it comes to emotional experiences. This man's mental reactions will be distinguished by their accentuated emotional excitability, and this character trait in turn is the result of his hereditary predisposition. This is no contradiction of individual psychology, however, for the thesis of individual psychology is unaltered by the fact that the hereditary predisposition is a factor in the process of conative reconstitution toward the personal goal.

It is not difficult to demonstrate the modification of the personal purposive pattern by physical elements, many of which are inherited predispositions. Individual psychology has been the first to discover the influence of these physical factors on the personality. The physical constitution of an individual is a part of his experience, which he must incorporate into his style of life. In his striving for significance every element of his bodily constitution assumes the value either of an asset or of a liability which must be compensated for. Every constitutional abnormality, once it becomes significant in his conduct, becomes the focus of his individual goal in life.

Alfred Adler, as early as 1907, demonstrated the influence of bodily abnormalities on the development of mental mechanisms in his "Study of Organ Inferiority," a monograph completely in the realm of biology and constitutional physiology, which later became the foundation of individual psychology. Although much of what Adler stated in his theory of organ inferiority

more than twenty years ago has been superseded by the new discoveries in constitutional physiology, we must discuss his theory in more detail for other than purely historical reasons. The fundamental idea of the theory of organ inferiority is that in certain individuals specific organs and organ systems are points of lesser resistance and are consequently more subject to pathogenic influences. This organ inferiority is determined in most cases by heredity and often affects several generations of a single family. Not only does the disposition to certain diseases exist, but when an individual is affected various general disease processes of the inferior organs or organ systems bear the brunt of the disease.

There are families who have a hereditary weakness of the urogenital apparatus, including the kidneys, ureters, bladder and urethra, all of which may be considered as a functional unity. The grandfather of a given patient died of tuberculosis of the kidney, and his father suffered with bladder calculi for many years; a brother of the patient was operated upon for a cancer of the kidney, while the patient himself has been a chronic bed-wetter since childhood. There is no common cause for all these diseases, but it is no fortuitous circumstance that all of them are located in the urogenital system. In this family, the urogenital system is the point of least resistance, and if a member is attacked by tuberculosis, there is a probability that the tubercle bacilli will find their most favorable culture medium in his urogenital system.

An individual may experience the same fate as a family: a young woman who suffered from diseases of

the respiratory tract such as laryngitis, pneumonia, and pleurisy as a child, suffered a tuberculous infection of the apices of both lungs at the age of twenty. After several years of treatment the tuberculosis was pronounced cured. Twenty-five years later, when the elasticity of her tissues was lessened, a temporary bronchitis gave rise to chronic dilatation of the bronchi, and severe asthma attacks.

Not only the urogenital and respiratory systems but also the digestive tract (stomach, intestine, esophagus, oral cavity, and the related glandular systems, liver, gall-bladder, and gastric glands); the vascular system (heart, arteries, and veins); the sexual system, which is closely related to the urinary system; the nervous system (brain, spinal cord, peripheral nerves, and vegetative nervous system, which is closely related to the vascular system); the locomotive apparatus (muscles, bones, ligaments, and joints); the endocrine system, which is bound up with all the other systems (the thyroid to the respiratory, the pituitary to the nervous, the pancreas to the digestive, and all the endocrine glands together to the vegetative nervous system); and the sense organs, such as the eye and ear—all may be bearers of organ inferiority. Organ inferiorities in any organ system may be combined in the most varied manner with one another in the case of any specific individual.

A second form of organ inferiority in addition to that related to specific organ systems is caused by faulty embryological development. The human body, like the bodies of all vertebrates, is made up of a series of segments, all of which are fundamentally equiva-

lent. In a worm these segments repeat themselves from head to tail. In the course of development various organs begin to differentiate themselves in the single segments. The first segment produces the skull and its contents, together with the sense organs, which are closely related to it. Following this come neck and chest segments whose segmental nature is easily recognized in the spinal column. The upper extremities grow from the lower neck segments, and the lower extremities, the urogenital organs, and the lower end of the digestive tract develop from the lower bodily segment. Faulty development may affect one or more segments and produce a more or less hereditary organ inferiority in single or related segments. We call this segmental inferiority. Where there is a segmental inferiority several segments, although they have no functional relationship, bear the signs of organ inferiority. We sometimes find patients suffering from pneumonia whose chests and backs are covered with birthmarks. This occurs so frequently that one can often conclude from the presence of such birthmarks on the outer skin that diseases of the respiratory system either exist or have been cured. Similarly we may find a spina bifida, web toes, and disturbances of urination or a history of bed-wetting, in one and the same individual. All these symptoms seemingly have nothing to do with one another, yet they are the result of a congenital defect in the lower body segments.

A relative inferiority of an entire half of the body is a third form of organ inferiority which may assume practical importance. The phenomena of left-handedness, which will be discussed at greater length in sub-

sequent chapters because of their psychologic and pedagogic importance, belong to this type. In the case of left-handedness the relationship is the more complicated because the right half of the brain controls the left half of the body, and vice versa. We cannot decide, positively, whether there is an inferiority of the right half of the body in the case of left-handedness, or whether the inferiority affects the left half of the brain. The latter is probably the case.

Organ inferiorities represent inadequacies of the physical structure which the psychophysical unit organism utilizes for further elaboration. Is the significance to the individual of organ inferiority exhausted when we indicate that the organism's points of least resistance to disease are conditioned by these inferiorities? Or does the organism attempt to overcome these difficulties in its striving for biologic validity?

The latter is true. In nature the law of compensation has been recognized for many years. This law of compensation governs the lives of human beings, too, and is of tremendous significance in the case of organ inferiority. If a diseased kidney is removed from a man an enlargement of his other kidney occurs automatically; in a very short time the functional capacity of the remaining kidney is doubled, so that the defect caused by the removal of one kidney is quickly compensated. In a heart, defective because of valvular insufficiency, the heart muscles develop to such an extent that the heart is capable of doing as much work as the normal heart, despite the valvular defect. The so-called hypertrophied heart of heart diseases cannot be considered a sickness, but the compensation of a

sickness. Without this compensation the patient could not live at all.

In many cases the compensation results from training made imperative by the defect, as in the case of a man who develops huge muscles in his left arm after the right arm has been amputated. In the case of the kidney and the heart no conscious practice is needed to effect compensation of the defective organ, for the organism itself automatically replaces the damaged function. The phenomena of compensation are no more than the indications of that immanent design of the organism which is one of the most important characteristics of all living things.

The process of compensation often exceeds its objective and becomes overcompensation. The scar formed after an injury to the skin is an overcompensation because this scar is thicker and more resistant than the original skin. Sometimes just such overcompensation may result in defective function, to be sure. The scar is thicker than the normal skin, but its elasticity is less, and it is incapable of withstanding certain other injuries. In some heart diseases the hypertrophied organ is twice the normal size, but such tremendously hypertrophied hearts are incapable of fulfilling their tasks. In other words, overcompensation is often less valuable than mere compensation; but this is not strange when we remember that only a defect so severe that compensation by normal processes was excluded would require *overcompensation*.

But in another form of the overcompensation of organic inferiority the process is actually so successful that superiority and not inferiority of the organ re-

sults. This happens frequently when the overcompensation does not occur in the organ itself, but in the form of what Adler has called a mental superstructure. Every organ system is controlled by a certain segment of the nervous system and in any injury to an organ, not only the organ but also the appropriate segment of the nervous system reacts to the damage and takes part in the process of reparation. Finally the human being as a unit must take a mental stand toward the defect. The inferior organ thus becomes the center of attention, and the individual behavior pattern adjusts itself in such a way that the existence of a relatively weak point is given ample consideration.

The individual may react to the inferiority in a variety of ways. Impressed with it, he may orient his life in such a way that the inferior organ will not be exposed to danger and all his activities will be directed toward the defense of his weak point. Or he may be so stimulated and irritated by the consciousness of his inferiority that he focuses his entire psychic energy on the process of compensation; and in such cases an overcompensation in the mental superstructure is likely to result. His choice is determined by other personality factors, but chiefly by his courage and self-confidence. Significant achievement frequently is the product of such overcompensation.

Interesting light is thrown on the lives of a great many artists in this way. The paradoxical fact that such great musicians as Beethoven and Smetana became deaf at a comparatively early age is not to be regarded as a mere coincidence. These are cases of overcompensation. Otosclerosis, the basis of Beetho-

ven's deafness, is a disease of the ears that develops on a constitutional basis and becomes evident very early in life. By referring to his biography you will discover that the greater part of Beethoven's important works were composed when he was already hard of hearing. His conscious hearing difficulties were doubtless preceded by years in which the presentiment of future deafness was indicated by premonitory but scarcely perceptible signs. It is highly probable that an otosclerotic ear does not function normally from infancy, although no actual hearing difficulty can be detected. We may be certain that Beethoven focused his interest on auditory experiences from his earliest days, and that he began a process of intense training culminating in his remarkable success as a musician.

We are purposely not discussing the problem of genius and the predestination to great accomplishments at this point. Yet the number of musicians who are hard of hearing and the number of painters who have defects of vision are far greater than we could expect to find without an underlying law of overcompensation of physical defects by mental superstructure. We do not say that artistic achievement can be accomplished *only* by the compensation of a specific defect, just as we do not maintain that an organ defect in itself disposes to such achievement. Success in the field of art is just one of the possible paths of development, which we emphasize because of its psychological and educational significance.

A chapter on left-handedness is in place here. Books have been written in explanation of the physiological right-handedness of man, but the question has never

been solved. One thing is certain, however, and that is that left-handers are in a great minority, even if not in such a minority as one would believe at first glance. A great many seemingly right-handed people are really left-handers who have so completely compensated for their left-handedness that you can recognize it only on careful and thorough examination. Overcompensation for this peculiarity is common. There is no absolutely certain sign of latent left-handedness, but there are a number of tests whose results, taken in their entirety, will decide whether a given individual is really right-handed, or whether a latent left-handedness is present. One of the best-known tests is to observe how you clasp your fingers. If the left thumb lies on top there is always a suspicion of basic left-handedness, but the test is not conclusive. The right-handed individual applauds with his right hand on his left, the left-hander applauds with the left hand on his right. All single tests of latent left-handedness must be taken with reservations in conjunction with other signs, whose detailed description would lead us too far afield here.

What are the signs of a successfully compensated left-handedness? A very beautiful hand-writing is frequently an indication of original left-handedness. The tremendous training of the right hand which left-handers are forced to undergo in order to compensate for their defect leads them to write better than the normal right-handers. In the same way converted left-handers are very dexterous. Although the left-hander usually is considered clumsy (*gauche*) in some cases a high degree of training leads to unexpectedly good results. The strongly developed sense of symmetry

often to be found in converted left-handers is evidence of mental compensation (Alice Friedmann).

In summing up the significance of organ inferiority in the mental life, we find three possibilities:

1. The inferior organ represents a defect in the material available to the personality for the construction of its pattern; at the same time this defective element is the point of least resistance where any injuries to the total organism may readily appear. In functional nervous diseases, for instance, physical symptoms affect the inferior organ almost without exception. Freud, who noted this phenomenon from time to time, called it the "*somatisches Entgegenkommen*" or the somatic rejoinder.*

2. The organ inferiority becomes a point of crystallization for the mental superstructure of compensation and overcompensation. At that early age when everything can be achieved by training, when a plus can be made out of a minus, the inferior organ becomes the focus of attention and training. It usually does not, however, cease to be the weakest point of the organism in this process, so that varying mixtures of overcompensation and failure which become "characteristics" for the individual are found.

3. The organ inferiority may deepen the feeling of inferiority that every child experiences; and in consequence intensify the striving for significance toward an unattainable goal. In the course of this process the per-

* *Translator's Note*: The term "somatic resonance" seems preferable to the translator. No more beautiful example of the unity of the psychophysical organism could be found than this phenomenon in which the psyche announces the theme and the soma echoes with a physical obbligato.

sonality is changed, and usually exhibits the traits of a "nervous" character.

The structure of any specific personality results from the interaction of these three forms of organ inferiority with one another, and with other character determinants to be discussed in a later chapter. Moreover, this scheme incorporates all our knowledge of the significance of hereditary and congenital dispositions in the development of character and personality. All genetic data gathered from other sources, and prepared from other points of view, are embraced by these three categories.

At this point we may discuss the new data on the relationship between physique and temperament based on Kretschmer's observation of the insane.

We purposely say "physique and temperament," and not "physique and character," as Kretschmer himself does, because we want to distinguish temperament, which is more or less predestined, and is closely related to the physique, from character, which develops from the interaction of predisposition and environment. We formulate the problem in this way in order to meet the investigators of other schools half-way, although this formulation is not entirely in accord with the principles of individual psychology.

What is the relation between physique and temperament? Kretschmer distinguishes two essential types. On the one hand there are individuals with a pyknic (syntonic) physique and a cyclothymic temperament, and on the other hand individuals with the asthenic (leptosomatic), athletic, or dysplastic external appearance and a schizothymic temperament. The character-

istics of the pyknic appearance are small to medium stature, large chest and abdominal circumference, wide hips, tendency toward adiposity, round or five-cornered face, baldness, and slender extremities. The cyclothymic temperament which belongs to the pyknic aspect may be characterized by depth of emotion, grading to sentimentality, joviality, a tendency to easy change of mood, a sense of humor, the social sense, ability, industry and the talent for organization. The asthenic characteristics are medium to tall stature, long narrow chest, long slender extremities, narrow shoulders and hips, a tendency to leanness, a long egg-shaped face, and sharp profile. The athletic type is marked by broad shoulders, small hips, large coarse extremities, coarse bony structure of the face, predominance of musculature, together with very slight fat. The small group of individuals with the dysplastic characteristics is not uniform as it is composed of various types based on various anomalies of structure.

The mental characteristics of the schizothymic temperament which accompanies these physical types are introversion, shut-in-ness alternating with irritability, unsociability, great mental productivity without the capability of systematic work or organization, fanaticism and moral puritanism.

Kretschmer, to be sure, never expected to find pure cases of these types at all times. Mixtures and variations of these types are far more common than the pure types, because these types are based upon inherited factors, and variations and mixtures affect not only the physical markings but also the mental picture. Mixtures of physical and mental types may be found. For

instance, a pyknic physique associated with a schizothymic temperament is not uncommon; for explanation one need only assume that the former originated on the father's and the latter on the mother's side—an assumption which can often be substantiated in fact. Nevertheless it may be proved statistically that the correlation between bodily type and mental attitude in Kretschmer's sense exists. If you set up Kretschmer's theory as a guiding principle you can maintain it against objections.

Although the validity of Kretschmer's statement has not been entirely accepted in scientific literature, many experiments indicate that a relationship between the pyknic physique and the cyclothymic temperament exists. Further research is required to prove whether the isolation of this single group from the total available material has not falsified the statistics for other types, and caused a specious relationship between schizothymia and other bodily types to appear. It is our task to bring the facts of Kretschmer's researches on the relationship of physique and temperament, into alignment with individual psychology.

This is not at all difficult. So far as emotion and affect are concerned the traditional and artificial separation of body and soul does not exist. We have shown that emotional responses are originally nothing more than reflex phenomena of the vegetative nervous system and the closely related vasomotor system, which are incorporated into the personal behavior pattern by the process of conative reconstitution from the biological pattern during the process of ego-discovery. We have, moreover, shown how these primitive reflexes are

given a mental content and enlisted in the service of the personal goal. The quantity and quality of these reflex mechanisms is naturally dependent upon a physical basis. The irritability of the vegetative nervous system varies in different individuals, as we can demonstrate experimentally. Our methods of experiment, however, are so inadequate today that an enormous number of the possibilities of variation in quantity and quality cannot be proved. What we do know today is that gross variations from the norm of the vegetative irritability are associated with concomitant changes in the emotional tone of the individual. These variations from the norm are equivalent to organ inferiorities, as we have pointed out before.

The previously enumerated channels of potential compensation for organ inferiority also govern this specific inferiority. The hereditary variation of the vegetative apparatus is drafted into the service of the personality. The individual who is born with an over-excitabile vegetative nervous system experiences a more intensive emotional life than his normal neighbor. This more intensive emotional experience further influences his attitude toward the world in which he lives, and affects his goal in life to a large extent. Such an individual may be afraid of his own emotionalism; he will then live so that he will be spared all such experience. On the other hand, his intensive emotionality may lead him in the direction of training toward compensation and overcompensation. There is a third possibility—that the specific type of vegetative reflex mechanism will intensify an existing feeling of inferiority and so give rise to those exaggerated defense mechanisms and

that abnormal striving for security which mark the "nervous" character.

What we call temperament is nothing more than the specific emotional reaction pattern, and this reaction pattern is essentially a physical one based upon changes in the vegetative nervous system. Yet we cannot be satisfied with purely quantitative differences. Temperament is more than a greater or lesser irritability of the vagus nerve or of the sympathetic nervous system. Nevertheless our present technique of investigation allows of no more delicate results. Sooner or later we will understand the vegetative emotional reaction pattern of a cyclothymic and consequently understand why this reaction pattern accompanies the pyknic physique. Then and then only will the relationship between physique and temperament become clear.

But temperament is by no means character. Temperament is the raw material which is given us at birth. Before it becomes character it must experience a purposive reconstitution and become aligned in our personal purposive pattern. The elaborated raw material fuses with the pattern of the personality, colors it and gives it shape, and finally becomes identical with the personality.

Other specific organ dispositions—they need not actually be inferiorities in the true sense of the word—may be the starting-point of some specific type of character development. A science of types could be constructed on our knowledge of organic dispositions. We must not forget, however, that the physical factor is but one of many that enter into the structure of the personality. Special emphasis on the physical apparatus

of locomotion frequently produces what we call the "motor" type. Individuals of this type have a tremendous interest in movement. This interest has been an essential element of their life from early childhood as a result of some organic need. Armed with this interest, these individuals will solve some problems more easily, but they will have greater difficulties in other situations.

Such facts are significant in the development of the character. We all know children who cannot sit still. Of necessity conflicts arise between teacher and child in any school where the old-fashioned restrictions are enforced, and the conflict is conditioned by the child's physical peculiarity. Later in their development the positive or negative emphasis on motor activities will determine their choice of occupation. The automobile, the locomotive, the airplane, and other agencies of motion and speed, whether with or without the participation of muscle, either become the object of their desire or become strictly taboo. No matter which form is chosen, these motor activities assume exaggerated emotional values and are thus removed from the realm of the purely objective. Motor characters may become passionate sportsmen or dancers, or they may consider sports and dancing inferior and despicable; these latter may spend most of life at a writing table, until some day they give way to some excess. This motor upheaval which breaks through their ascetic life is frequently followed by remorse and self-reproach. The fundamental motor type is betrayed by its unobjective attitude toward motor activities. The law of "all or none" characteristic of the neurotic attitude toward life governs the choice of the extremes of

motor activity. The *specific* quality of any individual character development is conditioned, however, by other determinants of character formation, which will be treated in subsequent chapters.

The visual personality type, called the eidetic type in modern psychological literature, follows the same laws that govern the motor personality type. The eidetic predisposition (first described by Jaentsch) is characterized by a certain readiness to form visual images. It is much more frequent in children than in grown-ups. An eidetic individual can look at a picture and recall it in his imagination in detail with his eyes closed. In the eidetic type, the gulf between actual perception and imagination is far less marked than in the average man. Jaentsch showed that the eidetic predisposition is nearly always accompanied by other physical signs. Of these one only interests us here: the almost constant failure of the development of the finer skin capillaries, which seem to remain at an embryonic level. This failure of development also is found in the blood vessels of the retina, for the retina is developed from the same embryonic layer as the outer skin. The abnormal condition of the retina is an excellent basis for assuming that an organ inferiority of the eye exists. This anatomical abnormality of the eye is present from birth, and the eidetic's eye functions differently from the normal eye, although the individual may never be conscious of the difference. It is not strange, therefore, that individuals with this defect develop that type of compensation and overcompensation known as eidetic behavior. Eidetic individuals emphasize their visual activity above all; their visual

experiences become objects of intensive training, so that the remarkable hallucinatory powers of the eidetic individual result.

Inferiority of the visual apparatus is of signal importance in the development of the so-called "talents." Not only do many painters have weak eyes, but many writers suffer from severe shortsightedness and other defects of vision. The description of visual phenomena plays an exceedingly great rôle in the writings of such individuals. They paint in words in order to express their intense imagination, and their creative power is directed toward the vivid exposition of their visual sensation.

Visual defects of one eye, resulting in disturbances of three-dimensional vision are of extreme interest. The ability of the eyes to fuse the visual images of both retinae into one picture gives us three-dimensional vision. It is this principle which is used in the common stereoscope. In the stereoscope two pictures, simultaneously photographed by two cameras, separated by the normal distance between the eyes, so that each eye sees its appropriate picture, cause the flatness of the photograph to vanish and result in a three-dimensional picture. This happens in ordinary vision, for the two images on the two retinae have the same relation as the two parts of a stereoscopic picture. If you have a defect in one eye, so that the image in that eye is blurred, you accustom yourself to exclude the blurred image, when using both eyes, and, therefore, you actually see with only one eye; such vision is almost entirely two-dimensional because vision with one eye is very inadequate.

When a child suffers from such two-dimensional vision, his character is affected. All finer coordinations are controlled by the eyes, and you have but to keep one eye closed to test the importance of stereoscopic vision. Children without such vision encounter especial difficulties in learning manual activities or processes. These children have two antagonistic possibilities for development. One child never overcomes his manual clumsiness, because he avoids all training in activities that lead to constant defeat; another child begins training to overcompensate for his defect in the very sphere in which he finds himself most incompetent. It is more than likely that he will become very clever with his hands. Unilateral visual defects, therefore, produce the same consequences as left-handedness.

Other possibilities present themselves in individual cases. One of our patients was a man who suffered from a unilateral visual defect. He found three-dimensional vision difficult but compensated by interesting himself from youth on in every three-dimensional aspect in the world in which he lives. Among his most cherished toys was a spindle-shaped piece of wood that he whittled himself. He became a world-renowned physicist and invented an engineering device that has made his name famous. His invention is contained in enormous cylindrical or spindle-shaped iron containers, the consummation, and the realization, perhaps, of a childhood fantasy, whose traces may be found in the whittled spindle of his boyhood. Three-dimensional relations always played a great rôle in his physical and technical ideas, and in contrast to other technical experts, in construction of new instruments he always

imagined his inventions in three dimensions. This man's overcompensation is a contribution to the welfare of the world.

More or less successful attempts at compensation and overcompensation for a feeling of inferiority conditioned by organic weakness are to be found not only in the sphere of technical and artistic achievement but also in the realm of character. Endless possibilities exist. You must remember this important thesis: the significance of an organ inferiority is not dependent upon the actual defect, as judged by a physician, but upon its psychological importance in the eyes of the individual himself. A very serious disease need not obtrude itself subjectively, nor hinder anyone's activities to any great extent, even though it lasts many years. Such a disease will be without especial significance for the development of the personality. But a defect which is unpleasant or irritating to its bearer, even though of no medical significance, may be responsible for intense attempts at compensation.

Among these minor defects are defects of structure, scars, the sequelæ of disease, ugliness, especially abnormal smallness or largeness, or fatness or leanness. People sometimes begin to act the way they look, because some traditional or instinctive physiognomic features become determinants of their personality-ideals. Many children with adenoids have difficulty in breathing, and their constantly open mouths give them unintelligent (adenoid) faces. People consider them stupid, and when you think a child stupid, and treat him as if he were stupid, he usually becomes stupid in the end. If the school physician prescribes an adenoidectomy,

and the child can breathe through his nose and keep his mouth closed after the operation, he will be completely changed. He will lose his resigned air and his inattentiveness in school and quickly compensate for his losses during the period that he was ill. In a short time he will be a normally developed, intelligent child.

Everyone knows the tremendous psychological significance of being fat. Although Kretschmer was the first to describe the pyknic type scientifically, laymen and poets have instinctively understood it for a long time. Shakespeare, for instance, lets Julius Cæsar say:

“Let me have men about me that are fat;
Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep o’ nights.”

You expect a fat man to be good-natured, jolly and humorous. There is no doubt that on the basis of a congenital temperament the personality of the fat man develops as you might expect. The fat man’s traditional method of acquiring the sympathy of his environment is the quickest and easiest way to make an asset of his physical constitution. It is not surprising that a change in bodily aspect is accompanied by an appropriate change in mental attitude. The loss of fifteen or twenty pounds can affect the mental state of any individual profoundly.

The psychology of the ugly person has been treated in literature so often that we must say something more about it. Because beauty is so much more important to a woman than to a man nowadays, ugliness plays a considerably different rôle in their lives. The significance of ugliness may become apparent in the child’s nursery. An ugly girl whose sister is beautiful lives

under constant pressure. If, as is often the case, the difference is accentuated by some tactless remark, the ugly sister may become hopelessly timid, hypersensitive, incapable, and useless for the realities of life. In other cases a false compensation will take place, and the ugly sister will utilize meanness and malice to revenge herself upon the beautiful sister. The more her mental attitude makes itself felt in her exterior, the more she will take up a bitter war against the whole world. The soured spinster and the gossipy old maid are types that develop from this situation. On the other hand the sociological and economic characteristics of our time give the ugly girl a chance for real compensation. She can fortunately compensate by spiritual or intellectual superiority for a lack of physical charm. In favorable cases the courageous compensation for ugliness extends beyond the merely intellectual, and is evidenced and expressed in a special charity and sympathy for human beings. An ugly girl may thus earn more love and honor than a woman whose sole asset is her beauty.

There is no doubt that beauty counts as an especial asset nowadays. Yet, if you examine the development of beautiful people you will find that physical beauty is actually to be considered an organ inferiority. Beautiful children, admired and spoiled throughout childhood because of their beauty, grow up in the illusion that all they need do in life is to look pretty. They believe they are princes, and people with a prince or princess ideal make such tremendous demands of life that they are never happy. No suitor is beautiful, or rich, or important enough for them. Beauty produces so

great a sense of power that it lures the beautiful to repeated tests in the erotic conflicts of the sexes, making them cold-hearted coquettes, interested only in subjugating their sexual partners. Anyone who enters life with the thesis that beauty is power must accordingly have bad experiences. The Don Juan who loves women only as a hunter loves his prey is a product of this thirst for power that grows from misused beauty. Beauty does not always remain the victor in the battle for the prize of love. Many a beautiful woman realizes that "men," that is those men who are interested in her, are interested only in her body, for they believe that the greatest love is no more than a temporary flaming passion. Such a woman will be disappointed and embittered sooner or later, and will withdraw from life, marry for spite, or remain unmarried, lonely, and misanthropic.

Inferiorities of the sex organs are of especial importance. We must preface our discussion of sexual inferiority by saying that the concept of virility plays a tremendous rôle not only in the lives of men but in the lives of all human beings. The virile ideal of our civilization makes itself felt early in childhood. A small boy may consider a harmless anomaly of his sexual organs a hopeless defect, and consequently believe that he has been cheated of his virility. He believes he is a poor cripple, and his whole outlook on sex is permeated with a deep pessimism from the very beginning. Here again the possibilities of compensation lie in two counterdirections. Mr. X will develop an exaggerated sexual activity and attempt to convince himself that he is not only a normal, but an especially manly man.

Mr. Y will timidly avoid the whole problem of sex and so remain helplessly fearful and clumsy in the presence of women; if he takes flight, and assumes some form of resigned sexless life, his defect is not actually to blame. Little girls may also consider themselves inferior because of some actual, or apparent, anomalies of the sexual organs and consequently feel themselves excluded from the communion of other people or believe themselves unfitted for marriage. The first menstruation may be the shock that brings a girl's feeling of inferiority (which is based on other causes) to a crisis.

Aside from the status of the sexual organs themselves, the sexual constitution inasmuch as it is related to the glands of internal secretion is of great moment in the development of character. You can hardly expect normal development in a boy who looks like a girl, and purely external characteristics may be active determinants in such a case. This holds equally for girls who look like boys. Similarly, those changes of exterior occurring so frequently later in life, the masculinization of women at the time of climacteric, and the effeminization of men who suffer from disease of the internal glands, are profoundly important. Sex is the most sensitive point in the man's whole mental attitude, for his attitude is directly dependent on his physical state. A physical "plus," such as exceptional potency in a man, may be equivalent to beauty as an organ inferiority under certain circumstances and make the orientation of the personality distinctly more difficult, as specific cases frequently indicate.

The specific character type found in the presence of

inferiorities of the digestive tract is frequently associated with the origin of psychoneuroses. The individuals who belong to this type usually come from families in which gastro-intestinal disturbances are hereditary. They have to struggle with the difficulties of digestion from the earliest days of their childhood. When such children are a little older, no gastro-intestinal difficulties need actually exist, but the vestiges of the defect are manifest in their eating difficulties. Either they will not eat at all, or they make every meal a battle-field. This state of affairs is no longer a purely organic symptom, for errors in the parental attitude always accompany these childhood hunger strikes. Children who are inclined to hunger and eating strikes are chiefly "only" children, and spoiled children. The occurrence of hunger and eating strikes is always preceded by parents' oversolicitude, as well as by the parents' readiness to submit to the tyranny of the child. The evil results of oversolicitous education, to be sure, might just as well manifest themselves in some activity other than in eating. In a given case pampering a child may cause him to go on a hunger strike in preference to showing abnormal anxiety, exaggerated dependency in his daily life, or a flat refusal to attend school. This fact is already an expression of his "somatic resonance," and a further indication that the whole process of digestion is stressed by the hereditary predisposition.

After this childish hunger-strike phase passes, the child gives up the struggle for significance with these instruments and develops normally so far as eating and digestion are concerned. His digestion may indeed be remarkably good, and his stomach may suffer all man-

ner of dietary indiscretion without protest. The child may, indeed, become a gormand, indicating successful overcompensation; the digestive function, nevertheless, remains stressed, albeit not in the original manner. An original inferiority may subsequently become a superiority. This is so common that when you hear of an individual who is given to a great deal of eating you may deduce that he has had difficulties of digestion in childhood, and that he comes from a family of similar sufferers. The connoisseur of culinary delicacy and all those who overvalue eating belong to this type.

An abnormal interest in food is commonly projected beyond the narrow boundaries of eating and of food itself. You often meet individuals whose chief character trait is "to have all and to give nothing." They are avaricious, stingy, distrustful and boundlessly ambitious. Furthermore you will find the traits of outspoken pedantry, fussiness, and pathological cleanliness, commonly associated with this character picture. These traits are direct outgrowths of a primary digestive inferiority. The psychogenesis of these traits can be traced with ease. The child with digestive difficulties usually suffers also from improper excretion. Defecation often becomes the central point in the life of such children, and if you force them to regularity and punctuality against their stubborn protests they develop an exaggerated desire to be exact, and they become pedants, anxious to be perfect in all human relationships. This character picture was described by Freud as the "anal" character, but we cannot accept the sexual significance which he attached to it. This character type is best understood as the result of in-

tensive and extensive compensation and overcompensation. It is a clear expression of the purposive unity of the personality pattern in which the childhood attitude is projected, by a process of generalization, to the totality of life.

Although the original digestive difficulties may be overcome by compensation and overcompensation, or may even be transformed into special ability, this digestive system usually remains the individual's weak point, and factors injuring the entire organism are likely to produce their first symptoms in the digestive tract. In this way a man who has been healthy for decades suddenly develops a gastric ulcer, or, if he becomes nervous as a result of difficulties in life, he develops a gastric neurosis. The digestive tract is, and remains, emphasized, and in the mental difficulties that lie at the basis of his neurosis, the gastro-intestinal tract becomes the loud-speaker of the soul, expressing itself henceforth in a "jargon" of the digestive function, called by Adler the "organ dialect." In this way stubbornness is expressed in vomiting, anxiety as diarrhea, and the digestive organs become far more sensitive to emotional and mental stimuli than in normal people. It is one way of becoming superior although the superiority, to be sure, is expressed in a pathological complaint.

You can readily see how important this theory of organ inferiority is to the understanding of talent and genius, for the three possible results of organ inferiority may produce definite forms of talent as they produce definite character types. Any organ inferiority is a modification of the apparatus, and it may become the

point of crystallization for compensation and overcompensation, or it may reenforce the general feeling of inferiority.

The usual investigation of talent is almost exclusively concerned with modifications of the apparatus. It is a common belief that some children are untalented for drawing because the appropriate apparatus needed for the perception, elaboration, and expression of visual impressions (that is, the sensory organs, the brain centers and the motor apparatus) is inferior. Other children are believed to be talented for the opposite reasons. There is no theoretical objection to this belief; it seems obvious. Countless human beings are "untalented" for digestion because of hereditary weakness of the digestive tract—that is, they are constantly running into difficulties in eating and digestion—and this ought to hold equally well for those other organ systems which are concerned in the production of talent and genius. The line of development, however, is not determined solely by the hereditary predisposition in either case. We are given a point of least resistance upon which the attention is focused, to be sure. But other facts having a specific influence upon the personal goal determine how this weak point will be incorporated into the personality pattern.

We cannot predict whether a child with weak eyes or a defective visual center in the brain will develop into a man who cannot draw a straight line, into an individual who will have hysterical disturbances of vision, or into a painter; but we *can* understand the resultant individual by investigating his developmental history. If he begins training at an early date he can

change his "minus" into a "plus"; but such training must begin before he learns how to draw in school. It is a great disadvantage to a child to enter school retarded in his ability to understand visual concepts and an unfavorable predication of successful training. Such training must begin in the earliest years of life, although the environment is unconscious of the fact that the child is struggling with the elements of the visual world and although this environment is not cognizant of the laborious process that the child goes through in order to build up a visual world and a technic of visual apperception much beyond that of other children. When such a child enters school he naturally solves his drawing problems more easily than his neighbor, and is considered talented and yet his talent probably originated in an organic defect.

This is not true in all cases, and cannot be proved in many others. Some children are stimulated by their environment to train their visual apparatus although they have no organic defect; and it is conceivable that a child utilizes a hereditary superiority of the apparatus in an attempt to make every possible use of his greatest capabilities. One thing is certain: a superiority in an organ gives no stimulus to training to superiority in attainment, and any superiority of attainment may result from an inferiority in equipment. And it is also certain that in many cases an actual inferiority produces the most intensive and successful training. This leads us to the conclusion that hereditary talent is hardly ever so important as it is believed to be, and its existence cannot be deduced from high attainment.

The sole premise of successful training is self-confidence on the part of the child. Without it, training is

impossible. Where self-confidence exists the third of our three resultants of organ inferiority develops, and we find the organ inferiority reacting on the goal of the purposive pattern of the personality. As we have said, organ inferiority may intensify the feeling of inferiority and the striving for significance, which leads to useful progress and, under favorable circumstances, real attainment. Such is the case when a child with an inferiority of the eyes becomes an artist. At the same time the intensified striving for significance may express itself in a hypersensitivity to failure, so that the child finds competition in an activity in which he has a handicap from the very beginning, intolerable. In this case the child will be inclined to exclude everything that has to do with vision, and confine himself to more favorable activities. The prevailing notions of talent enable him to veil his failures in the graphic arts because none can reproach him for his deficient hereditary talent.

Such a child may seek to demonstrate his defective organic apparatus by combining great industry and hopeless clumsiness. His failure then becomes incontrovertible evidence of his lack of talent as well as an argument against the significance of training. But this objection does not hold water. We have already shown that the training to draw begins when a child learns how to see; what has been missed in those early days cannot be achieved so well later. But the effectiveness of all training is based upon the premise that the child is confident of attaining his desire, and any child who approaches his task pessimistically, even if very industriously, is doomed to failure. His very industry signifies only the alibi of good intentions.

It has been the experience of individual psychology that attainment is not a result of inherited talent, but a product of courage and training. None can measure the quantity of inherited talent, and once we know that courage and training will transform an inferiority into genius, it is of no practical importance to us.

What has been said of talent in the graphic arts is equally valid for other forms of talent. Of some of these other activities, such as arithmetic, where no talent can be found, we are unable to say which organs and which brain centers are undeveloped. Arithmetic is too complicated a process to be related to any specific brain center. All people do not even do arithmetic in the same way, so that it is very probable that visually minded people do their arithmetic by an entirely different method—neither better nor worse—than individuals with auditory minds. The same may be said of the ability to think, and of intelligence, in general. The possibilities for compensation in these spheres of activity, therefore, are quite different from the possibilities in activities dependent on some specific sense organ. In thinking and in intelligence each person has a choice of learning a complex function, according to his own individuality.

We cannot deny that intelligence requires an intact apparatus. Where the necessary material is lacking, the personality loses its value, because there is no possibility of a compensatory function. Cases of feeble-mindedness due to diseases of the brain lie beyond the sphere of psychological interpretation. But there is a broad field of research where sure tests of differentiation between organic feeble-mindedness and retarded

development based upon inadequate training are lacking. The performance of some individuals gives us no insight into the processes underlying their lack of intelligence. No sharp distinctions are possible, because the personal goal may project into the realm of organic feeble-mindedness, so that, other things being equal, the same laws of individual psychology exist as exist in healthy individuals. The effectiveness of the "courage-training complex" (Birnbaum) is certain in all cases, whereas the theory of a congenital weakness of the apparatus is questionable in many.

As a matter of method, therefore, we shall consider the "courage-training complex" first. Where the child is signally retarded we may assume that a congenital defect of the brain is a causative factor. This is probably the case of those children who learn to speak very late, who show the signs of so-called mutism, which, in contradistinction to deaf-mutism, is the inability to speak *without* a defect of hearing. Nevertheless complete cures of mute children may be attained by proper pedagogy. But these pedagogical methods are nothing more than encouragement and stimulation to systematic training. This forces us to conclude that these children might have learned to speak earlier, despite the presence of a congenital defect, had they not lacked courage and training. Suppose a child grows up in an environment that carries out its wishes without his uttering them, and suppose this environment considers his mutism a matter of inexorable fate: that child will be precisely the one who will not learn how to speak, because speech is unnecessary for the fulfilment of his wishes, and because the

stimulus and optimism necessary to conquer the defect by training are absent. The hopelessness of his environment is transferred quite automatically to the child, and the child in turn testifies and confirms in fact the pessimism of his parents which originally determined his behavior.

The extreme practical significance of the point of view of individual psychology with regard to talent arises from the fact that *no case is considered lost*. Even seemingly hopeless cases are approached with the same pedagogic care and patience, so that where the practice of individual psychology is carried through, revolutionary results are frequently obtained, and the optimism upon which our point of view is based becomes justified. It is impossible, to be sure, to make a painter or a musician out of every child; and we must not assume a superior attitude and believe that we can create some positive ability in the child as a result of our own power, even when the child does not possess it. We can never know whether a child has a talent or not, but anyone can make any child *untalented* for music or art; indeed one can make any child stupid.

The importance of the pedagogical responsibility is apparent in this negative formulation of our theory. The difference between the points of view of those who believe in talent and of individual psychology does not lie in the fact that individual psychology denies hereditary factors. Individual psychology recognizes hereditary factors just as clearly as other schools. But this is of little significance. Individual psychology does teach—and this is the point that differentiates it from other schools—that these hereditary factors do

not appear directly as some specific physical predisposition of the apparatus but become valid indirectly, through the influence of the behavior pattern of the personality. It is this purposive personality which determines the attitude of the individual to his own capabilities and incapacities. And this attitude as well as hereditary predisposition is expressed in the quality of the achievement. Furthermore this attitude can be approached pedagogically, and if it can be concretized by courage and by training (whereas a congenital talent cannot be influenced by these factors), then individual psychology will place its chief emphasis on courage and training.

True inherited talent can appear in its pure form only when all the pedagogical insults and all the discouragements of thwarting pessimism, due to the fetishistic worship of talent and heredity, have been completely excluded. When this has been done we shall learn that A can paint better than he can compose, while B will be able to do mathematics better than he can write essays. At the same time we shall be certain that any original and fundamental ability has not yet been dimmed by the consequences of errors in education. In order to accomplish this we assume a working hypothesis in education which may sound paradoxical: *everyone can do anything he wants*. We know that this is not actually true, but this is the only way to exclude pessimism from education. Therefore, we treat every child *as if* it were true. The error in this assumption, in the last analysis, is really not great. With the exception of those cases of border-line feeble-mindedness, the converse that we really know what

a child can or cannot do can hardly be proved. We know only what he does. Not only his hereditary predisposition, but also the "courage-training complex" plays a rôle in his achievement, and no tests, be they ever so sensitive, can differentiate between the two. Suppose you do assume that human beings do *not* start from scratch: you can draw no practical conclusions from your assumption. There is no possibility of deducing the nature and the degree of any individual's handicap from his performance. It is more practical to ignore the mysterious existence of an unequal start, rather than to consider it voluntarily in our evaluation of performance.

Numerous cases of change in talent (and these cases are becoming more and more frequent where individual psychology is applied) are proof of the foregoing statements. Take the boy, for instance, who was believed without mathematical endowment from his first day in school until one day, quite by accident, he proved himself to be gifted in the very study in which he had been considered untalented. From that day on, he was changed as if by a miracle, retrieved what he had missed, and after a few weeks was considered one of the best mathematicians in his class. A second example is that of the child who seemed to have a special ability for languages until his parents moved into another part of the city and he had to change schools. In the new school his language teacher failed to make any contact with him because the teacher wanted to force his personal methods of study upon the boy. This boy then failed in the very subject in which he was previously triumphant, and after a short time lost all signs

of his aptitude for language. Even the most stubborn champions of the prevailing talent theories do not deny the existence of such cases. Yet, if such cases do exist, the question of whether or not a change of talent is possible in the future, and how this possibility could be recognized, must be answered. If there are no indices of such a change (and none have ever been found), one must credit the possibility of a change in talent in every case. This is the sole aim of individual psychology.

The same fundamental statement holds for inferior performance. Genius is differentiated from feeble-mindedness by one important factor: there is absolutely no anatomical basis for genius. If you examine a certain brain you can definitely exclude normal ability if you find disease processes or failures of development that are directly responsible for idiocy. But you cannot make an anatomical examination of a brain and say that feeble-mindedness could never develop in it. So far as genius is concerned we can neither prove nor exclude it by examining the brain anatomically, unless the brain shows the degeneration accompanying idiocy.

Nobody really knows what genius is. As soon as you attempt to identify it with supreme performance, objections pour in, for every high-grade performance is not genius. High-grade performance may just as well be the result of unbending zeal and industry. On the other hand certain personalities compel us with their genius even though they have never accomplished anything of exceptional value. Genius is differentiated from simple talent, so one is told, by quality and not by quantity. Every creative product, every new idea,

is hardly the work of a genius, for countless human beings have at some time in their lives had new ideas without anyone ever having called them geniuses for that reason. If the value of the idea were measured by its worth, that is, its quantity, then the genius could not be differentiated qualitatively from other beings. Furthermore no one knows just what a new idea is, and probably no one has ever had a thought that has not occurred in someone else's brain before. Shall we call everyone a genius whose ideas have priority so far as anyone can prove? If we exclude the question of priority the number of candidates for the title of genius is enlarged to absurdity.

Finally you may say, "Not the thing itself, but the manner in which it is produced settles the question of genius or talent." The talented individual must labor at his work zealously, whereas the genius produces his work by a process of spiritual parturition, giving birth to his creation in the finished form. His spirit is as fertile as the earth, and he produces without industry and long effort, because of a certain inner necessity. Objections would again arise. We have Beethoven's note-books for instance, which show how he struggled laboriously with his thoughts. A theme appears. It is varied, turned, recomposed and changed, until finally it stands in its finished state, and anyone who hears it gets the impression of undoubted genius, as if the composition had sprung, like Minerva, from the brow of Jove, full-born. Other musicians have produced their works in other ways. The overture to "Don Juan" is supposed to have been written in a single night. Schubert could shake melodies and whole songs out of his

sleeves. But who could say that Schubert or Mozart was a genius whereas Beethoven only had talent? The original manuscripts of Flaubert look like a battlefield. There is not a single sentence in them which has not been changed, corrected, erased or recast. Flaubert needed many years for every piece of work that he turned out. Some other writer turns out a short story a week for his paper, by simply dictating it to his stenographer. Each story takes a few hours to write and is published the next day in his journal. Is the godlike facility of the journalist a sign of genius? And is Flaubert simply an industrious and talented man?

One could carry such a discussion much farther, but it is obvious that no permanent values can be attained in this way. We cannot decide, you see, whether an individual is a genius or simply has talent without referring to his work. This brings us back to our original standard: the question of genius and talent must be determined by the value of the achievement. The whole discussion of genius has proceeded in fruitless circles from time immemorial. Every German who wants to defend the concept of genius against the skeptics uses Goethe as an argument, but it was Goethe himself, the national saint of German genius-worshippers, who said: "Maybe genius is only industry."

The greatness of the achievement remains the best index of genius, and we are not justified in investigating how this achievement is produced. Since contemporaries are not always in a position to value achievement correctly—as in the case of Bach, who was not recognized until a hundred years after his death—and since achievement is as frequently undervalued as over-

valued by contemporaries, the question arises whether anyone has a right to classify an individual as a genius, at least within the generation after his death. The whole question of genius, therefore, is of no great significance in psychology, unless we consider what Goethe called "genial effort" as genius. An individual may act in a very crazy fashion and be a fool rather than a genius; whereas another one may give the impression of the most untalented matter-of-factness, and be considered as a representative spirit of his time—a hundred years after his death.

We feel that the question of genius is of no interest either practically or theoretically. From the theoretical standpoint a superficial glance at the problems of genius will show that the problem is of no significance, because the theories of individual psychology, which give rise to the educational methods of individual psychology, must be favorable to the production of genius (if there is such a thing)—and never unfavorable to it.

The goal of individual psychology is to liberate every man's creative ability from all interference, and allow it to develop freely in the direction of objectivity and usefulness. The fear that a point of view based on the belief and on the working hypothesis that all intellects are essentially equal (and we have already pointed out how this working theory is to be used) will lead to the production of Babbitts, and the extinction of genius, is based upon a misunderstanding. The so-called "inferiors" must be convinced drastically that boundless possibilities for development lie within them in order that they may achieve anything

at all. The so-called "genius" cannot be damaged by knowing that others can accomplish what he has done under certain circumstances. Genius must originate in purer springs than the delusion that one is a superman.

The refusal to subscribe to the religion of genius revolutionizes the practice of every-day life. We know only too well that the generally accepted idea that genius exists becomes a justification to many not to try to do more than they have already done. The noble modesty with which some men relinquish the title of genius is a cloak for their cowardice. Men justify their mediocrity because they do not trust themselves to greater achievement—it is one way to feel comfortable in the lukewarm water of the mediocre, and to believe themselves justified in remaining half-way to their goal. The resigned statement, "I simply am not a genius," with its open or tacit corollary, "Others cannot do even as well as I did," is false modesty and the asylum of a coward. If you cut off the line of retreat by making the religion of genius extinct (as Edgar Zilsel tried to do) the coward will probably find another little emergency exit for his faint-heartedness. But we may as well begin the useful task of padlocking existing avenues of escape.

Chapter IV

Social and Economic Factors in Character Development

WHEN we enumerated the factors which determine the personality of the child, social and economic situations occupied second place. The perspective of history distinguishes these factors from all others, because social and economic influences have changed markedly during the last few centuries, to say nothing of their changes during prehistoric epochs. Our knowledge of the social and cultural relationships of prehistoric eras is based solely on the evidence of archeological excavations. The man of today differs essentially from his ancestor of five thousand years ago, while the latter, in turn, must have been quite unlike his primitive forebears of ten thousand years ago. If there were no races living today in social and economic relationships similar to those which must have obtained among our ancestors in a remote time, nothing would be known of the changes which have occurred. With some reservations, however, we may assume that the style of life among the primitive savages of today (in so far as it has not been distorted by European culture) probably resembles that of our ancestors of long ago.

Historical and ethnological research indicate with some certainty that the mental development of man has closely paralleled the development of private property, and has therefore been determined by economic factors. Primitive communism, a phase of early economic organization antedating the existence of private property, was followed by the epoch of private property and private business in which we live today. This epoch is characterized by the development of class differences, which are the natural consequence of private enterprise. Where private property exists there must be classes that possess and classes that do not possess. So far as our researches can throw any light on the subject, the history of human beings has been the history of class warfare. But this is not of immediate interest in our present considerations.

At this point it is interesting to note the fact that the racial development of the process of individuation, dating from the first phases of ego-discovery through the awakening of the cult of the personality during the Christian epoch, and leading finally to the extreme individualism of the last century, has paralleled the evolution of private property. You might say that the first man who put a fence around a piece of land and forbade his fellows to cut trees or build upon it was the first man who was ego-conscious, the first man who experienced his ego as sharply differentiated from the experience of "you" and of "we." We know that this first man in the process of individuation did not exist any more than did Adam, the biblical first man. Economic evolution, like mental evolution, proceeded very gradually during the course of uncounted years, but

the fact that this evolution was gradual does not alter the case nor the relationship between private property and ego-discovery.

Under the primitive conditions of private enterprise that existed during the period of slavery, the processes of individuation, naturally, could occur only among the possessing classes. The class of slaves remained a dull undifferentiated mass. This group lacked a psychology, because the first premises of personality development were denied them. In the course of the slow centuries, during which the progressive emancipation of the non-property-holding classes gained ground, a new style of life emerged inasmuch as the propertyless classes became property owners, no matter how modestly. The final step in this development was ushered in by the French Revolution and by other contemporary revolutions in various civilized countries. The psychologic importance of the social and economic situation, at least so far as the proletariat is concerned, dates from the French Revolution. Political emancipation created the possibilities of personal emancipation, and with political freedom a common psychological basis for the property owning and propertyless classes, and a common arena in which the class differences could make themselves felt, became possible for the first time in history.

What is the significance of economic pressure on the character development of the child? If you understand the significance of inadequate nourishment, unfavorable living conditions, insufficient light and air, you can appreciate the psychological consequences of economic pressure. Every physician knows how unfavor-

ably bad living conditions influence the bodily development of the child. Rickets, tuberculosis, and congenital syphilis take their heaviest toll among the children of the poor. Organ inferiority plays a significant rôle among poor children. That child whose physique has been weakened, who is undernourished, crippled, or disfigured by rickets is poorly prepared for the problems of life, and requires more help, more care, and more service than a healthy child. But this is the very child who receives the least care and the least help, and it is not surprising that an intensely reenforced feeling of inferiority results from his unfavorable position.

Such a child becomes aware of his neglect and his weakness in countless little situations, which seem to be of small moment objectively. He responds with an intensified striving for significance, yet his progress is always uncertain because further discouragement only too often aggravates his handicap.

The danger that the sickly child's striving will lead him into antisocial channels, moreover, is greater than in the case of a healthy child. Weak bodies, and a greater tendency toward disease, together with the ugliness so commonly derived from these factors, add to the burden under whose pressure poor children are condemned to grow up.

A second group of factors derived from the unfavorable economic environment react directly upon the poor child. There is the cheerlessness of the poor child's existence. The poor child is happy when he has the bare necessities of existence. Little is left over for toys or sweets. If the poor child does get toys or sweets,

at rare intervals, he realizes on these infrequent holiday occasions what he is denied in every-day life. The child's unfulfilled wishes and unsatisfied desires grow on and on, until he ends in resignation. The fact that the child must deny himself intensifies his feeling of inferiority, and simultaneously produces a boundless overvaluation of all the pleasures he sees in shops or in the condition of wealthier children.

Little by little these things denied the poor child assume the extraordinary values of a never-to-be-attained ideal. To the poor child, to be "grown up" soon signifies little more than to enjoy himself without let or hindrance in those very things which were denied him while a child. Sport, beautiful clothes, good food, sweets to children, alcohol to the adolescent, movies and the theater, a life of splendor and joy, become the theme of day-dreams, and the poor child's goal in life. No effort is too costly for the attainment of this goal. The striving for significance, born of childhood necessity and the pressure of an unhappy life, is lost in the mad struggle for pleasure. An eternally unsatisfied desire and a furious greed produce a materialistic philosophy of life, which expresses itself in the desire to make as much money as possible; and to transform this money into pleasure as soon as possible. Later in life the most costly relationships between human beings are sacrificed upon the altar of materialism. Human relationships that ought to have an entirely different meaning are transmuted by this pleasure hunger, so that the love life becomes no more than a means of attaining pleasure, and a sexual partner is judged in much the same light as food and drink—something to be used and thrown away as soon as you are through with it.

We have just described an extremely unfavorable case. If, as so often happens, something worth while develops from the deep despair of an unhappy poor child's life, we have other more favorable, ameliorating influences to thank for it. Human nature is so elastic that even economic and social poverty can be overcome, if courage is not wanting. When a child, pressed by the difficulties of poverty, chooses the line of least resistance (only too often indicated by the style of life of his parents) and becomes lost along the path of materialistic pleasure searching, his love of pleasure is, in itself, a form of discouragement.

The fetichism of money, the leading ideal in this age of private property, is not confined to the propertyless class. Making money is the chief goal of the majority of people, because it is the sovereign means to the attainment of the essential goals of the individual's striving for significance, whether these be goals of power or pleasure. The realization that riches are not an adequate goal, because money will not buy the real values in life, is reserved almost entirely to those who have become rich, and have experienced the fact that they are no nearer happiness than when they were poor.

The child growing up under economic pressure faces, in the problem of work, a problem hardly less important than that of material deprivation. Despite all the efforts of social reform, child labor remains a part of our present economic system. Although child labor is regulated by law in the greater part of the civilized world, children continue to labor, nevertheless, at the widespread "home-work" (not done in a factory and therefore not under control), as farmhands,

newsboys, caddies, messenger and elevator boys, and the like. This is especially true in poor homes where, because of the economic necessity, their employment is not seriously opposed. The necessity of working in a business designed for adult occupation, or in the household, however, is contrary to the nature of a child. The proper activity of a child is the play and the school-work appropriate to his age. Every child makes an adequate contribution to the society in which he lives in the course of these preparatory activities. If the child is stimulated to do adult work in the form of a game, and in a play community such as the Montessori kindergarten, it is a valuable enrichment of the child's play material. But if the child must get up two hours before school to clean up a room at the command of his mother, to wash clothes and dishes, to sweep the stairs, and to do the other chores, which are almost exclusively the work of nine- to twelve-year-old children in poor families, he is doing work equivalent to the slave labor of days gone by. This is likewise true of factory "home-work" in which a whole family with the greatest possible effort can hardly earn the necessities of life.

The child, to be sure, also considers school-work in the nature of a compulsion, but he may be taught its importance. The more the modern school adapts itself to the psychological needs of the child, the more will pleasure in school-work and a voluntary attendance in school become essential factors in the child's school life. The most favorable school environment, nevertheless, allows for communal activity with other children of the same age. Going to school usually becomes tol-

erable because the school offers so much interesting and consoling material.

No ameliorating circumstances exist where the child has to work in the home or the factory. The significant thing about child labor, in whatever form it exists, is that the child learns to consider work as a hateful plague, and consequently he cannot liberate himself from his dislike of work for the rest of his life. The child's dislike of work is closely related to his desire for pleasure, which originated in his childhood deprivation; and these two factors produce a unit style of life. The motto of such an individual is to get as much money for as little work as possible and to utilize this money for the greatest amount of pleasure it can buy. That false and primitive form of socialism known as the "envy of those who have not" may be formulated in this way: "What fools we are to work for pay that will not buy even the necessities of life! The property-owners, who have nothing to do but collect their rents, sit at a princely table and lead just the life we should like to lead if our desires were fulfilled."

The style of life characteristic of the unproductive rich is certainly just as false as that of the protesting pauper. The unproductive rich are victims of a contemporary economic structure that permits them to live without working. The hungry workingman who is denied his pleasure cannot see that the wealthy man who is denied work is just as unhappy as he is. The poor workingman derives the energy for an anarchistic battle against the ruling society from seeing the well-fed and easy life of the rich, and from feeling their hate of the poor. His conflict with the ruling class is

anarchistic, because no really revolutionary nor historically justifiable conflict ever originated from envy or from a disinclination to work. This conflict, which we all feel, is carried on under the banners and in the name of an idealistic socialism; but in practice the contemporary political parties utilize as soldiers in this battle those poor pleasure-hungry devils who have no inclination to work, but who would be quite in harmony with the present social system if they themselves were on top and the rich were the under dogs. They are the guerrilla mercenaries of the class conflict, who fight most lustily where the clink of gold is loudest.

In the family life of the poor all the horrible poverty and vice of adult relationships appears before the very eyes of children in some dingy, overcrowded room. The return of a drunken father, strife between parents, wife-beating, insufficient beds (with all the danger of sexual delinquency in adolescence which this entails), undisguised conversation concerning the vice and evil of life in this class—all these factors produce a most unfortunate precocity in the child of the slums. No wonder the child assumes the hopeless pessimism unfortunately all too justified at this social level, and consequently loses every hope and belief that his fate may be better than that of his parents! Many a child may conclude: "My parents are decent people, and a life of hunger, misery, and anxiety is their only reward. It is foolish to be decent and to allow opportunities to go by which will enable me to get rich quick. All this unhappiness is the result of poverty. You can be decent only when you are rich. The thing to do is to steal, and to get away with it!"

The delinquency based on poverty is another factor which we must take into account. Very little love is lavished on the children of large poor families. Every new child means greater poverty, and each new child is greeted with hate, and considered the punishment for foolish indulgence. This child never learns the meaning of love. We attempted to show in the previous chapter how the relationship between mother and child is the source of the child's social feeling. It is obvious that in many poor families where a child grows up without love the social feeling dies of starvation. Among the poor the small yet very important social community of the family exists solely for the prevention of hunger and for the maintenance of shelter. There are no personal ties. The poor child finds more hostility than friendship in the life of the streets and he must defend himself as best he may. The child of the slums acquires what little social feeling he has only in the degenerate form of the gang, a social group whose sole interest is warfare against other similarly organized gangs. The poor city child's style of life is akin to the pattern of primitive belligerent communities. But our present society, whose ideals are clearly opposed to the gang, has little more to offer such a child than moral preachments.

To summarize: the feeling of inferiority is exaggerated in the life of the poor child, and his intensified striving for significance becomes crystallized as a great hunger for pleasure. The discouragement of the slum child is betrayed by his disinclination to work, while his starved social feeling expresses itself in a tendency to inconsiderate brutality in the attainment of egoistic

goals. There is little wonder that the poor child very often fails in school. Poor children are distinguished from the children of the well-to-do not alone by their clothes, but by their timidity and anxiety, by their resistance to discipline, and by their brutality. Frequently they seem more stupid than the children of the well-to-do. These characteristics originate in the psychological situation of the poor child. Juvenile delinquency in adolescence is a common result of this type of childhood development.

Children in whom the striving for significance is forced into false channels by the pressure of economic and social inferiority develop into adults characterized by their predilection for alcoholism, criminality, and prostitution. The gangster, the pimp, the confidence man, the "racketeer," and others of their type are the product of such evolution. Alcoholism is the transparent expression of an exaggerated love of pleasure. The drunkard makes an unimportant adjunct of living his veritable goal of life. Pleasure is an element of the biological conative pattern. It is a biological premium designed to foster natural functions such as eating and reproduction. Where the ego-sentiment has gone astray under the pressure of discouraging experiences, and where the ego has lost hope of attaining significance along biologically legitimate lines, it may happen that the experience of pleasure becomes reconstellated into a goal of life. Personal significance and pleasure become identical. What we call pleasure-hunger is a form of hedonistic behavior, based on a deeply pessimistic confusion of the actual goals of life. For the young adolescent, alcoholism is the crystallization of a hedonistic philosophy. He goes to the saloon or "speak-

easy" to get drunk because this is considered "manly," being forbidden to children.

The less harmful habit of smoking is an analogous phenomenon. Neither tobacco nor alcohol tastes good to children in the beginning, but they will not admit it, and they continue to smoke and to drink stubbornly until they become accustomed to tobacco and alcohol and find pleasure in them. When the adolescent boy or girl has reached this stage, alcohol is no longer simply a means of pleasure worth eight hours' daily work—it is a narcotic and an intoxicant. Narcotics and intoxicants are devices of cowards; they help the timid to commit a crime under the protection of a sense of irresponsibility. Furthermore the narcotic enables the coward to flee from the care of a drab every-day life into a condition of illusory happiness and calm—in which he approaches godlikeness if only for a few hours. Reality is thoughtlessly sacrificed for a fictional satisfaction of the coward's will to power.

The outlook for a psychotherapeutic approach to the problem of alcoholism would be much easier than it is today if the rôle of alcohol in proletarian life could be explained to the youthful drinker more convincingly than it is. The bitterness of modern life seems to applaud the drinker. The man who lacks the courage to strive for a better future may actually find no valid equivalent in real life for the intoxication he is urged to abjure.

Criminality is another product of the hopeless slums. The criminal is dominated by his pleasure-hunger, and his goal—the greatest amount of pleasure for the least amount of work—leads him directly to bur-

glary and theft against a society which is hostile to him. When the striving for significance is directed toward the acquisition of pleasure and the avoidance of work, the criminal can best accomplish his aim by making war against bourgeois society, which maintains the dominance of the possessing classes by a net of laws and defenses that exclude the poor man from the plentiful tables of the rich and deny him all pleasure. The best way that a criminal can attain his goal is to fool the police and participate in this pleasure despite all the precautions of society. The thieves' gang, with whom the criminal is leagued by common interest, absorbs the dregs of his starved social feeling. Every successful crime becomes a triumph against a common enemy, and the danger of being put in jail is considered as no more than a necessary business risk. The criminal is willing to take pains and care so long as his work is not useful, according to the standards of bourgeois society. The spoils of his business are translated into pleasure as soon as possible. The criminal does not save. To save would be senseless, for crime is not a profession calculated to keep a man alive and well-nourished. There are much easier and less dangerous ways of doing this. Criminality is the excess of an individual whose striving for significance is dominated by the desire for pleasure. The goal of crime is always orgiastic intoxication or mad spending.

The pimp and the prostitute are close cousins of the criminal, and their style of life is evolved from similar sources. The pleasure-hunger of the poor girl is crystallized in her desire for luxury and beautiful clothes, and in her disinclination to do useful work. The ex-

ploitation of the false sexual morals of society is the device that enables her to attain her ends. The prostitute lacks the courage to strive for pleasure in a socially acceptable way. Except for unusual good luck her goal is actually impossible of attainment. The trick of prostitution seems the easiest way, and the girls who go into prostitution do not realize that in the majority of cases it leads to poverty, sickness, and woe. If a girl chose this profession in a rational way, she would be quick to see its disadvantages. But prostitution means enjoyment of the boundless pleasures of "high life" from the beginning. The prostitute is sold to the sexuality of men, to whom sex is simply a hunting ground. The prostitute herself is frigid in her sexual intercourse with her customers, and her love belongs to her pimp—the sole luxury which she permits herself. The pimp, on the other hand, by means of his prostitute, achieves his goal of pleasure without work; he sells himself to her in much the same way that she sells herself to her paying clients.

All of them, drunkards, criminals, pimps and prostitutes, are discouraged deserters from the front of life, who are willing to suffer a thousandfold the pangs and unhappiness of the defeated in their battle with society rather than to do the seemingly hard and thankless tasks which life demands. The boundless striving for power characteristic of discouragement is evident. Their bitter hate of society does not originate in a fundamental hostility, for they would all be thoroughly satisfied with the prevailing social system, if they could but exploit it. Sometimes they succeed in getting over into the camp of the enemy by a lucky trick. In

many American cities habitual criminals frequently are put in the pay of the police, with good results. Occasionally a prostitute finds an honorable citizen whom she marries, and she becomes a very thrifty bourgeois housewife. Men and women of the type we have just described are intolerant only of social and economic pressure. They do not trust themselves to attain their ambitions by honest work.

These are the practical consequences which may be derived from this psychological interpretation of the character of the alcoholic, the criminal, and the prostitute: The cure of alcoholics must fail unless it is accompanied by psychotherapy, whose conscious goal is the encouragement of the patient. The same may be said of the treatment of morphinism and cocaineism, although drug addiction frequently originates in other economic and social situations. Legal measures against alcoholic intoxication, furthermore, will always fail, as long as the *psychological necessity* for intoxication remains. Education about the danger and damage of alcoholic drinks is not enough; there must be a social therapy that strikes the evil at its root. We must liberate men and women from the burden of a childhood and youth spent in deprivation, and under the pressure of economic need. We must prevent the overgrowth of pleasure-hunger, the constantly recurring desire to forget the bitterness of the world, and the necessity of evading personal responsibility by means of intoxication. When human beings have been brought thus far, legal restriction of alcohol will be unnecessary. No one misuses alcohol except under psychological pressure.

Criminality and prostitution must be combated in the same way. Nobody believes nowadays that the criminal can be bettered by a term in prison. Single crimes may be prevented by the fear of punishment, but such prevention of crime is hardly comparable to the horrible fact that adolescents and young men who could still be won for society are inoculated with the feeling of hate and vengeance toward it and are completely discouraged by a term in prison which cuts off their hope of social rehabilitation. Society would be protected far better if we put every criminal into jail for life, inhuman as this would be. As it is, the criminal prepares to make war on society while in jail, and is then let loose to do so. Punishment for "prevention of crime" is simply the excuse of pharisaic moralists who set themselves up to judge those who have been less lucky than the judges.

Any possible psychotherapy of the criminal will be faced with an impossible task so long as the "moral" citizen, whom Fate has spared the necessity of breaking laws, can maintain his power, and so long as the law-abiding citizen draws a line between himself and the criminal, and will not recognize the criminal as his brother. This cannot be done by any patronizing gesture. It must be done without condescension because it is self-understood. Psychotherapy cannot be practiced condescendingly. Ministers of all religions have attempted this and have never succeeded. The priest is no more than the agent of an authoritative society which the rebellious criminal is fighting. When the criminal outwardly clowns the rôle of remorse and promises to reform, he hardly listens to the priest, and

secretly makes fun of him. The criminal triumphs over the priest because he is cleverer than the priest. The criminal knows only too well that the priest is a partizan of society, a society which attempts the stupid and hopeless task of converting an enemy to a voluntary cessation of hostility. Actual comradeship is the essential premise for the treatment of the criminal.

Yet even where the premise of comradeship is fulfilled, and the old-style justice resigns in favor of education toward courage and responsibility, the conditions for successful psychotherapy of the criminal are still unfavorable as long as the ruling social order makes it so difficult for the criminal to reform and return to society. The weightiest arguments we can use against the criminal unfortunately cannot be used, because we live in an age in which poverty and unemployment actually exist. Our social order, which controls not only the means of production but also the means of life and its enjoyment, provides inadequately for the majority of mankind.

The criminal is surely not right when he despises as fools those who progress by honorable work, and thus avoid dire poverty. We may succeed in convincing him that industry and self-confidence can overcome the difficulties of the social order. But we must concede that a great deal of industry, and a great deal of self-confidence, plus some good fortune, are prerequisites of social success. To promise the poor man a beautiful future in order to effect some solidarity with those of his class, is to promise him a future for his children and his grandchildren rather than for himself. If the poor man is to understand this,

evaluate it correctly, and make it a motto for his behavior, he requires a great deal of courage, a great sense of responsibility, and a well-developed social feeling.

The premise of psychotherapy, therefore, is actually what its results ought to be. Nevertheless success is possible. Under the circumstances it is wise to be patient and to expect a great many failures. We must not overlook the fact that the prevention and cure of criminality and of sexual delinquency, as well as the prevention of the craving for intoxicants and narcotics, will not be effected by individual therapy alone. The social and economic pressure which causes these manifestations must also become the object of our attention, but discussion of the methods of changing social and economic pressure lies beyond the limits of individual psychology.

As long as we are discussing the social and economic conditions of character development we must consider the other extreme and analyze the psychological effects of wealth. The psychology of the rich, while it is not as significant as the psychology of the poor, because it refers to a much smaller group of human beings, is nevertheless of practical importance in a day of extended plutocracy.

The children of the rich grow up without privations and without the necessity of working. They are well taken care of, they are never left alone, and they are usually guaranteed—although this need not always be so—the measure of love required for the development of the social feeling. A whole series of unfavorable psychological factors that mar the development of the

poor child are thus excluded, and we should expect the development of character and talent in the children of the rich to proceed much more favorably than among the poor. This is largely true.

In the public schools the children of well-to-do parents usually distinguish themselves by better achievement, better behavior, and greater courage than the children of the poor. This fact, which teachers are constantly reiterating, is due to differences in background. There is no justification for reserving higher education and important public office for the children of the well-to-do. But we cannot protest too strenuously against the standpoint that the better behavior of well-to-do children is dependent upon hereditary differences. Existing class differences would not only be preserved but become an even greater problem for the adolescent, were this granted. The more the poor are denied the opportunity of bettering themselves, the more profound will the discouragement of poorer achievement and inferior morality be. This standpoint produces the very phenomena with which it justifies its existence!

Closer inquiry, however, indicates that the educational conditions for the development of rich children are better than those of the poor in some instances, but worse in others. The danger that the children of the rich will be "spoiled" is much greater than the danger of "spoiling" among the middle classes and the poor. The pampering of the rich child has two effects: in the first place it produces dependency, and dependency sooner or later manifests itself as inadequate preparation for life. We shall speak of this in a later chapter

on education. In the second place it overfeeds the child with pleasure of all kinds, so that pleasure loses its value. This is not harmful in itself, because the hypothesis that pleasure is not the sole purpose of life is a worth-while element in the normal attitude toward life. But we cannot overlook the fact that the child of wealthy parents is usually educated in a hedonistic philosophy, which makes pleasure the most valuable thing in life.

Parents who are conscious of their educational responsibility see this danger, and conscientiously prevent its occurrence. This seldom happens. More frequently the example of the parents' manner of living, usually hedonistic in its orientation, overshadows the moral mottoes which the rich child learns at school and at home. Contrasted with the example that he sees in his home, these moral fables appear lifeless indeed. The child who sees how far below him the servants, or the employees of his father's factory, stand because they have to work with their hands, must, as a matter of course, orient his life in the defense of the social position his parents have reached.

It becomes a rich child's purpose in life to work as little as possible and to enjoy the pleasures of living to the uttermost. People who work much and enjoy little can hardly impress the child of wealthy parents very deeply. In this way the rich child's style of life goes astray in quite the same way that the poor child's does. All classes are infected with the social ideal, the false striving for power and pleasure which dominates our age. It is natural that the extremes of the social ladder should show the most radical expressions

of that philosophy. The problem of the poor child and adolescent arises from the complete unattainability of pleasure and power. The problem of the rich child arises from a surfeit of pleasure—his false valuation of all power and pleasure. Because the rich child has attained these in the very beginning, and need not fight for them to possess them, he gets no semblance of satisfaction from them. The rich child who has sufficient self-confidence and inner security will create a world of values in science or art, in order to guarantee his salvation. On the other hand if he is discouraged by an education that produces dependency in him (and this is all too common in the well-to-do milieu), he will not trust himself to the creative style of life demanded by science and art. What little remains of life when real attainments are excluded not only does not suffice him but leads him directly into the neurosis. Neurasthenia therefore is the fashionable disease of the rich, being determined to a large extent by social and economic conditions.

If economic factors are the basis of the psychology of the rich and the poor, sociological factors are more important in the middle classes. In the middle classes where the economic situation is not characterized by too much or too little money, the family constellation becomes the essential index of the class.

The family, which achieved its flower in the days of feudalism, has been in the process of disintegration for a long time. It hardly exists in the wealthier society because the style of life of such society destroys the family. It exists still less among the poor, where women have less and less time to undertake the functions of

housewife. Family life is built around women, and for this reason it is the woman of the lower middle classes, and the woman of the farm, who is not prevented from the maintenance of her family function by social duties or by the necessity for work, that make family life. The middle class, especially in the cities, grows smaller and smaller with time.

But today a middle class still exists, and this middle class has a family life, and the children of this environment always show their origin, for better or for worse. The good results arise from the fact that the family is a useful preparatory school for life, especially where life is carried on under fairly good circumstances, as the middle class may carry it on nowadays. We shall discuss the significance of father, mother, and sister for the destiny of the individual more fully in a later chapter.

At this point we need only call attention to the fact that in favorable cases family life fosters the development of the social feeling, and therefore is capable of producing useful human beings. To be sure this happens only in the most favorable cases. On the other hand there are certain dangers of family life which must be recognized. It is in the middle classes that we find the tragically stereotyped life histories of neurotics. Weakening by overtenderness, strict education, and the damaging effects of authority, the misuse of the fifth commandment, which compels children to grow up under the yoke of the impossible and untenable burden of gratitude to their parents, the dull sticky atmosphere of outworn moralization—all these factors infect the children of the middle classes and make

them appear helpless and unadapted to living conditions that have long ago proceeded beyond the patriarchal culture of Bible days.

The children of the middle-class family are armed with the ambitious expectations of parents who are proud of their intellect. They are thrust out into the world and vainly attempt to adapt themselves to living conditions that are at least fifty years ahead of their time. Their first or second failure makes them introverts or drives them into a neurosis. The neurosis is almost always successful in these cases, and these frightened individuals run back to their family and are not to be lured from this asylum of complete safety. These are the compulsion neurotics, and these are the men and women who suffer from agoraphobia. They manifest their desire for narrowness, for immovability, for absolute freedom from danger, in the very choice of their neurotic illness. These unfavorable cases illustrate the tragedy of a dying style of life, which with transparent clarity becomes concretized before it vanishes entirely, in greater and greater personal unhappiness and sorrow from a sociological standpoint.

No class is absolutely favorable, and no class can be considered relatively secure—this seems an index to the fact that we are living in the period of transition, of crisis, and of revolution. The period in which we are living has no adequate culture or style of life. The stimulus to solve this crisis is derived from the problems of our own life. Retreat is impossible, we must go on. Everyone who is sure of understanding the significance of this development must cooperate to effect the more quickly what must eventually be.

Chapter V

The Family Constellation as a Factor in Personality Development

THE family is the first social group with which the child comes in contact, and the child's first mental traits are expressed in relation to it. There can be little purpose in making "the child in itself" an object of psychological experiments, for his behavior is so completely dominated by his family constellation. We are not even justified in considering him divorced from the family, in the examination of his simplest bodily functions. We are well aware of the error in method involved in the description of organ inferiority and of the social and economic situation of the child before considering his family constellation. The foregoing analysis was indispensable, and if we realize a source of error, we avoid its dangers.

The family relationship begins with the relationship between mother and child, if the mother is living. In complete contrast to the theories of Freudian psychoanalysis this relationship holds for both sexes. The "Œdipus complex" may occasionally occur in the course of a child's development, but it is always a secondary matter arising from some specific constellation. The closer bond between a child and a parent of

the opposite sex, such as that of a girl to her father, is one of these specific situations. The closest relation of the little girl is to her mother. The mother's interest in her infant develops the germ of social feeling by a simple transfer to the child, but the parasitic relationship of the child to his mother does not indicate a true social feeling. A child who refuses to be separated from his mother for a moment, because of his helplessness and dependency, does not, therefore, love his mother—he simply needs her.

Love is an active attitude; it premises a certain degree of inner security, requisite for normal activity in the world. When this minimum of mental energy exists, love of one's mother becomes an exceptionally valuable aid in the conquest of life's difficulties. The more a child loves his mother, the more the mother loves her child. In this way the child creates a feeling of absolute trust and is convinced of the unconditional trustworthiness of at least one human being in his environment. Even during the time that the social feeling is germinating, the parasitism of the child is still in its ascendancy. Mother is put into the service of the child as far as possible, and the child's expressions of love are little more than successful attempts to reinforce the mother's dependency. The rôle of mother has nothing to do with blood-relationships. Any human being who plays the rôle of a host to the parasitic child assumes the mother rôle.

The social behavior of the child is based on this situation of trust and confidence towards his mother. As the child's inner security grows, the sphere of his useful relationships to other members of the family be-

comes larger, so that the father, older brothers and sisters, and finally servants are included. These relationships of the child to his adult environment are not often purely friendly. The tendency to be jealous of others who also have relationships to the mother may lead to conflict. Nevertheless, the child's excesses in his striving for significance seldom destroy the feeling that the child is related to other members of the family; nor can conflicts distort his realization that these other family members are closer to him and therefore more important than other people. Children know instinctively that hostility and conflict within the family are never extremely dangerous.

The child's trust in his family contributes an essential reenforcement of his self-confidence, and even the limited possibilities for experience which offer themselves to the child in the first years of his life make the conditions of his life easier. The child knows his place within the family, knows how to speak to his parents and to his relatives, and presently develops a technique of every-day life which paves the way for the development of self-confidence and real progress. The child need not forego these pleasant conditions of life until he is sufficiently grown-up and has gained adequate power and independence to live life by himself.

When the child's inner independence is not reached for various reasons, until the end of childhood, he finds difficulty in weaning himself from his family, and for this reason we frequently find mental difficulties appearing in the period of transition to independence, just as we find exaggerated manifestations of in-

creased dependency and closer relationships to the family group during that period. When a child fifteen or sixteen years old acts as if he were five or six years younger the cause of his behavior may be sought in his adolescent dependency and insecurity, which acts as an obstacle to development and not in the intensity of his family bond, even though the child has been badly pampered.

To be deprived of the warmth of the family relationship in the first deciding years of his life is an even more serious handicap to a child. We shall not discuss the frequently successful communal education of children as a substitute for education within the family at this time. Such education is the rule for orphaned children, when no adult can be found who will take the place of an actual mother and love the child as much as if the child had his own mother. The actual blood-relationship has little to do with the case, for there are real mothers who treat their children like the traditional stepmother, and vice versa. A mother's lovelessness may be caused by economic pressure, but children of wealthy parents are delivered to the indifferent care of paid servants and are deprived of their mother's love as often as their poor contemporaries in sorrow. Their salvation often depends on a governess whose heart is in the right place.

A child needs mother-love to bolster his self-confidence, and he feels himself doubly isolated and doubly in danger if he is deprived of it. The consequences of its loss are profound discouragement with all its after effects; failure at school, hopeless timidity and inhibition, fear of people, and, finally, desertion from life.

Children of this type are often marked by their lack of emotion, their failure of emotional response, and their inability to make contacts with their fellows, for the development of social feeling is distinctly hindered in an orphaned child. The more insecure these children feel themselves, and the less capable of solving their life's tasks they consider themselves, the more ego-centric their behavior will be.

People who contribute no love toward their fellow man receive none in return. A fundamentally pessimistic opinion of others (the expression of a fear of human beings), finds confirmation, seemingly, by the very experiences that it fashions. People actually are evil and mean to them, because the reciprocity of human relations holds in general, even if not in every case. Everyone is treated by people approximately as he treats them. Life becomes dreadfully difficult to the unsocial individual, because living is intolerable without the help and fellowship of others.

An inability to make human contacts or to attain inner security, is most noticeable in the love relationship. The individuals we have just described cannot love—they can only buy their sexual object. Naturally enough they are not loved in return. To marry, if you cannot love, would be ill-advised. We have people whose sex life is simplified into sexuality, a sex life which is satisfied according to the simplest, least dangerous, and greediest manner possible. Occasionally, of course, the fear of life and the exaggerated fear of the consequences of sexual love lead to a complete disinclination to sex life or to an evasion of the problem in some less dangerous perversion.

When we discuss a fatherless child it is less important to know whether the actual father is present than to know whether there is someone who fulfils a father's function in the development of the child. A real father may fail in his function, while a step-father, an older brother, or even a mother, may fulfil it excellently. What is the function of a father? In a lesser degree it is much the same as that of the mother: a father is the first individual with whom the child can make a social contact, with whom he can experience love. The father is a trustworthy support in the structure of the child's life, which the child can relinquish only in the degree that he is sure of himself and capable of facing life independently.

The economic function of the father in our society, in addition, is of extreme significance to a child because it is by the father's work that the family is supported. In our civilization, which is dominated by a masculine ideal, a fatherless boy is far more affected than a fatherless girl. This is a further objection against the importance of the "Œdipus complex" and its feminine counterpart. It is self-understood that most boys imitate their fathers in one way or another. And most boys realize that they will have to sell their work in the outside world at the highest price and in turn become the head and support of a family.

This future responsibility may seem immeasurably difficult to a child. A father awes his child by his greatness, and the difference between the child and the father seems inconsolably great to the child. But the father may also be a model, and the child realizes that life's tasks can be done. He may measure the signifi-

cance of his actual progress and his training for the conquest of difficulties in the life and activity of his father. To many children the stimulus to become "like father" is a strong impetus. In watching their father in conflict with the realities of life they realize that these realities may be conquered.

The boy who is fatherless in the sense that the fatherly function is not fulfilled has little or no idea of the technique of living. Life, work, and the necessity of making money are empty concepts for him. Other conditions may falsify his perspective on life, and he may conceive life in terms of fantastic dangers because he knows nothing of it, and because he has no confidence in himself. On the other hand some fatherless boys grow up as if they were on a happy island, without presentiment of any difficulties and without any concept of objective problems. In both cases the prognosis for later life is bad. The subjective overvaluation of danger in childhood leads to timidity in later life. The child whose attempts at progress are pessimistic from the beginning, because his feeling of inferiority has been exaggerated by false impressions, usually fails for want of courage.

The difficulties of life, like human beings, are what you make them. Let a man believe that he is incapable of success and he will take care through his cowardly hesitating actions to make the obstacles greater than they are. Everyone makes his own experiences. The pampered children who have been kept from any contact with reality as long as their solicitous mothers could hold them, while being robbed of the comradeship of a father's experiences, are quite unprepared

for the real difficulties of life, and are quite incapable of handling themselves when these difficulties appear. It is usual for such children to take fright at their own helplessness. They flee from difficulty and return to the protection of their mothers whenever possible.

Both types end in the same situation. They grow up into oversensitive, timid, incapable, complaining adults, very much inclined to follow the tactics of childhood in subsisting on the sympathy of others. They attempt to assume a parasitic rôle toward their fellows, allowing themselves to be helped by others at all times because they are convinced that the parasitism which proved so serviceable with their mothers is the one and only real way to live.

Boys of this type will not have very great difficulty in sexual activity, because their close relationship to their mother prepares them and accustoms them to women; but in marriage, as in the rest of their life, they will thrust all responsibility to the shoulders of their partner and remain helpless and ineffective in marriage, as in work.

We are purposely giving extreme cases, and we must warn the reader that the endless complexity of life is not to be forced into simple types. It is very instructive, however, to trace the effect of the family constellation on the character of the individual, deductively, for only in this way can we find the approximate pattern of cases which actually occur—though seldom as pure types—and so recognize these types from their origins in the family constellation.

The prevention of the character traits that unfortunately result from bad family constellations, more-

over, can be effected by recognizing them. By knowing the dangers that occur in any single case, we can begin to prevent the bad effects of definite family constellations, at an early age. It is desirable, therefore, to substitute the function of the mother and the function of the father in every case of orphaned children in such a way that the child will experience the love-producing function of the mother and the work-producing function of the father. When one parent is wanting, the other parent may often play the double rôle of both.

The case of the only child is of extreme importance. The fact that this very type can be recognized frequently even among adults seems to indicate how important environment is in the development of the child's character. Only children, whether as children or adults, constitute a large percentage of a psychiatrist's patients. Only children are usually helped too much. Being alone in an environment of grown-ups the only child becomes more and more conscious of his need of help. His parents, who believe that in helping him they demonstrate their love, and fulfil their duty, help him more than is necessary. Every little difficulty becomes the object of exaggerated care. The child is never alone—his parents are his servants, and he assumes that such service is right because he never has experienced anything else. It is for this reason that only children never want to be left alone in a room, and never want to go to sleep; and it is for this reason that they wake up at night, after dreams of terror, in order to call their mother to their bed.

The personal self-esteem of an only child is based

on his weakness, and he fosters his helplessness because this helplessness enables him to tyrannize his family. To be sure, the only child wants to grow big and strong, but he has not enough courage to do it. His first day at school is usually a crisis, because in school he must share the help of the teacher with many others, and take his place in a community and remain without special honor for the first time in his life.

This situation robs him of his courage, and the only child either fails in school or attempts to avoid school by producing symptoms of "nervousness," such as nausea, headaches, vomiting, and the like. On the other hand he may become a "problem" child, and by his undisciplined action, his grimaces and naughtiness, attempt to hold the attention of the teacher and thus assume a rôle of importance in the classroom. Anyone who understands the connection between the behavior of such a child and his situation in the family will easily understand that it will profit little to treat such a child with medicine, or to punish him for his naughtiness, for neither of these methods will accomplish the only desirable end: to make the child courageous.

Because corrective measures are only partially successful the "only-child" type appears with surprising clarity in adults. When human beings have failed entirely to compensate for their difficulties, they never really grow up, but remain children and really want to remain children. They long for the lost paradise of childhood all their lives; and all their lives they want to reproduce the situation of their childhood to which they have been accustomed. As in the case of the only child, the grown-up who was once an only child is

forever searching for an environment to love and admire him. He will be looking for powerful and influential individuals who will back him. If he succeeds in attaining his desire he saves himself the labor he dared not begin alone. He fears nothing so much as open competition with equals. He does not want to take dangerous chances, and only where he is unique, only where he can be the beloved darling, and only where he can find individuals who will put themselves in the service of his weakness, will he deign to live.

The only child considers himself unique, socially very valuable, and much superior to other people. But closer investigation shows that this false superiority is the mask that covers a deeply rooted feeling of inferiority. It is a bluff. Overweening vanity is characteristic of this type, which cannot live without outer evidence of success. The only child wants make-believe success, not reality, for he does not trust himself to real achievement.

Any child who has been the only child for a number of years may find his situation fundamentally changed for the worse with the arrival of a brother or sister. The newly born child threatens his supremacy. Children who have been pampered up to the time of the birth of another child in the family will show active tendencies to jealousy when they find the new arrival taking all the attention. The older child feels he has been driven from his paradise.

In many cases such a child reconciles himself to his new position, and actually finds it an advantage not to be the smallest one in the family. He may, indeed, learn to align himself with the grown-ups by being

helpful to the baby, but all children do not succeed in this. Whenever the second-born is preferred more distinctly, as in the case where a first-born girl is followed by a boy who is greeted with a special enthusiasm simply because he is a boy, and nurtured and guarded as being exceptionally valuable for this reason, the natural tendency to feel deposed and discriminated against may be intensified into the deepest embitterment which inexorably determines the future conduct of the older child's life.

When this happens we find men who carry the gesture of a dethroned monarch throughout their lives. They become individuals who are oversensitive to the point of having delusions of persecution. They experience insults and degradation on all sides, and their life is spent in a ceaseless battle for their threatened prestige. The typical situation of childhood seems to repeat itself as if by a curse. But it is much the same as with the only child—a man or woman actually arranges these seemingly fortuitous acts of destiny, and industriously brings about those very situations which he dislikes.

People who believe themselves persecuted and frustrated act toward their environment as if they were constantly being insulted, and thus gradually produce the circumstances which they originally imagined. They believe that no one loves them, that people want to have nothing to do with them, and withdraw from them. The result is that they gradually isolate themselves and find it increasingly difficult to escape from their isolation. Because these people have been deprived of love in their childhood their social feeling fails to

develop, while their profound discouragement, originating in an aggravation of the family situation, results in a tense striving for the maintenance of their prestige.

Aside from this exceptionally unfortunate development pattern, being an oldest child in a family has definite advantages. First-born children frequently develop spiritual maturity, inner security, and a sense of responsibility, very quickly after the birth of a younger brother or sister. The oldest child is greatly encouraged if he is taught to feel that he belongs among the adults. A love of order and a sense of duty may appear spontaneously, even when they previously have been the objects of a hopeless battle between child and parents, when the oldest child realizes that constant scolding and oversight are no longer appropriate to his honor. The older child finds that he must become a model for the younger one, and senses that he must win his rights to take part in the younger child's education. As his self-confidence grows, his social feeling is strengthened simultaneously. The oldest child becomes more considerate of the wishes and the needs of his environment and adjusts himself more willingly to the little community in which he lives, because he need not play the rôle of the smallest and most helpless any longer. His heightened sense of responsibility enables him to take over small duties and activities in the household, and thus permits training in the direction of real progress. Every success is sensed as a strengthening of his self-esteem and appropriately elaborated in the process.

Yet the position of the oldest child is not without

its dangers. The oldest child is generally expected to be especially sensible, and a good example for the younger ones, and these great expectations are often too difficult for the child to realize. Not infrequently, therefore, oldest children assume the rights of the first-born with transparent vanity, but avoid the tasks of life and school by making constant evasions and excuses. These oldest children dread every examination because they fear that they cannot realize the high expectations of their parents. They are far more inclined to take part in extra-curricular activities where failure is not so evident and control cannot be exercised. Theirs is the false optimism of the cowardly who console themselves with hopes for the future. When the crisis comes they take flight into the nervous breakdown which is the final alibi and salvation of their self-esteem.

Another oldest child will demand the privilege of authority, and show his true colors in his boundless tyranny over the younger children. This occurs most frequently when oldest children have suffered the authoritative pressure of their parents for a long time, and have felt their self-esteem insulted by their parents' actions. They know no other method of reconstructing their self-esteem than to burden their younger sisters and brothers with the evil experiences they have suffered at the hands of their parents.

In later life they become the unbearable know-it-betters, the little Napoleons who are always nagging their fellows, and noticing every little mistake. They assume a magisterial attitude toward the whole world. Usually they will be conservative and will criticize

everything novel; they will deprecate everything by appealing to unquestionable authority, feeling it their mission in life to prevent anyone from rising. Their secret insecurity lurks behind the mask of their seemingly impregnable superiority, which is satisfied only when others have been intimidated and made insecure. Their fear of their own worthlessness is assuaged when they have proved the valuelessness of others.

The type of the youngest child is no less characteristic. From the very beginning the seeming hopelessness of ever catching up with older brothers and sisters, and the intolerable feeling of always having to be the smallest and most defenseless in the home, is calculated to rob the youngest child of courage. Under the conditions the need of preserving prestige becomes so much the stronger, and the sense of self-esteem becomes so much more sensitive to actual or imagined insults. Youngest children who will not allow anything to please them, simply because they are the smallest in the family, display a revolutionary stubbornness as a fundamental trait. They feel themselves called upon to be little heroes and they await the attacks of imaginary enemies by unfailing preparedness for battle. Those belligerent and hearty ruffians who have no real contact with the actualities of life, but prefer to pound their heads against walls so that they may enjoy admiration for their audacity, are developed later in life from these children.

Their audacity, however, is the direct opposite of real self-confidence. It originates in the irritated sense of inadequacy common in the youngest child. It is a bravado which turns to fear and panic when the first

attack fails. Constancy of effort, quiet self-confidence, and the objective weighing of actual possibilities are foreign to these children, who sometimes succeed because they are willing to stride over dead bodies. But seldom, indeed, do they achieve any quiet or calm, because their insatiable ambition and their lack of social feeling never allow them time to rest. Their success is the horror of their environment. What they achieve is not an end in itself but a means to the glorification of their ego.

In favorable cases the heroic position of the youngest child may give rise to valuable achievement. This has often found its expression in fairy tales and legends. Everything new that has ever been done by human beings was, in some way, a revolutionary deed, an audacious break with custom and tradition, viewed by the old as a crime, but considered the highest heroism from the standpoint of development and progress. Not all progress is the result of gradual development. Now and then in the history of the world we find the sudden existence of something which has never existed before, a novel invention that has completely and suddenly changed the world.

The agent of these important discoveries has always been a revolutionary, but the worth or worthlessness of his deed has hardly ever been correctly evaluated at the time of its performance, for it is history—the judgment of time—which passes the final verdict. It seems that this phenomenon is part of Nature's plan, for there is no doubt that the tangled mixture of right and wrong, of egocentric ambition and far-sighted objectivity, which we find so often in heroes and fighters,

is a favorable premise for the achievement of memorable novelties. Here is the most appropriate sphere for the youngest child.

Youngest children who are born late, however, develop in a different fashion. The great interval between them and their older brothers and sisters makes competition with these older children seem hopeless. The late-born child grows up in much the same way that an only child grows up, surrounded entirely by adults and adolescents, conscious of his uniqueness. He is traditionally pampered and spoiled. The natural consequence is dependency, cowardice, and the desire for support, as well as a tendency to take the helpfulness of others for granted and to misuse this helpfulness for private ends. Such children will find great difficulty in relinquishing the warmth of their family life, and that fateful moment when they must stand alone on their own feet to assume the responsibility of being grown-up will be projected as far into the future as possible. Often enough they are possessed of much grace and charm, but they are hopelessly incapable of doing anything for themselves. They make their helplessness seem delightful, so that no one can be cruel to them and all the world views them with a mixture of sympathy and contempt.

The cases we have described should be considered as illustrations of various results of the influence of the family constellation, and not as a complete catalogue of possible types. There are countless special types, such as that of the middle child of three, who under certain circumstances may be pushed into the shadow and so become discouraged, timid, and insecure. The situation

of the older and younger of two children, for example, is considerably different from that of the oldest and youngest of a large family.

In evaluating the family constellation the factor of the difference in ages must be taken into account. Twins are a special case in point. It is worth noting that twins, even when they are of the same sex, are far less similar in their mental reactions than they are in their physical constitutions. This fact is strong evidence against the assumption of the significance of the hereditary predisposition to mental traits. If heredity were the most important factor for the development of mental characteristics, twins would have to be as similar in their mental reactions as they are in their bodily; but as a matter of fact, experience teaches us that one member of every set of twins assumes the rôle of the older. In the case of twins who grow up under similar conditions, slight differences in physical capability, or in the attitude of the parents, may distinctly lower the scales for one, and raise them for the other. Allow one of the twins to gain the upper hand, and the similarity of conditions is broken for all time. The feeling of superiority on the part of one evokes a corresponding response on the part of the other; this in its turn calls forth a new reaction on the part of the superior child. The disparity growing from this reciprocal influence is further reenforced by the experiences of later life.

The relation of children to one another should not be undervalued. Little is to be gained by belief in the traditional bromides of the love of brothers and sisters for one another. That brothers and sisters could love

one another is more or less apparent, but it is of little interest psychologically. The degree to which they do *not* love or actually hate one another, or are jealous and envious of, and compete with one another, either in their activities or for the love of their parents, is much more important. The reciprocal relationships, together with contrasting degrees of dependency and superiority not determined solely by the ages of the children, may definitely decide the fate of the individual child.

The relationship of brothers and sisters to each other in regard to accomplishment in general, and accomplishment in certain specific spheres, is very significant in the discussion of talent and genius. We can predict with some certainty that if two brothers play the piano and the older one is especially talented, the younger one will fail completely in his piano study. The significant advantage of the older is quite sufficient to dampen any desire of the younger to compete. If this younger child is otherwise courageous, he will seek another activity in which he can succeed as well as his older brother does on the piano. In general, where there are only two children in the family, we shall find development in divergent directions. Two children seldom resemble one parent in their mental development, although their physical likeness to one parent frequently occurs. The bodily similarity is based upon heredity, but the mental similarity is due to the fact that a child chooses either his mother or his father as a model.

In general the oldest child orientates his ideal of personality according to the parent who dominates the marriage. The identification with the loved par-

ent, of which psychoanalysts speak, is a natural result of the fact that the beloved parent is overvalued, whereas the parent who is not so well loved is undervalued. In his striving for significance the child raises the beloved and overvalued parent to an ideal, and makes the imitation of this parent his goal in life. He succeeds in this by imitation and intensive training.

The choice of the second child is limited, because to direct his personality ideal along the same line as that of his older brother brings him in contact with dangerous competition. The very fact that brothers and sisters are striving for the same goal makes them hostile to one another. What one child chooses is deprecated by the other, and leads to preference for another line of development. The divergence in the development in character among brothers and sisters may be explained on these grounds. In large families the relationships are not so easily catalogued and in the individual case can be understood only by a minute analysis of the family constellation.

Aside from too great differences in age which obviate competition the factor of sex differences, which will be discussed more fully later, plays an essential rôle. If other factors do not interfere it is surely more natural for a boy to strive for a masculine ideal, or for a girl to strive for a feminine ideal. The task of an analysis by individual psychology is to take the given facts (among which the family constellation plays an important rôle) and to deduce from them every single aspect of the unique character of the analyzed individual. The possibility of doing this may be proved over and over again. Research into family life along

the lines of individual psychology would develop more extensive data to prove this point.

The family constellation may also be of significance in an individual's choice of occupation. Fear of competition with older brothers and sisters need not be the only consideration. A father's occupation is a strong determinant of the son's occupational attitude. The manner of influence varies greatly. Whenever a son sees his father successful in an occupation which the son believes valuable, there is always a probability that the son will take up the same occupation, although we must realize the possibility that the son is competing with his father and chooses the same occupation in order to prove himself the more powerful. It frequently happens that a child follows the same occupation as his father with the conscious desire to surpass the father. The son of a public-school teacher may want to become a high-school teacher, the son of a petty official desire to become a high dignitary, and the like. Both father and son may be stimulated by this competition, and if the self-confidence of the son has not been destroyed by other circumstances, there is a good prospect of the son's realization of his occupational ideal.

The situation is much worse when the father has made exceptional contributions in his occupation. The more the son admires his father, the greater the possibility that he will lose the courage to compete, and the greater also will be the possibility that he will sense the necessity of being less eminent than his father as a severe discouragement. Often the son relinquishes the competition with his father and occupies himself

with work in which no such competition is possible, as in the case of the sons of a famous jurist, one of whom became an engineer and the other a botanist. Then again, the son will desire to rise on the shoulders of his father and begin where his father has left off, as is instanced by many a prominent business man who carefully capitalizes his heritage in order to achieve greater wealth than his father.

If the father is a famous man it is easier for girls to follow in his footsteps, for they have the consolation that people do not expect as much from them as they would from a man, because of their sex, and this feeling excludes all comparison from the beginning. The stimulus to emulate him which a successful father can bequeath to his daughter may be a great asset if the girl does not take it too seriously. In general, however, the danger that the children of important parents will make a failure of their lives is greater than in the case of ordinary children. The example of Walter Goethe is a case in point.

The fact that important men have seldom had important children can better be explained in the light of this psychological mechanism than according to the traditional mythological explanation that the energy of the family has expended itself. To be the son of a great man, under our prevailing genius worship, is a bitter fate for which only a few persons are prepared. Almost all children desire to be at least as great as their fathers, and in the case of the great man's son, the goal is too high. Ordinary ability becomes relatively unimpressive, and when a child is involved in the alternative of "all or none" and finds the

"all" unattainable, he is forced by Fate to decide on the "none." There is one real exception to this rule to be found in history and that is the family of Bach—for several children of Johann Sebastian Bach became very capable musicians. We must not forget, however, that in his own day Bach was known only as an excellent organist, whereas his significance as a composer was recognized only a hundred years after his death.

The relation of a child's parents to each other must be considered as a partial factor of his family constellation. If marital conflicts exist they come to the attention of children sooner or later although parents do their utmost to let their children believe that they are completely in unison. Conflict between parents almost always terrifies children. When parents, the symbols of worth and totality, lose their calm, war with one another, then the child's belief in the unconditional trustworthiness of parents is destroyed. The child does not know whether he should trust his father or his mother and is forced to become a partizan of one, and consequently to relinquish his relations to the other. This process must, of necessity, destroy a large portion of the child's inner security, making his life the more difficult. The child naturally enough attempts to rescue himself from this disadvantageous situation in so far as he can, by using the conflict between the parents to his own advantage; he sells his partizanship at the highest price.

Everyone knows how the children of divorced parents suffer between the opposing battle lines. The custody of the children is hotly contested in marital

difficulties. Each parent maintains that the custody of the children is his moral and righteous privilege, only to be stubbornly opposed by the other parent. But the child is no one's property, and the relationship of children to their parents consists solely in the fact that the parents are responsible for securing the most favorable conditions for the development of the children. The more emotional the conflict between the parents the less these facts are taken into account. Family conflicts leave inevitable scars in the character of the child, causing an exaggerated fear of the dangers of life, especially those of marriage, laying the foundation for attitudes that arrest character development, or lead to neurosis.

The situation of the stepchild is frequently a difficult one. Although in reality stepmothers are seldom as bad as they are pictured in fairy tales, they find it a very difficult matter to effect a proper relationship with the child, especially where the stepchild has had a close and deep feeling for his own mother. The stepchild remembers the time when his own mother was living as that of a lost paradise, and his first attitude toward his stepmother is one of hostility. Not infrequently the stepmother, although in the beginning she had the best of intentions, responds to the child's hostility by being hurt. The opportunities for a stepmother to become jealous of a stepchild, and to insinuate herself between father and child, are all too common, and the child's prejudice against his stepmother often becomes justified after some time. We shall touch upon the power of lovelessness and cruelty to discourage the child, and to produce an incon-

solable pessimism in his attitude toward life, in a later chapter.

Each family is a case in itself, and within it the decisive influence of the family constellation affects the life of each individual child in turn. There is no position in the family constellation which is favorable under all circumstances, no position which does not have its specific and characteristic dangers. On the other hand there is no position in the family constellation which must inexorably bring unfavorable development in its wake. A child may under favorable circumstances overcome the obstacles of any position in the family constellation, just as he may suffer a spiritual shipwreck, under different circumstances, *because* of the same position.

We have learned the sensitive reaction of the child to every detail of his environment. Should we discard the family as an instrument of education, and substitute a system of communal education for it? Were we to compare the family as it is with the communal education as it ought to be, the choice would surely be in favor of the ideal educational community, although such a one does not exist anywhere today. The conditions of the family environment could certainly be improved by the education of the parents; but a real improvement is not to be sought in this sphere, especially as the family belongs to a decadent phase in the sociological evolution of mankind.

On the other hand there is no doubt that the educational communities, in so far as they exist at all, are not entirely adequate to the specifications of a psychologically minded system of pedagogy. Theoretically

many of the dangers of the family constellation would be obviated by communal education. In the educational community the problems of the only child or the dethroned oldest child do not exist, while the youngest child and the smallest child remain in their unfavorable situation only for a short time. Neither conflict between parents, nor the loss of a mother or father, occurs in the educational institute, and furthermore, it is probable that trained teachers are better able to avoid the mistakes parents so frequently make.

The dangerous effect of parental authority is minimized when it appears in a more harmless form, as the authority of the institution, where authority attains an objective goal, discipline and adjustment. Because of the impersonality of the authority of the institution children tolerate and recognize its worth more readily than in the family. From a technical standpoint, in addition, it is far easier to develop the personal self-esteem and a sense of responsibility in each child by the institution of various monitorships. It is easier, therefore, to develop the child's independence in the educational institution.

The sum of these undeniable advantages of communal education is counteracted by a single but highly significant advantage of family education. Even the best communal education cannot give the child a substitute for mother-love. We have already indicated that "mother" in most cases signifies an individual of unconditional trustworthiness to the child. We have shown, furthermore, that the close relation between the mother and the child develops the first germ of social feeling in the child and that these first tendencies

toward social life are gradually projected, under various difficulties and inhibitions, to other members of the family, and then to the rest of the world.

This first personal relationship of child to mother cannot be replaced. All the goodness and friendship of a professional teacher cannot offer the child a veritable substitute for the lost mother function, because this goodness and friendship must be divided among a number of children and loses its value by too frequent division. Some child will always attempt to make its relationship to the teacher especially close by flattery or competition, in order to become the teacher's "pet." Other children will desire this same unique position, and jealous conflicts will be more common than in a family where similar competition exists.

Where the child loses the battle for a unique position in the teacher's graces he may well develop the traits of stubbornness, bitterness, oversensitivity, and the feeling that he has been discriminated against—all of which are obstacles to proper character development. Only the children who relinquish the privilege of being the teacher's pet, and satisfy themselves with the teacher as a substitute for their mother, can find the stimulus to valuable development in the comradeship of their contemporaries. This demands a certain degree of courage, as well as a great deal of inner security. For this reason we can well understand why individual children, who are put into educational institutions because of the damage done by education in the family, find it very difficult to adjust themselves to the new group.

The goal which we desire to attain by changing the educational system is in itself the first premise of the applicability of that system. Children who have been badly educated at home, therefore, are frequently incapable of overcoming the obstacles of the past, and are unable to adapt themselves to the group. The teacher of the group must come more than half-way toward the individual child during the period of transition, and actually guarantee him a unique position in the group, lest the child become discouraged and be spoiled for further group life. The domineering behavior which such a child has learned during a bad family education must be gradually circumscribed, and it is not always possible to obliterate it completely.

Those children are best fitted for group education who, for one or another reason, can never enjoy the proper relationship to their mothers at home. Considerable difficulties will be met in transferring such a child to a new environment, because a motherless child suffers from a deep distrust of human beings, and has developed to but a slight extent that comradely feeling which is the basis of a larger social feeling. All that we can be certain of in such a case is that a child has lost nothing by being separated from his parents. The children who have been correctly orientated from the very beginning, and who would have succeeded just as well in a family as they do in a group, will usually become the pillars of the educational group, give it its tone and its necessary atmosphere of comradeship and trust.

Whether family education or group education is better will always have to be decided for individual

cases, and not for children in general. In the light of sociological, intellectual, and economic conditions, it is not difficult to predict that the family will gradually give way in the future to the community and the group, in the matter of education. As a matter of fact, many more children than most people believe, grow up without mothers in certain strata of society: among the poor, and especially in the intellectual bourgeoisie—where the working woman has little time to concern herself with her children.

The family in its present form will surely vanish in the constantly progressing process of woman's economic emancipation. So far as the education of children is concerned it is questionable whether we should encourage or hinder the evolution of the family. Our attitude is very much a matter of our personal and political philosophy of life. In each individual case we must make an individual decision concerning the desirability of changing the educational environment, independent of our theoretical sympathies for one or the other tendency. When we decide in terms of psychological insight, we must always ask this question: How will this child, who has grown up in this family, find the transition to group education? The theory and practice of individual psychology will nearly always furnish an approximately correct prognosis.

The results of this investigation of the psychological effect of the living environment upon the child demonstrate the importance of the family constellation as a determining factor in the evolution of the child's goal in life, his behavior pattern, in short, his character. This is an indication of the importance of social rela-

tionships to every human being. It demonstrates moreover how the reciprocal contacts with our fellows determine the nature and specific character of our personalities. As long as psychology is interested solely in the individual it must remain sterile. Individual behavior can be described and understood only when it is considered relatively to the behavior of other human beings who make up the society of mankind in the broadest sense of the word.

Chapter VI

Sex and Character

SEX is not only part of the great problem of social relativity but also a partial problem in the individual's physical constellation. In both cases it is a factor in the development of the individual's personality. The problem of sexuality, moreover, is one of the sociological premises of mental phenomena. Because of its close relations to a variety of allied fields of investigation, it deserves special treatment in a special chapter.

There is a biological reason for the existence of two sexes. A constant and recurring mixture of the germ plasms of two individuals occurs in the formation of each new individual, so that the characteristics gained in the historic (phylogenetic) adaptation of the race can be maintained as a lasting asset for the species. Cross breeding produces ever new variations of the original type, and from these variations never-failing sources of new possibilities for more complete adaptation to the conditions of existence are obtained for the species. The sexual form of reproduction, therefore, is the only possible form appropriate to the evolution of a higher type. Evolution in all nature is a matter of necessity.

Two important factors are closely related to sexuality. The first is the existence of pleasure as a reward (*lustprämie*) for sexual union to guarantee the purpose of nature—reproduction. The second factor is the differentiation in the physical organization of both sexes, in part a point of divergence, and in part the result of the division of labor. The fact that pleasure accompanies sexual union is an essential element in the sex reflex mechanism which appears in every individual who has reached sexual maturity.

The specific stimuli of the other sex, which come to the male through his sense organs—visual, auditory, olfactory—effect a tumescence or engorgement of the sexual organs, and a characteristic modification of the vegetative tonus of his whole body. These stimuli also give rise to certain motor impulses, such as the clasp reflex in the frog, or the rhythmic movements and spasms of the tail in mammals. This condition of vegetative excitement, which we call sexual tension (*sexualspannung*), causes the male to approach the female (although there has been no previous experience) and finally leads to cohabitation, a method which the individual seems to learn intuitively.

In reality cohabitation is a race (phylogenetic) habit. Intimate contact with the stimuli arising from the female ends in the completion of the reflex chain in the sexual orgasm. With the orgasm the vegetative tonus reverts to the status that existed before the sexual tension occurred.

We must emphasize that this is exclusively a reflex mechanism in which the coaction of mental factors is not at all necessary. Only when cohabitation has been

learned from one or several successful attempts, and is associated with the experience of pleasure and the subjugation of the female, can the mental wish for the repetition of these experiences arise. We could designate this wish as sexuality, or the sexual impulse, if these terms had not come to be mistakenly used to refer to the total reflex mechanism of the sexual function.

The second of these two factors we mentioned above, that of a division of labor, is the focal point of the sociology of sex. Since the chief burden of reproduction in the animal world falls on the female, the provision of food is often, although not without exception, the function of the male, at least while the female is busied with reproduction. These relations vary in human beings according to economic circumstances, now, as in the past. Among primitive peoples who live by hunting, the provision of food is the duty of the male, whereas in agricultural communities, where the fields surround the settlement, women are the chief providers. Where the method of providing food was modified as a result of migration or other changes of conditions, the division of labor between the sexes also changed. The development of matriarchy and patriarchy depends largely on this division of labor. The dominant sex is always that sex which provides the food, and marriage laws and laws of inheritance are adapted to the interests of the dominant sex, while the whole spiritual and physical civilization bears the imprint of the dominant sex, whether male or female.

We are at present living in the last phase of an epoch of masculine dominance thousands of years old. The last three generations, marked by an increasing

emancipation of women, have seen this masculine dominance weaken. The deflation and circumscription of masculine superiority, made necessary by changes in our economic structure, has, however, hardly touched prevailing prejudices. Most people still believe in the superiority of man and the inferiority of woman, and only a few thinkers realize that the difference in values of the sexes, in so far as it actually exists, is a product of a civilization dominated by a masculine ideal such as our own. Sooner or later the transformation of the cultural relations between man and woman which is now in process will result not only in equal privileges but in the equal valuation of both sexes.

The superiority of man is not a natural law. The strongest evidence against male superiority is the fact that in other civilizations, where women played the dominant rôle, the superiority of woman was considered just as natural as the superiority of man is believed to be in our age. Women were undoubtedly the superior sex in the days of matriarchy. It has been argued that women have not accomplished what men accomplish in the occupations which have been opened to them, although women have had ample time and opportunity to prove their worth in free competition with men. The rebuttal is similar to the answer to the question of talent and genius: achievement is so far dependent on courage and training that it is practically impossible to evaluate any underlying hereditary predisposition correctly.

If this can be proved for individuals it is equally valid for the feminine half of mankind. Many women share men's common pessimism about their achieve-

ment. They dare little, and, therefore, they achieve little. One must not be deceived by the obvious self-consciousness of many women who are active in professions usually open only to men. The more they emphasize their inner security, the surer it is that they would like to overcompensate, by their ostentatious confidence, for a deeply rooted feeling of insecurity with which their sex is so often cursed. Women's important achievements in almost all fields of endeavor must be valued the more highly because, as the emancipation of women goes on step by step, a process of gradual encouragement will be built upon these previous attainments, and thus lead to greater achievements in the future.

At the same time we must reckon with the ingrown prejudice that women are inferior as with a given fact, and take cognizance of its psychological influence in the life of any individual. The conviction that the two sexes are of unequal value is in the air, and although this prejudice is not necessarily voiced, its influence is unavoidably felt early in the childhood of a girl during the development of her personal self-esteem.

When a girl, who has been the only child for a time, is followed by a brother, she finds that the new arrival is greeted with great enthusiasm not alone because he is a new child, but because he is a boy. Being dethroned is in itself a heavy burden for the older child, but to be degraded because she belongs to the feminine sex—and the arrival of the newborn boy brings it to her attention in no uncertain manner—fills her with bitterness and jealousy. Sex differences which had hardly come into her consciousness before the birth of

a brother now become the center of burning interest, and it is more than likely that she will ask herself: "If it is better to be a boy, why can't I be a boy? Couldn't I make a boy of myself?"

No child is entirely spared this phase of emotionally tinged sexual investigation. Boys learn of the difference of the sexes sooner or later and recognize the difference in the work detailed to the two sexes. This difference is not such a degradation for the boy as it is for a girl, but it makes him conscious of his position, and he is burdened with the necessity of proving himself worthy of it. All too often such statements as, "No boy would do that," and, "Shame on you, you're acting like a little girl," force him to play up to his onerous sexual rôle. In the case of young boys the feeling of inadequacy which grows out of the general situation of childhood gains a specific sexual color because of the tendency to emphasize masculinity as if the danger of a boy's losing his virility existed.

Children of both sexes are inclined to believe that masculinity is equivalent to superiority, and femininity is equivalent to inferiority. The one-sided overvaluation of the male sex that dominates our culture is taken over by children and exaggerated to their advantage, wherever possible. The more a child suffers from the difficulties of his position, the more the problem of sex becomes the basis of his pessimistic fear of life. Under these circumstances not only the unfavorable factors of the family constellation and of education, but also organ inferiorities play an essential rôle. Variations from the norm, which frequently occur in the sexual organs and in the secondary sexual characteristics, are

evaluated in a very subjective manner by their bearers, and become the basis of more or less successful compensations and overcompensations, as we have shown. When an adult innocently remarks, "Why, you look like a girl!" he may indeed have inoculated the child with a tremendous terror, anxiety, and doubt of his own sexual rôle.

When a child asks about the secrets of sexual life his questions are more than mere curiosity. They are bound up with a vital interest in his own person, an interest which is entirely in the line of his striving for significance, and not, as the psychoanalysts would have us believe, the expression of infantile sexual tendencies. We recognize the fact that children may begin to masturbate at a very early age and that this phase of sexual research may begin as soon as the fourth year. And yet it seems inconsequential to find such manifestations the expressions of infantile sexuality. So far as masturbation in children is concerned it signifies nothing more than the child's utilization of all possible sources of pleasure in his body.

Once we realize that there is a mechanism of pleasure we can easily understand why masturbation actually occurs. Every pleasurable sensation may have been significant sometime in the history of the race as part of the biological pattern as a pleasure prize, but nowadays only a very few pleasure perceptions have this biological significance. These occur infrequently in childhood, and thus the possibility of their "misuse" exists. Though pleasurable sensations may become their own goal and purpose, the pleasure principle does not, as the psycho-

analysts would have us believe, play the chief rôle in life. The behavior of the child very clearly indicates that the desire for pleasurable experiences arising from the child's own body is secondary to the purposive trends directed toward the enlargement of the personal self-esteem. We must except those cases in which the childish striving for significance is identified with the pleasure principle, and is merged with it as a pleasure-hunger. We have already shown how this false form of identification may occur.

Pleasure-hunger is always an index of profound discouragement. It is the pessimistic emergency exit of a depressed feeling of personal self-esteem, in an individual who trusts himself neither to actual achievement nor to the preparation necessary for achievement. It is exclusively the discouraged child who tends to excesses of pleasure-hunger in whatever form, be it in a boundless desire for sweets or in constant masturbation. When these cases are superficially examined the key position of the pleasure principle seems obvious. More thorough investigation indicates that it is the compensation for a feeling of inadequacy, in one of the safe side-shows of life. The apparent change in character which overtakes the masturbator, commonly believed to be the consequence of his masturbation, is in reality its basis. Masturbation is an expression of a helplessly weak, insecure attitude toward life. In a later chapter we shall have occasion to describe how feelings of remorse and guilt become significant factors in character types of this kind.

We can speak of sexual libido only where the relation to the other sex is actually a sexual relation,

whether real or imagined. The perversions which seemingly exclude relations with the opposite sex do not indicate that we have bounded our concept of sex too closely. For we can always prove that a perversion which results in the exclusion of normal sex relationships originates where normal sexual relationships seem too difficult or too dangerous, and represents an attempt to avoid these normal relations.

A whole series of physical mechanisms which are present in earliest childhood are present in the manifestations of sexuality. These are the pleasurable mechanisms related to the skin and mucous membranes of which we have spoken above. Yet we are not justified in considering these pleasurable activities as autoerotism, and dragging them into the concept of sexuality, simply because these functions can later be utilized in the service of sexuality. The pleasurable possibilities of the genital zone acquire sexual characteristics only when these organs take up their sexual function and thus actually become sexual organs, for until puberty they serve exclusively to empty the bladder.

Until sexual maturity is reached there is hardly any difference between the genital pleasure and the mouth and gum pleasure of the child—childhood masturbation and the pleasurable taking of food—either biologically or theoretically. If the new psychoanalysis which goes beyond Freud considers the apperception of pleasure in the taking of food as a partial aspect of infantile autoerotism it deserves praise, for this is true. But if every pleasure experience is to be catalogued in this way, then the concept of *libido sexualis* loses all vestige of

value and becomes indistinguishable from the concept of the pleasure principle in general. We must distinguish between sexuality in the broad sense and sexuality in the narrow sense. Little can be accomplished by the substitution of unusual and misunderstood terms for ordinary language.

The so-called partial drives of sexuality such as anal-erotism, urethral-erotism, oral-erotism, and the like are nothing more than the transcription into sexual language of the fact that various bodily zones, together with the general motility and sensibility of the entire organism, may be pressed into the service of the sexual function. The observations of Adler that the sensitivity to pleasure is often exceedingly emphasized in those very organs which are the seat of organ inferiority is not without significance. This is a form of overcompensation. Thus children who have a marked defect of the digestive tract experience more obvious pleasure when they empty their bowels than is normally the case with other people. But this does not justify us in designating a psychologically unimportant anal pleasure as an anal-erotism.

To be sure the neurotic may make a great deal of it because it is appropriate to his general behavior pattern; he may sexualize physical phenomena and base his abnormal sexual function upon their presence. One is justified in speaking of anal-erotism only within the structure of the neurosis. These physical premises and manifestations of individual sexuality are the material for the personal behavior pattern and acquire value only in reference to the personal goal. This personal goal extends far beyond the boundaries of the purely

sexual and affects the individual's attitude toward all the problems of life as well.

It is true that specific sexual experiences occur many years before puberty, and it was Freud's discovery which first drew attention to them. Occasionally this precocious sexuality is based upon precocious puberty which has been observed as early as the third or fourth year of childhood. Where the genital organs are precociously developed it is reasonable to expect that the psychic readiness to assume the sexual functions also appears earlier than usual, especially as mental precocity is often associated with sexual precocity. Often an unusually early appearance of sexual activity is psychologically interesting as a manifestation of the child's striving for significance, characterized by the ambition to be sexually as capable as a grown-up.

Sexual matters acquire a sensational and forbidden connotation because the modesty of grown-ups withholds sexual information from children as long as possible. To the child a knowledge of sex life is tantamount to being grown-up. But if a child dares to translate his knowledge into any form of sexual activity he is regarded with horror by his contemporaries and often considered half a hero and half a criminal. These circumstances play a far more important rôle among poor children from the age of ten up than is generally believed, but they are so widespread that they are hardly considered signs of sexual delinquency. Child prostitution may develop where the premises of neglect, pleasure-hunger, and hatred of work have prepared the soil.

Masturbation is one of the normal manifestations of adolescence. As we have said before masturbation is not at all a sexual act but the utilization of a pleasure mechanism. Some children, especially girls, discover masturbation by accident and believe that they have made a tremendously important discovery. Boys are usually stimulated to masturbation by their playmates, and for the most part children enjoy the pleasures of masturbation quite innocently. It is only when they have been discovered and scolded by their elders and learn that masturbation is forbidden, that the masturbatory habit becomes loaded with feelings of guilt.

Physically well-developed children usually give up masturbation at this point. But in those cases where an accentuated feeling of inadequacy prevents the existence of self-confidence, a battle to break the habit begins which has all the characteristics of a neurosis. Masturbation which originally had pleasure for its purpose undergoes a purposive reconstellation. Whenever the child suffers defeat or failure he withdraws from the world and seeks consolation in his habit of self-gratification. Pleasure becomes a means of ego maximation, while anxiety masturbation helps to evade the pressure of a future defeat such as a school examination.

The nervous manifestations of anxiety are closely related to sexual excitation as a kind of bodily resonance to the psychic phenomena. Masturbation as a form of spite and stubbornness belongs in the category of the emotionally transvaluated forms of masturbation. Spite masturbation is usually a reprisal for defeat. The child acquires pleasure from carrying out a for-

bidden act without hindrance from his parents. The fact that they cannot punish him for it because they know nothing of it strengthens the impulse to continue the act.

The individual who masturbates, however, crystallizes his whole sense of inadequacy in the feeling that he is doing something morally reprehensible in masturbating. This strikes the keynote of mental conflict. "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" is the direct experience which lays the basis for a fictional split of the personality and becomes the index of the war between the good and the bad principles—between God and the devil. The masturbator is always making resolutions never to do it again. His resolutions last for a few days or a week, during which he feels himself mentally elevated and purified. Then he suffers a fall from grace in connection with some petty defeat, and his excesses, accompanied by a feeling of perplexity, are followed by deep depression. This game is repeated countless times, and the presentiment of defeat is darkly felt even when the formal resolutions are made; and yet the battle goes on.

The psychology of mental conflict which we have attempted to describe above is transparently present in the struggle to quit the habit of masturbation. The "splitting of the personality" is an obvious smoke screen. The goal of the purposive trend which contains such a "splitting of the personality" is neither "purity" nor "sin," but precisely this futile vacillation between the two. The moral ambition of the belligerent individual, derived from his feeling of inadequacy, sets itself a task whose difficulties are artificially increased.

He wars for a complete victory, but his deeply rooted doubt as to his own value as a human being is the harbinger of his defeat.

The child actually does not dare to leave his position of inferiority. If he were to leave this position he would have to be afraid of his godlikeness, and the task of maintaining the moral level of victory is too difficult. The more victory is glorified in advance, the more certain is defeat. The premise of defeat is unconsciously surmised when the battle is begun. If defeat occurs, the individual still has the consolation of having put up a good fight. "*In magnis et voluisse sat est.*"

Depression, remorse, perplexity, and penitence and a new attempt to take up the battle restore the child's shattered self-esteem. At the same time his weakness has been proved. In so many words, the masturbator asks, "What can anyone expect of me, what can I expect of myself, if I am not even able to break this habit?" On top of this he assumes the thesis, "I am a masturbator," as a justification for every failure. "What couldn't I accomplish if I were not the victim of this terrible habit?" He does not spare his self-reproaches, while maintaining his alibi of good intentions by attempting to break the habit again and again—only once more to succumb to temptation.

During this process the poor sinner withdraws his interest from the outer world, because his mental conflict requires more and more of his time. Failures in life and school, in play and sport, increase in number but they lose their reality. These defeats are important only as affirmations of his own futility and as indices of the fateful consequences of his evil habits. The rem-

nants of his self-esteem are lost while the child plays the rôle of a tragic hero battling with his conscience.

The result of this process is uncertain. Given a certain hereditary predisposition, of whose actual nature we are not entirely aware, masturbation may be the introduction to dementia præcox. Psychologically this is not difficult to understand, for dementia præcox represents the final and complete retreat from the battle-front of life. The stupefaction (dementia), which the anxious hypochondriac believes is the consequence of masturbation, becomes a fact, as interest in the outer world is lost. The animal-like twilight state called stupor, which is frequently associated with excessive masturbation, indicates the mental equivalent of suicide. Stupor and dementia are infrequent results, and there is little doubt that they occur only in the presence of a certain bodily predisposition.

In the far greater number of cases the pattern of conflict between good resolutions and temptation is maintained until late in life and assumes the form of a neurosis. The neurotic cannot relinquish the recurring indications of his own weakness nor deprive himself of his constantly arranged sense of inadequacy, because he desires to evade the actual problems of life by occupying himself in a futile conflict within himself.

When a child grows and his inner security becomes established the mood of inner conflict becomes paler and paler. In the course of time moderate masturbation, accompanied by a minimum of inner reproach, gives way to normal sexual intercourse, and the way is opened to a life based on reality. Now and again we see cases in which some insult to the personal self-esteem,

such as a conflict with a sexual partner later in life, causes a relapse into masturbation as if an infantile position of inferiority had been assumed out of spite.

The mental attitude of the masturbator demonstrates how the search for personal self-esteem, and the quest of security, as found in an individual's social and occupational life, color his sexual behavior as well. In the case of masturbation a biological phenomenon is misused by the individual as a defense mechanism and as a device to cover a possible retreat.

The attempt of psychoanalysis to explain masturbation as the activity of auto-erotic impulse components is no more than a restatement of the facts in the sexual terms of the psychoanalytic philosophy, and is in reality no explanation at all. No one will deny that masturbation, accompanied by sexual thoughts, is a sexual act; an "auto-erotic" sexual act accomplished without the help of an actual sexual partner, is undeniably a real sexual phenomenon; but these are of no psychological interest. But an interpretation of the meaning of the mental reactions of the masturbator and the interpretation of the rôle that masturbation plays within the unit pattern of his personality, by individual psychology, are of great interest. From the standpoint of individual psychology the fact that masturbation has nothing to do with sexual tendencies will be obvious to anyone who does not reduce all phenomena of mental life *a priori* to a pansexual basis.

Masturbation, nevertheless, has considerable sexual significance, because, in a great majority of cases of masturbation in adolescents and adults, it incorporates a fear of actual sexual relations. This fear, which is

the essential basis of all sexual problems, arises in the childhood situation of the individual. We have already discussed how young girls, when they learn of sexual matters, believe that their sexual rôle is inferior, and that women are second-rate men. The little girl's further development is burdened in addition with the pressure of being a woman.

So long as a girl does not realize the unchangeable difference between the sexes she will attempt to become a boy. Such girls show little inclination for activities which are usually associated with girls. They lose their interest in dolls, seek the company of boys, compete with boys in wildness, become tomboys, and are happiest when they are allowed to wear trousers. The hopeless attempt to become a boy usually ends in bitterness and discouragement; for in the last analysis a tomboy is never considered quite an equal with the boys, and the more she attempts to wipe out the difference, the more the boys despise her.

This attitude, which Adler has called the "masculine protest," is maintained late into life. The modern restratification of social and economic relationships favors the girl who assumes a masculine style of life as she grows up. She will emphasize her disinclination to maintain her own sexual rôle by assuming the dress and habits of the masculine sex and she will also attempt to maintain a complete economic independence in her profession.

The masculine protest, which frequently has fairly good consequences in general, leads to serious difficulties in the sexual life almost without exception. In extreme cases of masculine protest normal sexual rela-

tions are impossible. There are women of this type who will have nothing to do with men, and they either evade the whole sexual question by an ascetic training mitigated by secret masturbation, or they seek the way to their own sex. Homosexuality among women (Lesbianism) is an unmistakable expression of the masculine protest. We need not assume the existence of a bi-sexual predisposition, or a homosexual impulse component, in order to understand the phenomenon of Lesbianism. An aberrant personality trend can overcome emotional resistances by training, and finally succeed in activating the sexual mechanism toward members of the same sex.

The masculinity of female homosexuals is no index of bisexual predispositions. In every case such masculinity indicates a false training against the female sexual rôle from early childhood. The training is always quite within the pattern of the personal striving for significance. This extreme type of masculine protest occurs most frequently where a little girl is crowded from the normal line of development by a trick of nature—by external masculine characteristics, such as ugliness, facial hair, masculine body, a deep voice, and the like.

If the sexual pathologists call these cases pseudo-hermaphroditism, or sexual transition forms, and consequently assume that homosexual activity is inherited, they must prove their point. It is well known that there are countless homosexual women who have absolutely none of the secondary sexual characteristics of the opposite sex; and vice versa, there are countless women whose exterior is very masculine, but whose

sexual life is perfectly normal. The not infrequent cases where a masculine exterior is associated with homosexual tendencies are to be explained psychologically. If every chance of success in the business of being a woman is excluded from the very beginning by external factors, the temptation to avoid sexual relations with men, and seek them with women, is very great. Whether any individual woman becomes homosexual depends on environmental factors.

One thing is certain, no woman is *compelled* to be a homosexual either by the force of heredity or circumstance. Legal efforts to remove homosexuality from the list of punishable crimes deserve to be supported, even though these efforts are based upon the false assumption that homosexuality is irrevocably conditioned by hereditary factors. This holds equally for homosexuality among men. Although we know that homosexuality is determined neither by fate nor by nature, we must condemn to the utmost the legal injustice of making a neurosis a punishable crime.

The complete expression of the masculine protest which leads a woman to the practical realization of her ideal of "manlikeness" and to homosexuality is the extreme and exceptional case. Such radical tendencies are usually recognized as mistakes early in childhood and there given up in the majority of cases. Yet when the goal of manlikeness is relinquished it is always done in a gesture of resignation, obviously because the child who gives up the protest still believes that the female sex is less valuable than the male. Such a girl must reconcile herself with being "only a girl" and appropriately arrange the plan of her life.

We frequently see attempts to transform the imagined weakness into strength, and this accounts for many girls who avail themselves of "feminine weapons" in order to express their power over the other sex.* Coquetry as well as the methodical though unconscious temptation of members of the other sex are nothing more than thinly disguised expressions of a masculine protest with feminine weapons. That woman who is capable of forcing men to their knees actually gains her victory, but she betrays the same ambition as her sister who is disinclined to be a woman. Whether a woman chooses one or the other plan of attack is determined by factors occurring in childhood and in adolescence.

Puberty is an undeniable crisis in the life of every girl. The awakening of the sexual function, quick bodily development, and the realization that actual life is implacably before her produce a mood of anxious excitement present in all her attitudes. Clumsiness of movement, a tendency to blush, pathological timidity, but also exaggerated gaiety and uninhibited behavior, are the external expressions of a certain inner stage-fright, which seizes the girl as she stands on the threshold of life, still desiring to fly back into that happy paradise of childhood where earnest problems did not exist.

Subjectively this is the last phase of ego-discovery. At this time, under the pressure of necessity, the ego is experienced as an object, and emotional and mental

** Translator's Note:* "Sex appeal" and "It" are contemporary American expressions of the masculine protest. Psychologically "It" represents an effective technique of conquering the allegedly superior male with feminine weapons.

processes formerly naïvely directed toward the external world become the object of attentive self-observation. The young girl begins to look at herself, and to write diaries of her activity. Any simple emotional experience is artificially raised to sentimentality in the process of self-analysis. Fear of the external dangers drives many a timid soul into itself, with the result that the little girl breaks many former bridges to her fellows and feels herself isolated and misunderstood.

In this stage a girl is insecure and without perspective. She escapes loneliness by returning to the external world in order to find some point of contact, and she forms sentimental "crushes" and friendships with her contemporaries who are in the same condition. Her growing sexuality becomes a pressing force, so that actual relations to the opposite sex are desired, yet they are simultaneously avoided because they are considered as disgrace and subjugation.

Many a young girl falls in love with actors, movie heroes, unapproachable poets, because they are far away, and because they lock the gate to the approach of any real man. The heart of such a girl no longer belongs to her. When any young boy woos her in actual life he is disdained in proud derision. But the disdain is the child of a nameless fear. We may well expect a crisis in her philosophical attitude toward life at this time. Such a girl needs radical mottoes. The "all or none" law, the sole support of her inner insecurity, becomes the essence of her philosophy.

Piety, asceticism, penitence, and self-reproach of her sex life, which is considered a sin, belong in the pattern that leads to an ideal of sanctity that many a young

girl pursues, because at this dangerous age she is stranger enough to life and the world to be satisfied with such an ideal. Other girls as fervently revolt against a childhood belief in God and find their way to philosophic materialism and atheism. The absolute and definitive Truth becomes a *sine qua non* of life, and it is sought in books where safety and security may be found, while the real world is evaded.

The storm gradually passes. The final attitude toward life and its tasks and especially toward the problems of sex emerges. If the girl has essentially reconciled herself to her sexual rôle earnest relationships with men begin. The more she has attained inner security, courage, and self-confidence, the more she is disposed to surrender herself to actual relationships.

Every love relationship is simultaneously a quest of personal significance and an attempt to effect a genuine adjustment to a community of two souls. It usually begins with the triumph of vanity. A young girl wants to please and she succeeds in pleasing. The admiring glance of a lover betrays her first triumph. Now she must follow up her victory. The best method of making a man fall in love with her is to fall in love with him. This flatters his sense of personal value, and his vanity demands that he idealize the girl who has interested herself in him, and furnish her with a halo of perfection. The same process occurs in her. The love of two young people is mutually inflamed by their relations to one another, until the process reaches its culmination in a declaration of love—a declaration in which the two lovers mutually intoxicate themselves with their admiration of each other.

Women first fall in love with love—then with a man. The game of coquetry gives rise to a genuine human relationship, which eventually and despite all inner inhibitions leads to physical union. A great deal of egoistic vanity and the desire to dominate remains, nevertheless. Every young girl senses a threat against her own domination when her boy looks at another girl. Her demure subjugation and dependence on her lover becomes an instrument of power just as is the case with a spoiled child. She demands that her friend shall be with her all the time, and from this moment a competition for love is developed. Neither the one nor the other will admit that he loves his partner less than he is loved. The proofs of love are exhausted in the process of mutual give and take, while the terra firma of objectivity is lost and the two lovers are involved in a war for prestige.

"You do not love me!" is an angry reproach which could never exist if the simple truth were admitted by both lovers that one can never force anyone to be in love. These young lovers do not know that love is always a gift, given or refused, according to inner necessity. This growing problem of love relationships leads to more and more conflicts. Presently we have the first infidelity. It is not caused by the arrow of Cupid who has wounded one or the other with the love of a third party. The infidelity is the expression of revenge, of belligerency, or of a desire to degrade. And the game begins anew with the new love.

This process is part of every woman's training and preparation for marriage. Many a girl believes that she is destined to marry a man who will enslave her.

Despite her anxiety and inner disinclination, the logic of life compels her inner affirmation of marriage. Her more or less serious premarital love affairs enable a girl to conquer her timidity toward men step by step, and to learn to tolerate human and physical intimacy.

But marriage is really quite another thing. Where marriage is concerned a woman must assume a responsible attitude as the head of her household, and the problem of motherhood must be faced. All this requires courage. Careful investigation reveals that many a young woman who is compelled by biological and economic factors to marry maintains a secret resistance to the man she marries. This resistance manifests itself very clearly in her behavior, although she is not conscious of it. Such women are very hard to please and set such difficult conditions for the men they would consent to marry that it is almost impossible to find any man who can satisfy them. Other girls again are remarkably clumsy when it comes to marriage, for they find happiness only with very young men who are incapable of marrying. Still other girls misuse the time of preparation, becoming involved in numerous adventures, so that they finally "lose their reputation," an important premise for marriage in the prevailing system of morals.

The common neuroses of the engagement period offer the last line of defense to the girl who wants to avoid marriage. This engagement neurosis is often considered the expression of love's impatience, but this is not its real significance. The engagement neurosis definitely separates the girl from the marriage of which she is afraid. If the decision to marry is made despite

the neurosis, mitigating circumstances, such as the personality of the man or his social and economic condition, outweigh the woman's hesitation. The objective factor of the husband's economic ability to maintain a home plays an important rôle, especially when there are illegitimate children, whose support is a much greater burden than the simple maintenance of a household. Among the very poor (in contrast to the middle-class population where the tradition of absolute virginity of the bride is maintained) sexual morals are not so strict, and a girl is tacitly permitted to have sexual relations outside of marriage.

That tremendously important sphere of duties which includes the maintenance of a household and the bearing and education of children, although it is hardly sufficiently honored in our prevailing masculine culture, is very much feared and repudiated by many women. Sometimes the recollection of a mother who suffered humiliation and disillusionment in her marriage acts as a warning signal. A neurosis must often serve a girl as a justification for the evasion of a business career, to say nothing of childbirth and the care of children. Little remains of marriage except social position, the "Vanity Fair" so common in our present society, in which the wife has nothing but her prestige and owes her social eminence to the work of her husband, his money, and her taste in dress. Few people realize that this is not enough to fill a life. The world-weariness, ennui, and bored pessimism, which are the just results of such a style of life, are translated into a neurosis directed, with seeming logic, against the husband who assumes the rôle of chief malefactor. A lady

with sensitive nerves becomes the center of her family. Everything revolves about her—her every wish is fulfilled. In this way she realizes an ideal of feminine power for which she did not dare to compete in more usual ways: another case of masculine protest with feminine weapons. It is not impossible for a woman to achieve a semblance of prestige and significance, at the price of a neurosis, despite her marriage.

There are some women, both married and unmarried, who avoid the implicit tasks of marriage by playing the rôle of a feminine Don Juan. Triumph over men is their goal in life. They engulf every man in their victorious coquetry. The especially strong sexual appetites characteristic of their style of life may represent either an organ inferiority with its consequent somatic resonance, or the result of training. These women need an accentuated sexual life, so that their men appear more desirable as sexual objects. They consider their greater sexual desire a justification, moreover, for their unmoral life, as long as they believe that it is based upon a physical imperative.

Outspoken frigidity in sexual matters is another expression associated with the same goal of the avoidance of marital duty. Frigidity clearly betrays the features of the masculine protest when we pierce its disguise and find it an instrument of conquest and degradation directed against a lover or husband. Frigid women are not concerned with sexual satisfaction, nor do they care to make any man happy. Once a frigid woman has "conquered" her man, let him be disillusioned and humiliated because he is not enough of a man to make her passionate! For her part, she will not allow herself

the intoxication of passion, because in a passionate response to his embrace she will be subjugated—so she believes—to him.

A union of these two attitudes—an accentuated sexual appetite coincident with frigidity and the inability to experience a sexual orgasm—is the chief characteristic of that neurosis which we call nymphomania. The nymphomaniac woman exceeds any man in her sexual aggression. She makes no choice and is willing to submit her body to any man's pleasure, but in the moment of submission her masculine style of sexual activity fails, because in intoxication of the orgasm she would have to be a woman—and therefore she can never experience it. A similar expression of the masculine protest is to be found in the sadistic tendencies of some women in fantasy and in reality. They experience sexual pleasure only when they feel themselves stronger than a man, either in their cruelty or in their dog-like subjugation to him.

Much of what we have said about the psychic development of woman and her sexual life is equally valid for man. The sexes are really not so fundamentally different as the transparent exaggeration of our times would have us believe. The one-sided overvaluation of sex, so common to our present-day culture, makes itself felt as a burden to every boy. Every boy has the high task of always "acting like a man," and this task in itself may seem to him a difficult heroic state. In his early years he must prepare to emphasize his manliness and train for his heroic rôle. Rough behavior, undisciplined and uncouth manners toward girls fit into this pattern. The higher the ideal of mas-

culinity is set the more surely will adolescence become a period of mental stage-fright for the boy.

It is at this period that masturbation, formerly an innocent unsexual pleasure mechanism, gains specific significance as evidence of masculinity. The "showing-off" and uncouth brutality of adolescent years betray an undertone of secret fear. The boy is afraid he may fail to play his masculine rôle, and his insecurity produces adolescent manifestations very similar to those of girls. Physical development, together with the newly experienced necessity of being grown up, the last phase of ego-discovery, the experience of emotional states as objects of introspection, mark this period. Retreat from reality, day-dreaming, misanthropy, the feeling of being misunderstood, loneliness, or "crush" friendships may appear simultaneously.

Girls are both feared and repudiated. A boy's first love for a woman much older than himself is obviously a timid way out of his difficulties. The young boy is hidden in his relationship to the older woman, for she sets the pace and almost plays the rôle of his mother. The psychoanalytic theory that the Œdipus complex occurs with the regularity of a natural law, however, seems untenable. If it does happen that the tenderness of a boy for his mother approximates real love and his relation to his father is marred by jealousy, the occasions are rare, and such a situation, in the last analysis, is no more than the expression of the infantile wish to be big. The boy identifies himself with his father and desires to take his place so far as the relationship to the mother is concerned. The infantile feeling of inadequacy lurks behind the Œdipus complex.

There is no doubt, however—and this may have

given rise to the feeling that the Œdipus complex is a universal experience—that every boy experiences this relation to the other sex in his first relationships toward his mother or older sister. Although in the majority of cases this relationship is distinctly not sexual, it does provide the boy with a handy pattern for his first real relationship to the other sex. His problem becomes easier if he can apply the rules of the game learned in his contacts with a mother or sister. When a boy chooses to love women who are similar to his female relatives because of their age, his Œdipus complex is little more than a trick of a timid soul.

The average young man feels that sexual intercourse is a task which he cannot evade if he wishes to feel himself a man; our civilization approves of a greater sexual freedom for men and guarantees them a lesser burden of consequences for sexual intercourse. Fear of women is the result of an exaggerated ideal of manliness which a boy develops in his childhood. In the fantasies that accompany masturbation he has always felt himself the victor over the other sex, but when he must translate these fantasies into reality he is seized with stage-fright. The more he believes his relationship to woman to be a relation of domination and subjection, the greater his anxiety. Many a young man is frightened of the task of "conquering a woman" and causing her to belong to him in the normal way. His courage may be great enough to talk of love to a little girl and to kiss and embrace her, but since the young girl is also usually afraid of final submission, this first love affair remains "Platonic" and does not lead to sexual intercourse.

On the other hand it requires no great courage to

enjoy love which you can pay for. A young man goes to a prostitute because he feels that a man must have sexual intercourse. Perhaps he seeks a prostitute because he has satisfied his pleasure-hunger by masturbation up to this time. If, as often is the case, his first attempt at coitus fails, the failure in itself is an expression of the boy's fear of women. In first attempts at coitus with a prostitute the fear of women may be connected with a justified fear of venereal infection. Coitus with a prostitute, who usually is frigid, can hardly be a great pleasure. To most young men it proves a great disillusionment. They have to admit that self-satisfaction through masturbation is not only cheaper but better. Yet intercourse with prostitutes is continued for reasons of prestige, because many a young man is ashamed to admit that he has not had intercourse.

A man gradually acquires enough courage to have a love relationship which he carries out to the last intimacy. This does not occur in all cases. We frequently find a characteristic division of sexuality and love life lasting until past maturity, especially in men of the middle classes. Their courage and ability to make contacts is not sufficient to win a girl of the poorer classes. Girls of the middle class, however, to whom these men feel themselves more closely related, are not to be had so easily, because they want to be married. In both cases the man is afraid of the resulting responsibility of conception following his intercourse.

When a man of the type we have just described marries, either for convention's sake, or for love, and

has intercourse with a "decent" woman for the first time, it is extraordinarily common to find that he becomes suddenly impotent, although with the aforementioned division of sexuality and love he was quite competent in his sexual relations. He excuses his failure by pointing to the fact that the decent woman doesn't know how to make love, and that the technical difficulty causes his impotence.

The truth of the matter is that the first attempt to blend sex with love evokes his first real fear of woman. This fear has been present, although hidden, from the very beginning. Intercourse with prostitutes really does not count at all, because a prostitute in his scheme of things actually is not a human being, but a creature misused for the gratification of his senses. He does not have to prove himself a man to the prostitute, for, by definition, she does not count as a real person. To embrace a woman who is an equal is the only real test of manliness. Every man who is not sure of himself beyond the merely sexual sphere fails in this test.

The common overvaluation of sexuality and manliness carries the connotation that the traditional form of sexual potency is equivalent to potency and virility in other matters. The impotent man is not pitied but ridiculed and despised. Many men are as proud of great sexual potency as they are of professional achievements, for in many cases the feeling of prestige expresses itself in sexual language. Sex becomes a symbol of power. The man in the vanguard has the courage to have sexual relations. The man who has stopped along the way for fear of defeats in life allows the fear of woman to assume gigantic proportions.

In other cases sexuality becomes a side-show in which some men who are incapable of fighting life's battles in the main arena succeed, by virtue of long training and mitigating circumstances, in winning petty victories. The triumphs of a Don Juan are make-believe triumphs. Although they represent a capture of the other sex, the conqueror cannot hold his position. The Don Juan actually runs from one woman to the next. He is proud of the fact that he could possess *any* woman, but it is certain that he is unequal to the task of sharing his life with *one* woman. The Don Juan may master the strategy of man's sexual approach to woman to the point of virtuosity, but he is a bungler in the technic of communal living.

Man's fear of marriage is much more commonly recognized than woman's. This is the consequence of our economic status, because marriage means security to a woman but a questionable luxury to the average man. In reality a far-reaching parallelism exists in both sexes' fear of marriage—that sexual union which is most appropriate to our present way of living. Some men are afraid that they are incapable of maintaining their relations to one woman. Some men, like women, are afraid of the responsibility of starting a family and maintaining a household with children. That the majority of men decide to marry despite their fear is evidence enough of the fact that the institution of marriage is probably the best possible solution of the man-woman problem.

When we realize what an inconsiderable minority of men and women attain meaningful human relationships in their work, and consider what meager oppor-

tunities for the construction of human communities in friendship and social life exist in our individualistic era, we must conclude that for the great majority of human beings the family is the only activity in which the purpose and meaning of life can be appreciated. No ordinary friendship permits the human proximity of the relationship between a man and a woman who are sharing their lives in marriage. The real fulfilment of their lives occurs in the production of children.

Birth-control arguments would be incontrovertible, and would have been translated into general practice long ago, if the production of children were simply an economic matter. The great majority of human beings are incapable of protecting their children from economic dangers. From a purely business standpoint every man who decides to have a family commits an error, because his children are seldom assets and often liabilities. Mankind ridicules the Malthusian rationalization and continues to produce children, not for economic reasons, and not because conception cannot be prevented, but because men and women want something to live for, something to take care of and work for; and because each human being wants to produce something which will go on beyond his own narrow and mortal person and circumstance.

Any person who, in his childhood or youth, has achieved that degree of inner security which enables him to seek his life's center of gravity in society, and in communal living, rather than in his own self, sooner or later will be capable of approximately solving the problem of love and marriage. All the others will attempt to evade this problem by means of tricks and

subterfuges, later to be described in our consideration of the neuroses and sexual perversions.

Among those who attempt to evade the issues are the young men whose masculine security has been shattered by a feminine exterior. These are the boys who are told, "You look like a little girl," when they are young, the boys who are burdened with an insuperable pessimism about the sexual tasks because of some medically unimportant anomaly of their sexual organs. They are usually taught masturbation by other boys before they are adolescent. The boy who doubts his own manliness continues what began as an innocent game, beyond the period of puberty, so that all the devotion and tenderness which his comrades direct toward women are directed toward boys with whom he has played his sexual game. A boy with such a history feels that in this way he has secured himself against the dangers of the other sex. We call this homosexuality.

An error in our way of thinking, based on the belief that homosexuality is due to a congenital and hereditary predisposition, sanctifies this cowardly aberration and allows it to exist just as if it were as right and as normal as normal sex love. One need but observe the behavior of the homosexual in other than the sexual sphere to realize that he is a coward in the face of all the difficulties of life. Such observation demonstrates that the homosexual's conscientious emphasis of his "womanly weakness" (he believes himself irresponsible because of his heredity), his deceitfulness, vanity, dishonorableness, and coquetry, are all part of the smoke screen of his neurosis, subterfuges which guarantee

the homosexual exemption and leniency, not alone in his sexual life, but in all his activities.

The homosexual neurosis is not different from any other neurosis. It should not be punished—it should be treated. Society should be protected against the homosexual practices of older men who have lost the courage to approach women and make the seduction of adolescent boys the expression of their sexual life. But in the last analysis these men need treatment more than punishment.

All the other sexual perversions are substitutes for the normal sex act. Masturbation, when it occurs in mature individuals, like any other perversion, is an evasion of sex. It is one of the commonest devices known to individuals who cannot overcome their fear of woman. Fetichism may be determined by early childhood associations. Fetichism is that form of perversion which consists in the attainment of sexual satisfaction by the observation or touching of an article of clothing or some specific part of the woman's body. It may occur in men who believe the sexual approach to a woman, in the normal way, is dangerous. The masochists feel their weakness so deeply that they make a virtue of it, and pay women to beat them and trample upon them. They intoxicate themselves with their feeling of inferiority, gaining courage to act only when they are humiliated and debased. The sadist, on the other hand, has to prove his manliness by cruelty and brutality before he feels sufficiently sure of himself to test his virility on a woman. The exhibitionist gains his pleasure by the degradation and vilification of woman in the exhibitionistic act. The "frotteur"

touches women when he is hidden in a crowd and uses the contact in order to satisfy himself in masturbation. He frequently attains the illusion of conquest from the experience since many women allow themselves to be touched because they dislike to make a public scene. The necrophile harbors a frightfully distorted sexual cowardice that drives him to seek sexual satisfaction on corpses. The sodomist, equally cowardly, misuses animals for his sexual purposes. All these perverts are deserters from the front of love. They are neither degenerates, nor cripples burdened with hereditary stigma, they are simply neurotics who lack courage to love and to live.

That greatest of modern problems, the conflict between individualism and communalism, between the striving for personal significance resulting from the feeling of inadequacy and the social feeling, is crystallized in the problem of sexual life. In the vacillation between conquest and submission, a permanent solution is impossible to find. The fact that we overrate masculinity and undervalue femininity focuses the whole conflict in the sexual life. So long as the majority of people either think or feel according to this biologically untenable and historically obsolete point of view, a conflict between the sexes must exist.

We must apply the point of view we have developed for the understanding of talent and genius to the woman question. We have demonstrated that with greater emphasis on training, the possibilities of achievement are much greater than we used to believe. Although biologic sexual differences may actually exist, even so far as brain functions are concerned,

they are not quantitative but qualitative differences. What women have accomplished in work and sport indicates that not even superlative achievement is unattainable by women. Theoretically, a woman can do anything that a man can, but a great deal of active optimism is needed to translate this possibility into practice. Such optimism will eventually emerge when the individual psychological point of view has become more common. There is surely no danger in accepting the thesis of individual psychology unless one were afraid that it might be proved true. To pity the alleged hopelessness of feminine efforts is rank hypocrisy.

The second reason for the central importance of the sexual question in our modern life is the fact that the sexual function has a biological purpose. The sexual function is and will remain a part of the process of reproduction. Reproduction signifies a desire for activity beyond mere individual existence. In other words reproduction is a partial function of the social feeling, and for the great majority of people the only part that has assumed meaning and value in the practice of every-day life.

Despite all theoretical pessimism, children continue to be born, loved, and educated. There is little doubt that a great many people find value and meaning for their existence in bringing up their children, despite the fact that their prevailing philosophy is the search for pleasure. For the majority of human beings the foundation of a family is the only valuable basis of life. Marriage, it is true, is not always considered a task in the beginning, but its duties are almost always sensed. Work, the earning of money, sociability and

friendship may all serve a goal of personal pleasure; but the foundation of a family appears as an irrational element within an otherwise almost exclusively materialistic style of life. Marriage seems a distinct contradiction of the egoism of mankind, and yet only a very small number can avoid it.

In later life, when hedonism and the cult of pleasure do not pay so well, this minority must pay the price of the evasion. With the exception of rare individuals who compensate by the creation of some important work, life without children is untenable for the aging man or woman. It is almost impossible to escape the need of the social feeling in the sexual life. When an individual with a failing sense of personal self-esteem cannot produce enough self-confidence to hew to the line and strive for his goal, his fear is proportionate to the significance of his task. The conflict that arises between "I must" and "I cannot" can only be solved by "I will" and "I do." This conflict frequently attains an intolerable tension in the problem of sex. He who fails to solve the sexual question gains nothing by the solution of the other problems of life, and it is for this reason that men and women who have failed to adjust to society and to work never solve their sexual problems. Often enough they do not realize their failure, but it is not difficult to predict their impending difficulties if misfortunes have not already beset them. The prediction is seldom false.

Chapter VII

Education and Personality

WE have seen how the development of the personality is determined by the factors of organ inferiority, by the social and economic status, by the family constellation, and by sex. These conditions exist when an individual is born, and, in their totality, influence the structure of his personality without being amenable to change. The fifth set of conditions that influence character development includes all those purposive and planned influences which affect mental behavior. We call this group of factors—education. The practical import of these influences merits full discussion. Whether the adults who dominate the environment of a child believe in specific educational theories or not, the environment has a pedagogical influence on the child, for good or for bad. This is so even when the people forming it are not cognizant of its pedagogical task nor of the responsibility associated with it.

The education of a child according to specific, well-formulated rules does not play the important rôle in practice that it is believed to play. The treatment that a child receives in his home is much more dependent upon the emotional attitude of the parents to the children and the part the children play in the lives of their parents.

In some cases the parents' attitude is expressed in pedagogical terms, so that theory and practice are one. In other cases, however, the educational principles are such crass contradictions to the realities of family life that any outsider can witness the conflict which is hidden from the parents. Some fathers, for instance, constantly repeat Pestalozzi's motto, "Teach by love and by example"; but, nevertheless, believe that their chief educational function is to impress their authority on their children. Little room is left either for example or for love under the circumstances. Some mothers believe that the first thing a child must learn is obedience and discipline (which is surely a false theory); true to their principle they refuse the most innocent wish of their child, yet allow themselves to be bribed and coddled into assent. Other mothers seem to recognize the great importance of love in education, only to emphasize their love for their children by tyrannizing over them with the command that they be duly grateful. It is difficult to believe in such love.

The fundamentals of good education are not hard to understand. They have been known for a long time. Nor is it hard to understand the fundamentals of the authoritarian education which originated in a definite cultural atmosphere, now disintegrating. Good and bad, but chiefly bad, are mixed in authoritarian education. It is easy for parents to see that this is so, yet the compelling personality trends of parents, expressed in their attitude toward children, are stronger in their influence than truth.

Every parent wants in some way to elevate his sense of personal self-esteem. Some parents can do this only by considering their children as private property or as

a domain which they must rule. Such parents do not understand their responsibility to their children, because they believe that children should serve a parent's vanity, ambition, and desire for perfection. Many a mother treats her child as if it were actually a "piece of herself." She is as ashamed of the child's mistakes as if she had made them—and she is as proud of the child's achievement as if she herself had accomplished something. There are mothers who say, "This is my child," as if they said "my arm" or "my head," and act as if they actually possessed the child.

Authority as an educational principle is based on emotion, and is supported by many theories. One of these theories proceeds on a psychological assumption which has a semblance of justification. The theory is that every child is egocentric, undisciplined, rebellious against authority from birth, and must be "domesticated." According to this theory, the initiation into a social community, which is the chief goal of education, must be accomplished in the same way that one compels a dog to "lie low." In the case of the dog the consequential use of dog-biscuit and whip accomplishes the end. When the dog obeys he is given a biscuit. If he disobeys he is beaten, so that the animal obtains a conditioned reflex in which obedience and pleasure are linked on the one hand, and disobedience and pain are bound together on the other. Every tendency to disobey is inhibited by the associated fear of pain, while the stimulus to obey is intensified by the imagined reward. If this method of domestication is carried through carefully and without mistakes, one can "break in" a dog.

But we must take one thing into consideration, and

that is that this physiologically correct method of training a dog succeeds only because the dog has inherited a readiness to be domesticated from his ancestors. Not infrequently dogs actually train themselves to be obedient without external compulsion. The experiences of every-day life can in themselves activate mechanisms which have been laid down throughout generations of canine history. On the other hand the training of wild animals is exceedingly difficult and cannot be accomplished without great brutality. The method of training and domesticating animals by authority remains valid in the case of wild animals (if not always necessary), because the trained animal has nothing to do for the rest of its life but to obey.

The premise of domestication is a biologically preformed social feeling, and so far as this is concerned, man lives under much the same conditions as a dog. We have indicated the proofs of the existence of a social feeling in a previous chapter, and at the same time we accounted for its failure to appear in early childhood. The specifically human phenomenon of the feeling of inadequacy inhibits the development of the social feeling in the first years of childhood. The natural function of education, therefore, would seem to lie in the task of hastening the gradual reduction of the feeling of inadequacy to the end that an uninhibited development of the social feeling may occur. Where this succeeds the social feeling develops spontaneously, not only in the direction of adaptation, fellowship, and discipline, but also in the direction of objectivity, independence, a sense of responsibility, courage, and a readiness to work.

Herein lies the essential difference between the education of a human being and the education of a dog. A human being must do more than merely obey. We believe that obedience is far from being the most important virtue a child may possess. The method of domesticating and training dogs is entirely dependent upon their obedience, because that is all a dog needs to know. The method of the animal trainer, however, cannot be applied to the education of human beings.

It is not difficult to find the undesirable after effects of authoritarian education in the behavior of children and grown-ups who have been "trained" in this way. The overemphasized authority of the grown-ups makes the gulf which the child perceives between himself and his parents seem all the greater. At one and the same time it intensifies a child's feeling of inadequacy and minimizes his hope of ever becoming significant in the face of such inordinate power. In authoritarian education a child is considered stubborn and uncooperative and is punished if he attempts to be independent. When the child's will is suppressed the child is discouraged, and his discouragement may manifest itself in the most varied fashion.

The model child is the end result of more or less successful authoritarian education. First-born children are usually model children, because the first-born child is inclined to accept the principle of authority as soon as younger brothers are born into the family. The birth of a younger child enables the first-born to enjoy the fruits of authority. He feels that if the world is so ordered that the great may tyrannize the small, he is justified in applying this principle toward his younger

brothers and sisters. But he must admit its reciprocal corollary and recognize the principle in his relation to those who are more powerful than he. For this reason he becomes an obedient and model child, and in this way he thinks that he has gained the right to demand obedience and model behavior from his younger siblings.

The most characteristic thing about the model child is his pact with authority, a treaty designed to permit him to share in the advantages of authority. The model child's feeling of weakness, which arises from the general situation of childhood as well as from the pressure of authoritarian education, finds its over-compensation in his feeling of power over his younger siblings. In order to enjoy these advantages he must recognize parental authority over himself.

If the younger brothers and sisters do not obey, the first-born child denounces them to the higher authorities. When he has "told" on a younger brother's or sister's shortcoming, the punishment which follows after his denunciation arouses a feeling of inner satisfaction and a Pharisaic superiority over the poor sinner, a pure form of enjoying the misfortunes of others. In this way a child becomes a nursery policeman, and his respect for conservative power usually remains part of his character for the rest of his life. So long as parents direct their authoritative demands toward real accomplishment in school and at home, the model child will doubtless accomplish a great deal. He will do everything that he is asked to do and attempt to do it as perfectly as possible.

The model child applies the same methods that he

has learned in the nursery to his school work, especially if his teacher believes in the authority of grown-ups. The model child is marked by his good behavior, neatness, and zeal to do the right thing from his first day in school. There is a transparent tendency to become the teacher's pet and thus approach as quickly as possible the desired close connection with authority. The model child is held up to his fellows as a brilliant example, and his denunciations are utilized for the betterment of class discipline. He is chosen the monitor who is responsible for the good conduct of the class. Sometimes the model child uses his power as monitor to sell his good graces to his favorites. Those boys and girls who are friendly to him are excused for their little lapses, whereas his personal enemies are unmercifully persecuted and delivered to the justice of the teacher.

A child's inner independence suffers severely in this development. The model child does not work for the sake of work, but to please parents, teachers, and current tradition. He lacks all stimulus to find new ways of doing things. Obviously, the old way is the right way, the way to get good marks in school and praise from one's teacher. There is no better way to produce servile minds than to make model children. The petty officials who tolerate the pressure of higher officials (just as in school and the nursery) only because they can subsequently exert the same pressure upon those below them, are recruited from these ranks.

Look for a former model child in life, and you will always find that he is surrounded by superiors on the one hand and inferiors on the other—that he will

always toady to superiors and be an intolerable petty tyrant toward those who are not so far advanced as he. Put a model child on his own and he fails. If a model child marries and founds a family he does so simply to create a sphere of influence in which he can lord it over his inferiors, who cannot, by the nature of circumstances, rebel against this tyranny. The model child practices that method of education which he has suffered himself. He passes on the beatings that he got from his parents to his children, for the tradition of authority is passed on from one generation to another.

But education to blind obedience does not always succeed. If a child refuses to accept the authority he begins to battle against it, usually in accordance with his place in the family constellation. Just as the oldest child is given to conservatism and a belief in authority, the younger fraternity are given to rebelling against it. The younger child is quick to defend his sense of personal self-esteem and his prestige with gestures of defense and offense. A revolutionary note dominates his entire life. Opposition at any price, is his motto. The mere fact that a father desires something makes the child refuse it no matter what its objective value. Stubbornness becomes a principle of life.

Granted the spirit of rebellion, failure in school, lying, dishonorableness and treachery become the appropriate instruments of protest and rebellion against power. The seeming effrontery of belligerent children usually hides an underlying discouragement. Whenever the young rebels have actually to accomplish something, or to finish some task, their disheartenment

is unmasked. The burning ambition of these children demands a goal far higher than they can attain under the given circumstances. But the rebel fails even in average accomplishment, evades issues, and seeks for alibis to escape responsibility.

The younger child defends his prestige from final defeat by looking for unreal victories. These victories and successes usually lie along the line of an unobjective conflict with authority and institutions. In the case of the rebel child, authoritarian education attains the very antithesis of its desire and goal. The authoritative father complains of his errant child and calls attention to the many beatings, the strict punishment, and the unavailing good counsels he has meted out to the child. He concludes that the child is congenitally bad or that he has inherited his badness. Fathers dare not admit that their strict education produces the very thing they want to avoid. No matter what crass failures follow a father's authoritarian education, he refuses to admit that what he calls effrontery, stubbornness and overactivity—the qualities which he has attempted to suppress by discipline—are in reality a lack of courage, a phase of disheartenment—the gestures of a discouraged child attempting to restore his insulted sense of personal self-esteem by temper tantrums and revolt.

Religious education is in many cases a special type of authoritarian education. Let us preface our remarks by saying that the question of religious educational methods has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. Anyone who investigates the matter objectively must be convinced of the fact that

religious concepts cannot be taught to children. To most children biblical history is a collection of more or less interesting fairy tales, while the catechism is an unendurably boring and uninteresting book which has to be learned by heart; confession to most children is a ceremony in which it is only necessary to tell the father confessor an appropriate number of sins. If one cannot remember the right number of sins, they can be borrowed from a friend. God is a kind of fetich, comparable to the idol of a savage tribe.

No child can understand the spiritual content of religion. Anyone who desires to educate his children to be religious men and women would do well never to mention a religious concept to them before they are fourteen or fifteen years old, if he desires to find them sensitive and open to the acceptance of such ideas. For these cannot be understood at any earlier time. Religious education as it is practiced today is usually little more than an instrument of authoritarian power in school and home. Its chief purpose seems to be to intimidate the soul of a child and to fill it with anxiety.

The child is taught that the power of a punishing Justice may be felt even where it is not seen. The omniscience of God, the concept of sin, the punishment of a hell which awaits the poor sinner after death are ideas which may have sublime significance to the adult believer and justify him in accepting religious and ethical systems. To the child they signify no more than a supernatural and superstitious extension of the pressure of authority beyond the boundaries of every-day life. Whether the child is afraid of the boggy-man or of the devil is of no consequence. Religious education

of children can have but one consequence: the inhibition of the free development of the child's sense of personal self-esteem.

We realize very well that we have been describing extreme types in this chapter just as we did in the chapter on the family constellation, and we know that in reality these cases are often less typical. Authoritarian education may have relatively good results if other unfortunate environmental factors do not complicate the picture, and if obedience is tempered by an underlying parental comradeship and love.

It is a crime and a disgrace to our culture, however, that children are still beaten and that in many parts of the United States parents and teachers are legally allowed to use corporal punishment. Nothing can destroy a child's self-esteem, and nothing is more degrading than corporal punishment. Yet the astonishing elasticity of the child's soul may bear corporal punishment without severe consequences when it is used regularly, as in the English schools; under such circumstances punishment loses all its value, as is the case when the child senses his teacher's love despite the punishment.

The worst consequences of authoritarian education are to be found where the authority is the expression of hate and cruelty. The authority of cruelty and hate produces the antithesis of its purpose. The social feeling cannot develop in a child who has never experienced love. At best such a child becomes a turncoat and a hypocrite. A child may never come into conflict with authority, because he outwardly accepts the legally prescribed virtues, but he will have no objection to hurting his fellows when he is sure he will be undetected.

The emotional frigidity and cruelty of parents is transmitted to their children with inexorable regularity. Humanity can best be learned and practiced in the warm relationship to father and mother ; one must be initiated to be a fellow man. Education without love may lead to adult criminality as we described in the section on juvenile delinquency, or it may express itself in a complete lack of understanding for human relationships. Although misanthropy is not legally punishable it is just as antisocial as crime. The path elected depends chiefly upon social and economic factors in environment.

The "philanthropic" financier who neglects the welfare of his employees, the ambitious profiteer whose progress is over dead bodies, the cold-hearted "gold-digger" who bleeds men and discards them, are individuals far more dangerous to society than the thieves and burglars from whom we can be protected legally by prison walls. All these types are not "to blame"; they have never learned to love. Life has been too hard for them in the icy atmosphere of a loveless family. They cannot gain enough confidence to meet the world on its own terms, because they have not realized that they are not alone in the world, because they have not learned that there is just as much protection against defeat and failure in the communal reciprocity of human relationships as there is in the cult of individual power. These are the men who dare not leave the fortress of their eternally threatened ego, men who fear to disarm, men who believe that they will be impoverished if they contribute the most insignificant mite without having their recompense safe in their

hands. They are so discouraged that they cannot afford to be good.

Is an excess of love possible in education? This question leads us to the theme of the pampered and spoiled child, which we partially discussed in considering the psychology of the oldest child, which is almost identical with that of the spoiled child. A family that constantly admires, pampers, overfeeds, and spoils a child is like an incubator—but incubation is certainly not the right preparation for life. The insecure child chooses tyranny over his environment as a compensation for his difficulties. This tyranny is not only tolerated but applauded by the family for a time; as long as it is tolerated there are seldom any conflicts or difficulties in education, because the unique despotism of the child is recognized without reservations.

The affability of grown-ups and their obedience to the despotic wiles of a child, however, have a limit of elasticity. When a parent's patience breaks, his love for the child is temporarily "done for." The oversolicitous mother then feels that her boundless love and patience have been misused and repaid with ingratitude. As soon as she begins to defend herself the child becomes terrified because he realizes that his parents, who have always been obedient slaves to his will, may, under circumstances, mutiny or become dangerous to him. This is the crime of lese-majesty, an insult to his sovereignty.

The spoiled child tries to restore his authority by temper tantrums, endless weeping and crying. The scene ends either in the more or less ignominious subjugation of the mutinous parents, or in the deep dis-

couragement of the child, especially when the child is taught the limits of his power by corporal punishment. The latter case usually has ominous consequences for the child. Scenes are but temporary solutions of the difficulty. Similar scenes are repeated for similar reasons, to the accompaniment of increased bitterness on both sides. Between battles the child continues to be pampered, so that his life is a procession of stormy scenes, interlarded with tropical emotional solicitude. The pampered child refuses to give up his sovereignty and the more he is irritated the more tyrannical he becomes.

We know well what character traits result from this childish war for prestige. Spoiled children are and always remain domineering, egoistic, and dependent. They emphasize their dependency for the purpose of forcing others into their service. Their weakness is a weapon. They enter life with the ultimatum that they must have everything for nothing, and when life demands performance from them they are at a complete loss. When their first attempt, with its dramatic gestures, has failed, they refuse to make further efforts. No wonder they grow pessimistic. The pampered child looks at ability and achievement with the sour-grapes philosophy of the fox in the fable. The pampered child affects a philosophic superiority in his epicurean attitude toward life, but he misunderstands it because he cultivates his pleasure-hunger at the expense of his fellows.

It is the rule that spoiled children experience difficulties when they are forced to leave their families and live independently in the world of men and work.

Young men who were spoiled children suffer shipwreck in their occupations. Young girls who were spoiled children bungle their marital relations. When spoiled children marry they try to reproduce their childhood situation in the marriage relation. A spoiled woman evades the responsibilities of maintaining and managing her household with all manner of excuses and alibis. She refuses to have children, or if she has a child despite her protests, she will spoil this only child until he becomes a serious problem. A spoiled mother spoils her child, because she was pampered herself. Then when the spoiled child demands too much of the pampered mother's time and effort, she can say with some truth that she dare not have a second child.

The man who was a spoiled child is distinguished by his helplessness and dependency in all the practical matters of marriage. He must be waited upon hand and foot and he refuses the least responsibility. Pampered children, when they grow up, act as if they were too good for this world, as if they were princes and princesses deserving special privileges and special considerations as a matter of course. If life plays into their hands they make something of a success of it, but if they find themselves in a situation which demands self-discipline and independence they fail miserably.

Education by nagging is frequently associated with authoritarian education. Nagging parents do not leave their children alone. They educate too much, forever criticizing and making suggestions; not the least mistake goes unnoticed. As a result, their children are just as dependent as pampered children. Constant nagging

and criticism endangers the inner security of a child, no matter how loving the criticism may be. The case of the person who grows up in an environment which always criticizes him is very interesting. It is a characteristic of such a person that he maintains his failings despite thousands of criticisms. As a child he acts as if he were accustomed to the unceasing warnings and did not hear them any longer.

The story is told of the daughter of a nagging mother who actually became deaf to the constant criticism of her mother. When the mother wanted to say something, which was neither nagging nor criticism, to her child, she had to shriek in order to gain the girl's attention. In some cases children retain their behavior difficulties for the very sake of criticism, because they like to have their parents busied with them at all times. Their chief hope of success lies in keeping some bad habit which is sure to attract the attention of their parents, and this habit they refuse to relinquish. The proof of this contention is easy: put the child in a different environment where the defect is not noticed, and it will vanish. Bring the child back into his family circle, and the bad habit will reappear.

In so far as their happiness is concerned, the grown-up children of nagging parents act like the children of pampering parents. They are as characteristically negligent in adult life as they were in their nursery, forcing their environment to pay constant attention to them. They run around with a bad conscience because they have not attended to this or that little matter, but they are too lazy to decide to do it. Anyone who lives with these people must remind them, goad

them, scold them, until they muster the courage to do some obvious and necessary deed. They cannot do without criticism and they force the rôle of the nagging parents upon their surroundings; and often enough the environment falls into their scheme and puts itself in servant's livery to them.

Ambitious education is another type of importance in our consideration. Ambitious education may be bound up either with authoritarian education or with an oversolicitous education. The essence of this educational mistake lies in burdening the child with expectations appropriate enough to the ambitious hopes of vain parents, but, more often than not, unrelated to the child's own wishes.

Under the influence of this type of education, a child begins with great efforts and very often achieves the ambitious hopes of his parents. When this is done he is praised and goaded to further success. There are parents who demand that their children shall be first in their classes and lead the child to believe that it is disgraceful not to be at the head of his class. The whip of ambition leaves such a child no free moment. Play is out of the question. When another child succeeds he is looked at with suspicious and envious eyes. Such children have anxiety dreams of getting bad reports in school.

In a situation as tense as this, any little failure may precipitate a crisis. An ambitious father touched to the quick by the failure of his son believes that he is justified and duty-bound to judge and punish his boy. Once this has occurred, a rapid regression suddenly sets in. The boy succeeds in nothing, and loses interest

in his studies. When a formerly ambitious child loses his way, he destroys his father's last hopes, so that the father also loses his belief in his son's ability. Tragedies of this kind are more common than is believed, and children seldom recover from them.

Yet, even in those cases where ambition attains its goal, where ambitious striving is never side-tracked, and everything that can be attained by industry and stubborn perseverance is gained, a happy development is impossible. The attitude of the ambitious striver is characterized by an insatiable, unobjective thirst for honor, while his relation to his fellows is marked by envy and misanthropy. The defeats and disillusionments which some children suffer in childhood may lead to their "nervous breakdown" in maturity.

We have attempted to show the results of several typical educational mistakes on the development of character. The influence of any type of education is determined by the personal purposive pattern. Every educational mistake directly or indirectly intensifies the child's feeling of inadequacy. The same educational error hinders the child's development to inner security and independence, courage, and social feeling. Whether education is carried out with authoritarian severity or by means of pampering; whether it is effected by an inconsiderate and ambitious goading to perfection or by eternally critical, unsatisfied nagging, whether good intention with a bad goal or educational indifference is the dominant factor of education—every educational mistake is elaborated in the arena of the child's personal self-esteem.

It is in this arena that education comes into conflict

with the other more or less unchanging determinants of the child's mental traits. Education may intensify these factors or it may minimize them, but one mistake can never compensate for another, because all educational mistakes have a bad influence on the personality. For this reason the mistaken idea, so popular in the past, that an exaggerated severity on the part of one parent can be nullified by the exaggerated tenderness of the other parent, never bears good fruit. As a matter of fact that most common combination, a strict father and an oversolicitous mother, is almost always fatal to the child. The child of such a family is intimidated and frightened by his father, and flees to the asylum of his mother's caresses where he can never experience enough love nor be too tyrannical. In this situation a child accustoms himself to dependency and helplessness, because his too tender mother is willing to help him out of every difficulty. Where the father appears with strict and authoritarian gestures and treats the timid attempts of the child to become independent as if they were stubbornness and egoism, and suppresses them as such, the helplessness of the child is doubled and redoubled.

In the end the child learns how to exploit the contrasting educational theories of the parents to his own advantage. More often than not, these contrasting theories are the expression of the personal opposition between the father and mother, and the child learns to play his mother against his father in order to protect his own cowardice, and to succeed in his own striving for significance. Under these circumstances a child grows up into a spineless, dependent adult in whom the

character traits of the child who is educated by authority are united with those of the child who has been spoiled. According to the situation that he meets in life, the child lays the blame for his shortcomings either on the attitude of his father or on that of his mother.

The causes of educational errors are only partly to be found in the inadequate pedagogical insight of the parents. Authoritarian education still has its champions, although for hundreds of years great educators have recognized that it is a false and dangerous method of education; but an earnest champion for pampering or cruelty can hardly be found nowadays.

The truth of the matter is that educational errors are based upon errors in the conduct patterns of the educators. The personal purposive pattern of the educator expresses itself in his relation to the child just as it does in his other human relationships. For instance, a man who believes that he can overcompensate for a bad childhood by maintaining an elaborate mechanism for assuring his prestige will carry the idea of authority which dominates his behavior pattern into his educational tactics toward children, and will cloak his unconscious pattern by the rationalizations of some pedagogic theory. These are the educators who are always telling us, with a hypocritical gesture of helpless pity, that it is impossible to educate children without punishing them and without forcing them to be obedient, although they admit that theoretically education could be accomplished without force. In every-day practice, they say, one cannot succeed without punishment and authority.

Observe such teachers more closely, and you find that these authoritarian individuals actually cannot do without authority and punishment, because the tone in which they approach their children from the very beginning, in itself makes impossible any desire of the child to submit voluntarily to discipline, or to identify himself with his work. These teachers irritate their children into opposition. It is always the teacher who wants to show his authority over his children and maintain his prestige at all costs; the children only take up the gage of battle and oppose the teacher's authority out of stubbornness and spite.

If one wants to make peace in this war one has to begin with the education of the educator. The teacher has to be shown that his desire for authority is based upon an uncompensated sense of inferiority and that his educational mistakes are nothing more than constantly repeated attempts to support his dilapidated sense of personal value. If one can succeed in weaning a teacher from his false goal of maintaining prestige, and educate that teacher to be a fellow man, everything is gained. If this is impossible it would be better to disbar, from the practice of his profession, any teacher who uses open intimidation of children, so that the children, at least, might be protected against the damaging consequences of a distorted educational method.

What we have said for the wide-spread error of authoritarian education is equally valid for all other forms of false education. Any character defect in the parents, such as the vanity of a mother, must obviously be expressed in the parents' attitude toward their children. A vain mother takes as a personal insult any

fault of her child, whether in his exterior, the neatness of his dress, his bodily cleanliness, or his behavior toward strangers. She will, therefore, be very much inclined to commit the sin of eternal criticism and nagging. She has no patience and will not console herself with the thought that the child will give up his faults by himself in the course of time. Any little fault is intolerable to her, and she feels the necessity of curing it immediately. In this way a vain mother tortures a child with never-ending criticism and disparagement, pulls and tugs at the child's body and soul, until the child's idea of cleanliness and decent behavior is synonymous with a torture chamber. The tragedy is that the vain mother ultimately accomplishes the exact opposite of what she wanted to do.

The ambition of parents is often felt in their educational theories. The father who has been disappointed in life, the man who blames fate or his parents for his failure to reach his desired goal, may often desire to have his son attain the triumph which he desired for himself. To this end he drives the child forward without any consideration of the child's own purposes in life. The result is that the child becomes an inconsiderate climber, or suffers a nervous breakdown.

On the other hand there are women who have never reconciled themselves with their sex and with marriage for reasons that we have described. The only child which they bear—because they have been unable to deny their husbands and the logic of life entirely—is so pampered that it occupies the entire time of its mother. The poor mother then claims she has neither

energy nor time left to devote to her household or to the education of other children.

There are other women who marry well, after a childhood of deprivation and want, and use their marriage as an occasion to satisfy the unlimited appetite for pleasure which originated in their childhood. Children would interfere with the satisfaction of this pleasure-hunger. If children happen, by accident, to be born to these women they are turned over to hired servants, for their mothers consider them a nuisance. The children have their bodies cared for, but their souls die of inanition.

Other parents who are themselves the product of intimidation, whose anxiety and fear of life has been produced by their oversolicitous parents, desire to wrap their children in cotton-wool and transfer all their own fear, anxiety, and pessimism to them. Then we have a child who grows up in a senseless fear of the dangers that lurk in the outer world, the kind of child who dares not make a movement in the direction of facing those dangers. He will want to spend the rest of his life in a feathered nest where nothing can happen to him.

Examples of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely. It is always a case of the character defect in the parents resulting in a character defect in the children. If the character defects of the children resemble those of the parents, which is surely not a strange coincidence, the parents are likely to talk of heredity. In reality this so-called heredity is nothing more than a false family tradition. When you realize that these children, the products of a bad education, will again

project their difficulties to their children and produce false behavior patterns in their turn, you realize to some extent what enormous psychological difficulties every attempt at educational reform must encounter.

It would seem that a quick amelioration could be hoped for only if family education, that depository of pedagogical sins which are handed on from generation to generation, were to be replaced as quickly and as fundamentally as possible, by communal education. The more obvious educational mistakes could certainly be avoided if such a change took place, because a careful choice of educators, according to professional and character qualifications, would guarantee to some extent that the old pedagogical sins would not be committed. Although motherhood remains an educational factor which can never quite be replaced, we must realize that our age is unmistakably a period of the disintegration of the family and as a result no matter what our attitude to family or communal education may be in individual cases, the future of education will certainly be found in some form of progressive communal education.

The pedagogical problem of the future is not so hard to decide and does not require so much of our responsibility as the contemporary problem in any specific case. Meaning well will not solve the educational problem. There must be insight in addition—but insight never occurs where good will is absent.

Chapter VIII

The Structure of the Neurosis

IN the previous chapters we have attempted to show how the personality is built up as a purposive unity whose direction is determined by the multiplex factors of the environment. Throughout this exposition the fundamental idea has been the theory of the feeling of inadequacy, and its compensation and overcompensation. The goal of the personal purposive pattern is always the goal of social significance, the goal of the elevation of personal self-esteem, the goal of superiority. This goal is indicated by a variety of manifestations. It may be crystallized as the ideal either of useful achievement, of personal prestige, of the domination of others, of the defense against danger, or of sexual victories.

It is the task of individual development to align the goal of personal significance to the biologically necessary social feeling and make it harmonious with the social feeling. The success of this process depends upon courage, inner security, and self-confidence. We know that the personal purposive pattern "makes" its own experiences and then values these experiences as if they were objective affirmations, in order to reenforce and intensify the pattern which has been laid down.

The neurotic symptom is not an absolutely new and unusual element in this conception of character as a purposive unity. It is a common means to the attainment of personal goals that the individual as a member of a community dare not admit to himself, and therefore dare not openly pursue. Where an inner insecurity, an egocentric philosophy of life, and an intense ambition come into conflict with reality, the individual is often so discouraged that he utilizes the neurosis to entrench himself and cover his retreat. In this way the individual's prestige is retained and his neurotic pattern maintained at all costs. Thus the neurotic symptom, like every other expression of the individuality and the personality, is an index and an expression of the total personality and can be interpreted and evaluated only by comparison with that total personality.

There is no real difference between the "nervous character," or the "neurotic constitution," as described by Alfred Adler and the idea of character which we have described in previous chapters. When the personal purposive pattern is directed toward a goal of superiority, which in its extreme form is a goal of godlikeness, it is the basis of a "nervous" character, that is of a character capable of producing neurotic symptoms whenever the environmental constellation demands. On the other hand when the social feeling has appeared in the conduct of the individual and he has developed the ability to "give out," to contribute to his fellows, the individual may be considered mentally healthy.

The concept of normality is vague: it is an ideal

which never occurs in reality, for there is no human being who can completely crystallize the goal of the social feeling in himself. The fact that there is a general human feeling of inadequacy, the fact that each of us goes through a process of individuation, the fact that every individual follows certain biological laws, make it apparent that there are only nervous characters. Any individual character can only be more or less neurotic, no one is either entirely normal or completely neurotic.

The neurosis is a sign of the times. The whole process of individual character development is crassly expressed in our present-day economic and sociologic cult of the individual. Individualism, however, is part of the neurotic striving for the perfection that is the overcompensation of a feeling of inferiority, and the exaggerated neurotization of the individual is a symptom of the contemporary crisis in the economic, sociologic, and cultural activities of our day.

This does not mean that every person is neurotic in the sense that he ought to be a patient for a psychiatrist. Our thesis is simply that the mental predisposition to be neurotic is present to a greater or lesser extent in every human being. Whether this predisposition actually leads to a neurosis or not depends on other circumstances in the individual's life. There are people who have remained mentally healthy, in a clinical sense, all their lives, who under more unfavorable circumstances might have developed a severe neurosis. On the other hand people who might have led a normal life under average stress and strain suffer a "nervous breakdown" under unusually unfortunate circumstances.

It is impossible to say definitely where a neurosis, in a clinical sense, begins, or to define when an individual is still "normal." The simplest and most obvious differentiation would be this: that every man who consulted a psychiatrist because of his neurotic complaints was a neurotic, providing there were no organic disease which had caused his symptoms.

This definition is both too exclusive and too inclusive. It is too inclusive because many patients consult a physician because of unimportant symptoms, which others disregard, and conversely, some people quite consciously utilize sickness to influence and affect their family without consulting a psychiatrist. The economic status of the patient plays a considerable rôle. A rich man can afford to consult a psychiatrist even when he is not ill. The definition of a neurosis cannot depend, therefore, on whether or not a patient consults a psychiatrist.

On the other hand the definition is too exclusive. Those neurotics who consult a psychiatrist are but a small fraction of those whose symptoms would certainly lead us to consider them neurotics. These are the neurotics who do not consult the psychiatrist, either because they cannot afford it, or because they are afraid to get well.

The ability of a man or woman to work is a much more useful criterion of mental health. Of the three problems which require a more or less fully developed social feeling for their solution, the problem of work is least frequently entirely mismanaged and evaded. If you fail in your occupation you are usually in imminent danger of economic shipwreck, whereas failure

to solve your social or love relationships produces no immediately dangerous consequences. For this reason the ability to work remains intact, where all other human relationships are either distorted or broken off entirely. Frequently the first symptom which causes a neurotic to consult the psychiatrist is his inability to hold his job.

Although we have practical difficulties in making a clinical definition of mental health and disease, we can, nevertheless, define a neurotic symptom. Any mental or physical activity, part of the personal purposive pattern and characterized by the fiction of being an involuntary and pathological activity, that causes the individual's partial or complete failure to solve one or all of the problems of life, is a neurotic symptom. The following are the essentials of a neurotic symptom:

1. *It must be part of the personal purposive pattern.* This excludes all organic diseases in so far as they have not suffered a conative reconstellation and have thus secondarily become part of the personal purposive pattern. An organic heart lesion, for instance, can be considered neurotic in the moment that it is utilized for some personal purpose. Such a condition is simultaneously organic and neurotic.

2. *The fiction of involuntary activity and the fiction of pathology must be present. Viewed subjectively by the patient, the symptom must seem unrelated to his personal goal, and viewed objectively it must seem to be a sickness.* A neurosis is differentiated in this way from all activities that are admitted by the conscious personality as desirable and voluntary, although they result in failure to solve some life's problem. Crimes,

bad habits, or emotional and intellectual character traits, loaded with personal purposes, may be permeated with the fiction of being involuntary, but they do not impress the patient as diseases despite the fact that they lead to the evasion of life's problems. For this reason, anger, jealousy, timidity, misanthropy, the hate of the opposite sex, avarice, and the like are not in themselves neuroses. The definitions must necessarily be very elastic, because the concept of what is and what is not pathological depends largely upon current notions. Some people speak of pathological anger, and of sickly fear and jealousy, so that the determination of the neurotic elements of any definite character trait would vary with the investigator.

The meaning of the involuntary and pathological nature of the symptom that the patient has constructed into a fiction is obvious: it is the trick of removing an activity, derived from the personal purposive pattern both subjectively and objectively, from the sphere of personal responsibility. This trick defends the practical result of the neurotic symptom against all logical or ethical arguments. If the neurotic says, "I will not," both he and his environment may fight against him. When he says, "I cannot," both he and his environment seem helpless.

3. *The partial or complete evasion of one or all of life's tasks, and the failure to solve them when this failure is the result of the neurosis, characterizes the neurosis as a behavior pattern aimed against the social feeling, that is, against life itself. The neurosis, therefore, is the expression of unrestrained individualism.*

Every behavior reaction in the personal purposive

pattern that is simultaneously characterized by the fiction of being involuntary and pathological is by its very nature a behavior reaction whose consequence is the partial or complete failure to solve one or all of life's tasks. In this third set of criteria for the determination of the neurosis, we cannot, therefore, differentiate between the neurosis and other behavior reactions. It must be apparent that the very tendency to evade the tasks of life compels the individual to mask his behavior reaction with the fiction of unavoidable pathology—in order that he may defend it against those objections which arise in the very logic of life. This third point, therefore, is actually not necessary for the definition of a neurotic symptom and serves only as an illustration.

From this third point, nevertheless, we derive the possibility of characterizing the neurosis by two other closely related and psychologically important criteria: the fear of life, and the fear of death. The fear of life, as an expression of the feeling of inadequacy toward the obligations and responsibilities of life, is part of the neurosis, because almost every neurotic sooner or later develops thoughts of suicide, makes suicidal attempts, or becomes an effective suicide. The fear of death, which does not contradict the fear of life and often occurs simultaneously with it, is an instrument for the disparagement of the very life that the neurotic feels himself incapable of living. Death seemingly makes every purposive activity in life useless and meaningless.

The fear of life and the fear of death have common champions. The first champion is the neurotic's

individualism. The suicide says, in so many words: "I was never created for this life." The fear of death deceives the individualistic neurotic until he believes that there is nothing of any importance in this world except the individual ego. The second champion is the neurotic's pessimism, manifesting itself either as a retreat from life's tasks, or as a tendency to disparage and deprecate life.

The suicide denies his individual life, but mistakenly affirms that life is very good for others. He believes that other people are important and capable of living, but he is afraid of death because he overvalues the importance of his individual life. On the other hand he denies the importance of life in general, for, since all human beings must die, life can have no meaning. These conflicting ideas are quite appropriate to the unique dialectic of neurotic behavior. Whichever of these two possible courses the neurotic chooses, his goal is always to stand still or to retreat.

How is the neurotic symptom made? This question is best answered by an illustration: It is the case of a woman, whom we shall call Helen, thirty-three years of age, the wife of a provincial lawyer. Helen has been married twelve years and has one child, eight years old. Since the birth of the child, Helen has suffered with agoraphobia—a fear of open places—which has existed with varying intensity. This symptom has been aggravated since the death of her father a few months ago. Helen had nursed her father, self-sacrificingly, for a year and a half.

Up to this time, although unable to go upon the street alone, she did not fear to go out when she was

accompanied by her husband. At present she cannot walk on the street, unless it is a very quiet street or a country lane where no one will see her. If she dares to go upon a busy street she suffers a severe attack of anxiety, which occurs in somewhat the following fashion: she has a vague pain in her head which quickly becomes exaggerated into marked dizziness and is accompanied simultaneously by severe palpitation of the heart, a sense of constriction and suffocation in her chest, together with the fear of impending death.

If Helen cannot save herself by running into a house, everything goes black before her eyes and she faints. After such an attack she feels very weak and greatly depressed. Between attacks her emotional state is distinctly depressed and, although she claims that the death of her father is the cause of her depression, she admits that so far as she can remember she has never been happy or jolly, especially not since adolescence.

Helen is a beautiful woman and looks much younger than she is. The first time we saw her she came with her husband, and one could see immediately that her relation to him was one of loving dependency. She allowed him to speak for her, and whenever she was asked a question by the physician she cast an entreating look toward her husband, whereupon he usually answered the doctor's question. Her husband makes a very good impression, for he is intelligent, tactful, tender, and full of loving understanding of Helen's difficulty. He is about ten years older than she, but seems to be far older in relation to her. He sometimes

addresses her as a child, and she sometimes addresses him as "Daddy."

In further conference Helen proved to be an extraordinarily clever, sensitive, and highly cultivated woman. It was difficult for her to overcome a certain reserve and speak freely of herself and of her affairs. Some little time elapsed before she effected the desired contact with the physician and, even after contact was established, it was always difficult to make her speak. She claimed that she had told everything that there was to be told after a few hours of consultation.

Helen grew up as the oldest daughter of well-to-do parents. A brother four years younger than she, with whom she maintains the most affable relations, lives in the same city. Her first childhood remembrance dates to a time shortly after the birth of her brother. This recollection is: "I am alone in a room and I am screaming at the top of my voice." Her position in the family seems to have been only temporarily aggravated by the birth of her brother. She was spoiled just as much after his birth as she was before it, and her mother could not show enough tender care for her.

Despite her mother's solicitude, Helen was more attached to her father. She speaks of him as of a good angel, and describes him as an incredibly clever, noble, and intellectual man. When she recalls his death, tears gather in her eyes. Though her father may have had a bad temper in earlier years and been very severe with her, the older he grew, the less he lost his poise and the better and wiser he became.

Helen was considered to be a very talented and a very good child, although given to anxiety. At school

she was a model child. Now and then there were scenes at home caused by her father's irate temper, which aroused her to spiteful aggressiveness. Her tantrums were the more violent because her tyranny over her parents and younger brother usually met with very little resistance. When resistance did occur by chance, she threw her whole personality into the battle in order to rescue her threatened prestige.

Helen's accomplishments in school and at home were excellent, and her ambition was fed by the great ambition of her parents. Although she had vaguely decided that hers must be an academic career she had no real program for the future. She had a few friends but never attained any real intimacy with them, and she was isolated during most of her childhood. Her physical health was good until she suffered a middle-ear infection when she was eight that affected her hearing in the left ear, and left a tendency to attacks of dizziness from which she suffered occasionally even before the advent of her agoraphobia.

As she grew older, Helen's isolation became more marked. In adolescence she grew unmistakably proud, became reserved to the point of haughtiness, and disparaged both the girls and the boys with whom she came into contact. Her ambition grew with her age. When she was fifteen she interested herself in a political movement and entered a circle of young people, to whose ranks she gave a good social tone without ever relinquishing her reserve in the least degree. It was at this time that she became clearly conscious of her dissatisfaction with being a woman. "I should have been a man," she said.

Everything really went very well with Helen until this time. Complications first appeared in connection with her political circle of young friends, where she had played the rôle of leader. Personal difficulties brought her into trying situations and conflicts, and it was just at this time that she had her first close relationship with a young man of this circle. Small-town gossip made capital of their intimacy, and her parents learned of it.

When her parents heard of Helen's affair, there were wild scenes at home, with the result that she left her political group, in which her first successes had promised so much for the future. She went to the country for a vacation of several months, saying that she was sick. After her return from the country she refused to go back to high school and remained at home.

Things went rather well for Helen, under the more favorable circumstances of living at home, and she seemed to have regained her old self. She was tutored privately, showed interest in intellectual matters, and read a great deal, although there was no longer any talk of Helen's taking up a profession. Helen's parents wanted to marry her off, but Helen maintained her egoistic opposition. Her father, a wealthy business man, hoped that Helen would marry one of his younger business associates, who lived in very comfortable circumstances, but Helen was not to be moved to this marriage.

A few years later she met her present husband and fell in love with him. At first she told her parents nothing of him, but when they found out that she

was interested in him, another great conflict arose. It was the last conflict that she was to have with her father. Mr. N., whom she had declared her fiancé, was a completely impecunious young lawyer, but Helen had her way, as usual, and married him when she was twenty-one. Her parents learned to like their son-in-law and were completely reconciled to Helen's marriage.

Despite the material aid which Helen received from her parents she lived under considerably straitened circumstances. She had to forgo a great many things to which she had been accustomed. Shortly after her marriage her mother died, and her father lost a great part of his fortune as a result of the war. While her husband was in the army, she and her father had to leave their homestead because it lay in the battle-fields. There followed some years of homelessness and of privation, which Helen, separated from her husband, seemed to stand quite bravely.

In the third year of her marriage, Helen became pregnant, and suffered from many bodily complaints during her pregnancy. It was at this time that the first clear symptoms of her fear of open places occurred. She suffered an extraordinarily difficult labor, and was forced to spend several months in the hospital convalescing.

When she arose from her sick bed, the agoraphobia was present in full intensity. All attempts to treat this agoraphobia, including psychotherapy, were tried and given up. When all treatment was in vain, both Helen and her husband seemed to reconcile themselves to her disease. She was unable to leave her house unac-

companied, nor could she ever visit the neighboring large city, according to her custom, to listen to a concert or to see a play. Helen was extraordinarily capable and industrious in her household work, although she had a somewhat pedantic love of order and an overdeveloped conscientiousness. So far as the child was concerned, Helen was a model mother. Yet no sooner did she leave her house than she was "good for nothing." Two years before her present illness and shortly after the death of her mother her father became ill, and moved into her house. Helen sacrificed herself in his care, realizing with inconsolable certainty that a cure—her father suffered from a cancer—was impossible. When her father died, Helen suffered a complete nervous breakdown. Weeks passed before she would make the least effort to live, and when she resumed her duties, there was a marked intensification of her agoraphobia.

Finally the agoraphobia became so bad that even her husband was no longer a protection against it. Nevertheless Helen spoke of her husband with great affection, admitted that he spoiled her and treated her as if she were a doll, and claimed that a better husband could not exist. Helen was very unhappy and depressed because of her disease. Although nothing was the matter with her body, she was as helpless as a cripple. It was impossible for her to control herself, for she could not conquer the nameless fear that seized her as soon as she stepped out on the street.

In several consultations Helen expressed her deep and inconsolable pessimism toward life and toward people. She felt that life had no meaning and no pur-

pose, and stated that, if it were not her duty toward her husband and her child to keep on living, she would be ready to end it all. On the other hand she admitted that whenever she thought of death it caused her unspeakable terror. In a terrifying dream, during the first days of her treatment, she saw her father beckoning to her and asking her to follow him. She awoke after the dream, bathed in perspiration, weeping bitterly, and greatly frightened. She loved her husband, so she said, both as a man and as a husband. But sexual intercourse meant nothing to her, for she had always been frigid.

This is the life history of our patient which we have extracted from almost daily conferences lasting four weeks. We have omitted all unessential details in order not to complicate the picture. But we can understand her case perfectly, even from this simple story. Helen was a beautiful, intelligent, spoiled child, an only child for four years, who grew up under favorable economic circumstances. She reacted to the birth of her brother with childish anxiety states, obviously in order to secure the attention which she felt her due. The situation of this first crisis would have been clarified to a greater extent had she submitted to a longer treatment, for all her later difficulties were unmistakably new editions of this first critical situation. She grew up proud and ambitious, beautiful and intelligent, seemingly as if she had been determined for the rôle of a princess. She considered the distance between herself and other people natural, and she demanded respect. As long as she could maintain this style of life everything went well, but the distortion and misanthropy of her neu-

rosis were only hidden under her attitude at this time. Helen could thank her favorable circumstances for the fact that her neurosis did not come to the surface sooner, and perhaps the fact that her catastrophe did not occur earlier was really no good fortune at all. It might have been better for her to have had her breakdown at a much earlier time, when she might have learned more easily that her princess ideal was untenable.

It is transparent, moreover, that her ideal of being a princess is in a way a second and enlarged edition of a more primitive style of life—the behavior pattern of the masculine protest. The threat against the prestige of her childhood position, incident to the birth of a younger brother, resulted in her dissatisfaction with her sexual rôle. Her next attitude was seemingly a compromise with reality, but in reality her new point of view rendered her just as unfit for life as her masculine ideal. The second phase of her ideal might be formulated: "If I must be a woman, I will be more feminine than any other."

Helen's beauty and intelligence came to her help and she succeeded very well in the beginning. Her courage seemed to be growing, and she dared even to have a timid sexual relationship. She failed when people were loath to recognize her unconditional superiority. She was too proud to fight. Deeply insulted, cast out of her heaven and deposed from her throne, she withdrew all along the line.

It is very significant that a circumscribed failure, a defeat which, though unimportant in itself, occurred at a strategic point, caused her to retreat sympatheti-

cally all along the line. We realize that her discouragement had been prepared long ago, and we surmise that she had been waiting for this defeat as an excuse to run. Her personal self-esteem was a colossus with clay feet. When it broke it tore everything with it. Not only her social relationship with her fellows—whose leadership she wanted to hold at every price because she could not conceive of herself in any other rôle than that of leader—not only her first erotic experience, but all her plans for her future occupation were the victims of her panic.

In this deep discouragement she sought an asylum with her parents. She resigned herself to the thought of marriage. Nevertheless, her ambition remained awake, and she determined that if she could not get a college degree herself, she would at least use her marriage to get into an intellectual atmosphere similar to that in which she had spent her youth. She had to override her parents to accomplish this end. It was for this reason that she married a doctor of laws, against their will. The victory over her parents which she won in this marriage made her husband more dear to her.

Everything might still have turned out well had Helen said to herself: "I have allowed this little failure in the line of my ambition to intimidate and discourage me. It is really not at all necessary to be a princess. To be the wife of a tender and clever man and the mother of children is enough to make life worth while." But Helen drew quite a different conclusion from her failure. She felt only that she had to be more careful; it did not seem to her that she could live a life like other people. The princess ideal re-

mained. It was only transformed from that ideal of victorious beauty and intelligence, the ideal of the Princess Turandot, into the ideal of the princess who could not sleep because of the pea under seven mattresses. She now seemed to say to herself: "If I must relinquish my ideal, wander among human beings, and forgo all special privilege, the least I can ask of Fate is that it shall strew roses in my path and remove every rock from my road."

But Fate would not listen to her. Her pregnancy and difficult labor shattered her second plan, which was something of an approach to reality. She had never wanted a child, and this severe insult to her princess ideal was an ultimatum. She then decided to declare war on life. An organ inferiority which had been present since childhood, the cured disease of the middle ear, was transmuted into attacks of dizziness, and finally, in conjunction with an oversensitivity of her vegetative nervous system, was elaborated into an agoraphobia.

With this Helen withdraws into the asylum of her house and wants to know nothing of life outside of her four walls—at least not without the support of her husband, whose position and honor in society give some support to her sense of self-esteem. She still had her father, the prime minister of her childhood. Her father's sickness and death were the last straw. When this occurred she could no longer hold out. She further circumscribed her sphere of influence, and finally refused to leave the house even in the company of her husband.

Helen's neurotic system is only seemingly the reac-

tion to a shock, the difficult labor in bearing her child, but the apparent causative relation between experience and neurosis immediately becomes a conative or purposive relationship, when the neurosis is compared with her past, and interpreted relatively to her total personality. The total personality was more or less constructed upon this theme: "I am a princess. No one can demand that I should conquer difficulties." Her whole life and her neurosis are based upon this specious trick. If a difficulty actually occurs, Helen must meet it in a fashion appropriate to her style of life. Her rejoinder to a real difficulty is a neurotic symptom: "But I told you that I was a princess."

The causal relationship between the shock and the neurotic symptom is *arranged* by the patient. The real *reason* for her sickness was not pregnancy and parturition, because countless women who bear children do not have agoraphobia. The real cause lies in Helen's desire to be a princess. Being a princess, however, is not reality but a poetic fiction of Helen's own making. Because a fiction, like a painted lightning bolt, cannot have real consequences, we must conclude that the whole cause and effect relationship which Helen has made between the shock and her neurosis is a mirage.

The experience of childbirth was utilized by the patient to secure her rôle of princess, by the limitation of her sphere of activity. If the series of causes which lead up to her illness is clear retrospectively, the chain of consequences prospectively is so much clearer. The consequences of her disease are these: No one will ever expect her to have another child. She must be relieved of every obligation in her household, as far

as possible, because she cannot make the slightest outside arrangement. Any thought that she may have had of regaining contact with an intellectual society and of following up the intellectual ambitions of her young womanhood must be quickly brushed aside. Social intercourse is impossible when one suffers from agoraphobia, and that is well, for otherwise there might be a recurrence of an early defeat. It is better to stay at home. Nothing can happen to you at home. A housewife in her own home is not only a princess; she is a queen, and even her own husband is her subject. Every danger of being supplanted in her marriage—a danger which lies along the line of her masculine protest—vanishes if she is sick and cannot leave her home, while her sexual frigidity protects her from sexual subjugation.

If we should tell the patient, "You want to play the rôle of a princess at any price, you want to secure immunity to all the difficulties of life, you want to prevent any social intercourse, you want to force your environment to give you special consideration at all times," she would protest her good will, and point to her strenuous efforts to master her disease and to disturb her environment as little as possible by her sickness.

We know that she is not lying, yet her assertion of good will should not influence our interpretation. We know that she does not understand the purposiveness of her illness, for if she did understand, she would not dare to persist in it.

Helen needs the *fiction* of her illness to make her irresponsible, because she could not honorably demand

that she be allowed to lead her life under easier conditions without surrendering her powerful self-esteem. Her "conscience" would not permit such unfairness. Helen's effort to conquer her own ailment defends her from her own pangs of conscience, while her public demonstration of good will is an alibi that defends her against her environment. She can afford to relinquish every attempt to make her sickness the focus of general attention, modestly declining all unnecessary consideration, for she knows quite well that her illness compels special consideration even if she does not demand it.

The very simplicity of our patient's illness is characteristic of her personality and the rôle that the neurosis plays in her life. Helen is an ambitious but discouraged woman. Her ambition was produced in a home environment that was the worst possible preparation for the problems of real life. This ambition is a compensation for her feeling of inadequacy, which is based upon the countless little experiences of a pampered child, originally the only child and then the dethroned oldest child, because, as she felt, she was "only a girl."

The theme of her earlier life as expressed in her earliest childhood remembrance is: "I must not be left alone." This original theme is then elaborated and completed in the symphony of her life. The second theme is: "I must occupy a unique position. I must be unique. I must be what other people cannot be. I must have the center of the stage." As long as things go well this plan seems to be successful, but the first failure is a catastrophe that must awaken her secret fear

of spiritual and mental bankruptcy, her fear lest the bubble of her personality might be pierced.

Retreat goes on by rapid stages, from this point. Helen must retreat as long as her goal has not been fundamentally changed. Her neurotic striving for godlikeness, recognizable in the deplorable contortions of agoraphobia, demonstrates that neither her ambition nor her secret kingdom has been relinquished. Our beautiful Helen, as fragile as a vase, unprepared for the storms of a brutal existence, lives next to her husband, contributing nothing, but forever levying tribute from a man who perhaps took over the rôle of prince consort all too willingly. She says, in effect, "Everything would be different, if only I were not sick."

Were we to ask Helen what she would do if she were well, her answer would certainly reveal exactly what she fears. Helen would reply that if she were well she would lead an industrious and social life, maintain social contacts on an equal footing with the women of her social group whom she has been training herself to despise since childhood. She would have more children, and she would show what she could do in the management of a household of many children, where activity is not crowned with laurels and public triumph. Finally she would translate the intellectual promise of her youth into reality by attending lectures and courses and taking an active interest in the intellectual life of her country, thus realizing her youthful ideal.

Those goals in life, in the pursuit of which Helen's illness is a ball and chain, are the very goals that she fears to pursue in reality. Helen does not dare admit

this to herself. Helen wants to relinquish these goals because their pursuit would signify a permanent abdication of the princess's throne. To pursue these goals is a tacit admission that she is no more than any other woman. She will not strive for these ends, furthermore, because she is secretly afraid that she will not accomplish even as much as any one of a dozen women whom she despises, because she is not so well prepared for life as any of the women in her circle.

As long as Helen remains a neurotic she is spared the necessity of gaining an insight into the true state of facts and of making the decision which such insight would compel her to make. She continues her life under extenuating and mitigating circumstances, preferring to play the rôle of princess within her four walls. It is obvious that she suffers in the process. If she did not suffer she would not be sick. If she were not sick she would have to move up to the firing front of life. Helen prefers to be sick.

The neurosis, as we see, is a completely sensible and meaningful structure. Given the same goal and the same situation, no one could accomplish his end any better than the neurotic. Look at his situation from his viewpoint, and you must admit that the neurotic is right. The road to his goal is not false. It is his goal which is false. The neurotic goal is placed in the world of make-believe, far removed from the logic of social life. Therefore it cannot be attained nor even approximated by the means of reality. The natural consequence of the neurotic goal is the "will to make-believe."

For a time the neurotic carries on his striving for

a make-believe goal by deluding himself with fictional successes. Sooner or later he comes to grips with reality, and the bubble of what Seif has called "psychic inflation" bursts. The last consequence of neurotic striving is suicide, a complete retreat from the fighting front of life, made with a gesture of tragic heroism.

Up to this final decision between the worth or valuelessness of the neurotic's own personality, the neurotic constructs a consoling gulf between his neurosis and reality by means of his suffering. As long as he suffers, he does not have to give up his behavior pattern. As long as he suffers, all the burning problems of life are temporarily suspended. The sole salvation of his sense of personal worth seems to be in remaining sick.

An appropriate and unmistakable "will to be sick" is part of the behavior of every neurotic. The fact that the neurotic consults a psychiatrist does not alter the case. In many cases—and we shall have occasion to speak of them later—the neurotic visits the psychiatrist and undergoes the treatment for the sole purpose of maintaining his contention that he is sick, as if the fact that he were going to a physician were in itself a proof of his illness.

What we have seen in this single case may be applied generally to other neuroses. Every neurotic is a discouraged human being whose ambition has suffered shipwreck. His style of life is always the overcompensation of a feeling of inadequacy which has been intensified by the multiplex situations and conditions of childhood; its goal is always a final victory and maximization of his ego. The behavior pattern characteristic of an egocentric and misanthropic attitude

toward life, manifests itself in a fear of making decisions in any important problem, in a flight from reality, and in an attempt to substitute a side-show, with easier rules and regulations, for activity in the main arena of life.

Every neurotic acts *as if* he did not belong to this world, *as if* he were too good for it, *as if* he were created neither for social life nor for objective achievements. He refuses to start the race from scratch. He uses his position of inadequacy as a handicap: if he loses the race the fault lies with the fact that he is different or that he is inadequate; if he wins, his triumph is the greater. The neurotic spends his life protecting his oversensitive self-esteem at all costs. Nothing else is important.

When the neurotic faces an actual situation which he must solve in an objective fashion, and when he cannot withdraw from this situation, he immediately makes it a test of his entire value. Anyone who is insecure and badly prepared would be afraid of such a decision. The neurotic uses his illness as an excuse to project every decision into the future or to table it indefinitely, until his "hesitating attitude" leads him to a complete standstill.

The neurotic is a human being in whom the normal development toward the social feeling and toward objectivity is dwarfed. He remains a child, after a fashion, and his attitude toward the problems of life is childish and unobjective. And yet some social feeling exists even in a neurotic. Indeed, it is his very sickness which shows that he recognizes the demands of social life, for, otherwise, he could refuse to comply

with social usage forthright, and would not have to secure exemption by setting up a make-believe sickness to produce a fictional irresponsibility.

The sense of responsibility, which is the expression of the social feeling, is actually well developed in many neurotics, and there are some neurotics, indeed, who transparently misuse their conscience. Conscience is normally a biological function, a safety valve for the social feeling, which indicates when society and objectivity are outraged. When every unimportant triviality is "conscientiously" weighed, when "sins" and omissions are characteristically followed by make-believe conflicts between remorse and self-reproach, the safety-valve is misused.

The significance of overconscientiousness is transparent. When the neurotic is especially strict in his judgments of himself, he places himself on a moral pedestal above all other human beings. The more moral and ethical he is with himself, the more he can permit himself to feel that he is better than other people, and the more he allows himself to be a judge of them. This moral inflation is especially transparent where the function of conscience annihilates itself in remorseful self-dismemberment after the "sin" has been committed. For the humble acknowledgment of sin is obviously the first step toward self-sanctification.

A tendency to "sinful" excesses of various kinds, which have no other value than to produce the material for ethical conflicts, is a necessary complement to moral rigorism and puritanism. "Sin" is followed by remorse and self-flagellation, and these in turn lead to the sanctification of the ego. In many cases these con-

licts are the continuation, in adult life, of a child's efforts to cure himself of masturbation. The production of make-believe activity, which actually does not exist, is the goal of this intensified inner life, and of this exciting exchange of inner victories and defeats. Scratch the surface of a man who is forever experiencing conflict within himself, and you will find, almost without exception, a man whose performance in life and whose ability to make social contacts is below par.

When you demonstrate this mental mechanism to this type of neurotic, he will be the very one who will prostitute individual psychology and misuse it to create new depressions and self-reproaches from his newfound insight into his failures. Such neurotics think that they have performed the proper ethical ritual by remorsefully beating their breasts and reproaching themselves, but beyond this they do nothing. The analysis of human problems without any moral evaluation is the only salvation from the ethical antinomianism, which is the kernel of all religious conviction.

We know that a biologically determined feeling of inadequacy lies in the background of all neurotic exaggerations, and we can see this same feeling of inadequacy giving rise to processes of individuation, contrary to the fundamental social feeling and to the individual's thirst for salvation. The neurotic is obviously that man who, because of especially unfavorable determinants in his development, has experienced these general human problems more deeply than another and, in consequence, has failed to equalize properly the conflicting tendencies of the personal striving for sig-

nificance and the social feeling. A complete and correct equalization of these conflicting tendencies is never possible. It is always a question of making greater or lesser errors in the process.

The neurotic takes flight from reality into the fiction of the neurosis and creates a special set of conditions which make his life tolerable, subjectively. These conditions are suffering and withdrawal from activity. The task of individual psychology in the treatment of neurosis is to show the neurotic that the course which he chooses is not economical—that the consequences of a false style of life revert and react upon the neurotic and that the neurotic's solution of problems, which is only a make-believe solution, costs the neurotic more than it profits him.

The neurotic's intensified feeling of inadequacy may have been produced by certain circumstances in his childhood, and may have been justified to a certain degree at that time; yet, if the neurotic acts and lives *as if* he were still under the pressure of an unfavorable childhood, we can demonstrate the error of such behavior to him and help him to overcome it. Even the most unfavorable conditions for development and even the bitterest blows of Fate cannot *compel* any man to take flight from reality into the fiction of the neurosis. There are always better ways of solving problems than by a neurosis. All that the neurotic needs to find these better ways is a small initial capital of courage. It is this iota of courage, indeed, which enables him to recognize his false behavior pattern and to attempt its correction. If he has won a few small successes along the new way, he gains new courage from them, which

in turn helps him to even better solutions. By substituting this beneficent circle for the vicious circle of his previous activity he can find his way back to normal life.

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Chapter IX

The Choice and Origin of Symptoms Conduct Disorders in Children The Forms of the Neurosis

SOME critics may object that the outline of the neurotic style of life sketched in the previous chapter is a false generalization of individual cases. The chief objection is that the scheme of individual psychology does not apply to the endless complexity of neurotic manifestations, although there are many forms of the neurosis in which the mechanisms which we have described actually may be found in the psychological structure. A further objection is that the unique symptomatology of any one neurosis cannot be explained by the application of individual psychological mechanisms.

The objection is valid in one respect: the chief task of individual psychology is not to *explain* the neurosis, but to *understand* it. These processes are not identical. Although we are interested to know how certain symptoms originate, we are more interested in understanding what significance any symptom has in the behavior pattern of a given personality.

If we apply the principle of significance, we find that various symptoms may signify exactly the same

thing. When a man wants to avoid marriage he can do it in a variety of ways. He may, for instance, give objective reasons for not attempting to marry; he may put his ability to marry in an equivocal light by manifesting a psychic impotence; he may evade marriage economically by being unable to work because of his neurasthenia; he may make himself unsocial by some nervous symptom, such as a tic, and thus bar his way to matrimony. He might choose any one of a dozen other methods, but all of these various forms of behavior would have but a single significance from the standpoint of individual psychology: to avoid marriage.

Symptoms are frequently overdetermined. A physical factor, originating in some organ inferiority, may accompany the psychological determinants of the neurosis, as we have shown in the previous chapter in the case of Helen, whose attacks of dizziness were influenced by middle-ear disease. It is quite possible that determinants of the neurotic's symptom complex are based upon his physical constitution; in various types of constitutions specific neurotic symptom complexes are often associated with characteristic organ inferiorities.

We cannot utilize traditional text-book classifications of the neuroses into neurasthenia, hysteria, compulsion neuroses, and anxiety neuroses, for these classifications are based upon purely superficial criteria, and have no relation to deeper psychological meanings. From the standpoint of individual psychology the actual facts of the case do not completely determine the choice of symptoms. The psychological his-

tories and final purposes of two neuroses such as ereuthophobia (fear of blushing) and agoraphobia may be very similar; the most minute analysis will disclose no valid reason why one patient utilizes one symptom, the other patient, another, to avoid solving their problems. This seems a question of minor importance, yet by the application of the laws of organ inferiority and their compensation we can, nevertheless, answer it adequately.

We can conveniently discuss the clinical picture of the "problem" child at this point, for the conduct disorders of children are, as a matter of fact, incipient neuroses, and each child's problem behavior may be interpreted as we interpret adult neuroses: we construct the previous history of the child and his present situation, and incorporate his symptoms into his personal behavior pattern in order to find the value of the symptom in its relation to the total design. The analysis of a child's conduct disorder is usually more simple than the analysis of an adult neurosis, because the critical situation in the childhood of the adult neurotic (which we find through long analysis) can actually be seen living before us in the case of the child.

"Problem" behavior and "problem" character traits are unconscious tricks to restore the child's toppling sense of personal esteem in a situation which he senses as dangerous to his spiritual equilibrium. This is surely the case when a first-born child responds to the birth of a younger brother with fits of anxiety. The first-born compels his parents to restore their attention to him and causes them to divert their love and affection, in part at least, from the young rival.

Any change in the situation of a child may be the signal for the occurrence of all manner of "nervous" symptoms or "problem" character traits. The death of a parent, the birth of another child, withdrawal from a play group into the family, the beginning of school, failure in school, change of teachers or of schools, sicknesses which result in isolation or pampering, may all be critical situations. The child reacts to the new circumstances and relationships with that most sensitive of indicators: a child's sense of self-value. If the child believes that his position is threatened, he is quick—perhaps quicker than a grown-up—to avail himself of the means and instruments of defense, which we label neurotic.

A child's fear is usually the basis of his nervous development. Fear and anxiety are not in themselves neurotic, in a child. To a certain extent anxiety is the child's normal and correct reaction to his position of inferiority. That children are afraid of dark rooms and do not wish to remain alone is the rule and not the exception. Adults find it difficult to understand why a child is not afraid in situations which appear dangerous to a grown-up and is relatively much more afraid of a dark room or of being left alone where nothing can happen to him.

We know of an intelligent nine-year-old child, capable of self-observation, who was afraid only in his own house. When he was in a strange house he would go into a dark room without concern. This seems contrary to one's expectations. This same child would cross streets in the heaviest traffic without the least sign of anxiety, but at night, in his own house, he

would refuse to go into the neighboring room unless the door was left open. On some nights this boy would actually be afraid to sleep alone. On other nights he would stay awake and sit up with the maid, refusing to be alone at any cost. On one such occasion he heard a noise coming from the direction of the stove. No obvious explanation of this noise could be found, except that someone was probably driving a nail in a neighboring house. The child was seized with a senseless fear, which remained long after the noise had ceased. Another child of our acquaintance was panic-stricken when a doorbell was short-circuited and did not cease ringing. Despite all explanations, this unusual noise caused the boy to scream in terror and to crawl under the table.

The situations which cause anxiety in a child are very peculiar: they are not to be compared with situations which grown-ups consider dangerous. Close observation, moreover, indicates that anxious children industriously collect the material upon which their fear and anxiety is constructed. Horror and ghost stories, as well as pictures of death and skeletons, have an unconquerable attraction for frightened children. Anxious children voluptuously expose themselves to these shuddering pictures of terror, and when they lie in bed at night they allow themselves to imagine these horrors and to be afraid of them. Actually there is no pleasure in these experiences. A child really suffers from his anxiety, but there is no doubt that the child trains his fear and anxiety and that he collects the material for his night terrors during the day.

Anxiety is the characteristic symptom of a feeling

of inadequacy: it is industriously accentuated and elaborated by the child to the end that he may enjoy all the fruits of his fear and helplessness. Anxiety is designed to gain the desired presence of parents and grown-ups. The reason a child is not afraid in a strange house, but is anxious in his own house, when his parents go out, is that anxiety in a strange house is useless! At home anxiety is equivalent to a command to the child's parents: "You may not go out without me. Your business is to stay at home with me." It matters little whether the child's anxiety always succeeds in keeping the parents at home. It is the principle which is at stake. Pampered or only children, who have made their anxiety a weapon of offense against their parents, usually succeed in making their parents take their anxiety into account to the extent that their parents will sometimes concede them the benefit of the doubt and stay with them. That is the goal of anxiety.

The little human parasite refuses to do without his host. He believes that he can be safe when he is hidden under his mother's apron. The same child may go out on the street alone, be unafraid of traffic dangers; he may even be foolhardy on the playground or brave in the gymnasium. These are different situations, where cowardice cannot secure self-esteem or bolster the ego.

The child is quick to realize that bravery and not cowardice is the best means to power on the street and in the gymnasium. He is cowardly or courageous as the need arises. The seeming contradiction in these traits is immediately solved when we view them as means of the child's striving for security and not as

static phenomena. The goal of the personality is fixed; but in various situations diverse means recommend themselves as appropriate tools to its attainment.

As we have said childhood anxiety is hardly to be considered a neurosis. Anxiety becomes a neurosis only when it extends beyond certain limits and produces symptoms. The night terror of children, so frequently associated with bed-wetting, is a neurotic symptom. The specific shape in which a neurotic childhood fear expresses itself is largely determined by organ inadequacies. According to the child's organ disposition, anxiety and fear may be expressed as enuresis (bed-wetting), by failure to control defecation, by vomiting, or in pronounced motor types, by restlessness and a tendency toward somnambulism.

The bed-wetting of children is frequently, if not always, conditioned by a concomitant organ disposition. Physiological factors often play a rôle in enuresis. On the one hand there is an occasionally demonstrable inferiority of the urinary system (a partial manifestation of an inferiority of the lower bodily segments), accompanied by a disposition to disease of the genito-urinary organs; on the other hand, an abnormally deep sleep may be clinically completely responsible for the symptom. It is actually true that children who wet their beds very often have a deep, almost deathlike sleep from early childhood.

The voluntary control of bladder muscles is a function of the higher brain centers, which develop slowly in the course of the second year of life. These higher brain centers are at least partially masked or inhibited by deep sleep. It may well be that the incompletely

developed voluntary control of the bladder present during waking life cannot break through the deep inhibition of sleep. During sleep there is an involuntary, rhythmic type of bladder evacuation dependent simply upon the degree of distension in the bladder; this is the normal type of bladder evacuation in an infant.

The older the child, the more unmistakably this organ inferiority, which has less to do with the bladder than it does with the sleep mechanism, becomes a device in the service of the personality pattern. Bed-wetting can be controlled only by an effort of will that extends into the sleep period. To avoid wetting his bed the child must sleep less soundly. To this end it is simply necessary to make up his mind not to wet the bed, just as a grown-up makes up his mind to wake at a definite hour by sleeping less soundly, so that his sense of passing time is not completely blotted out. The child can control his bed-wetting by controlling the depth of his sleep.

The mechanism of bed-wetting itself is fundamentally normal; it is only in relation to the age of the child that bed-wetting becomes a conduct problem. When a child does not conquer his bed-wetting, it is reasonable to deduce that he is more interested in keeping his habit, although he claims that he has every intention of relinquishing it. Bed-wetting is usually a meaningful and purposeful mechanism. Only children often use it to compel their mothers to give them as much attention at night as they do during the day. Stubborn children find enuresis a valuable weapon in their fight for personal prestige. Neglected children

compel their grown-up environment to pay attention to them. Children who are brought up very strictly and are plagued with too much cleanliness may retain their bed-wetting as a violent protest, as if they wanted to say: "You see I'm just naturally dirty. Do with me as you will."

This latter interpretation is especially important. The voluntary control of bladder and bowel evacuation is an important element in a child's education to cleanliness. The very small child naturally has no sense of cleanliness. Human beings are not naturally clean; cats are much cleaner, for they need not be trained to be clean. Our cleanliness is a partial function of the social feeling. To be clean demands a considerable insight into the cultural conventions of contemporary life.

Our present standards of cleanliness are a comparatively late development, as in the seventeenth, and even in the eighteenth, century only the most aristocratic society washed their hands and their faces daily, and even then washing one's hands was something of a pose. The daily bathing fostered by modern hygienists has practically become the rule even in the lowest strata of civilized people, but a child has very little understanding of hygienic rules. The child practices personal cleanliness because it is demanded by his grown-ups, and then only when adjustment to social demands fits into his personal conative pattern.

When a child is at war with his environment the whole problem of personal cleanliness is a welcome battle-field. In this arena any child can rout his grown-up environment and win an easy victory. When par-

ents say, "Shame on you!" the child is stimulated to maintain his advantageous position. Bed-wetting is appropriate artillery on the battle-field of cleanliness and decency, while nail-biting and nose-boring help to maintain the child's barrage.

Parents clumsily attempt to "cure" these unsocial childhood habits by appealing to the child to be grown-up. This is bad strategy; the child maintains his habits for the very reason that this appeal demonstrates his helplessness and dependency—all too common traits in the so-called "nervous" child.

Unpleasant infantile habits recur later in childhood and become the expressions of a stubborn will-to-be-a-baby, if they have once assumed significance as a protest against parental pressure. Not infrequently one sees badly educated children who wet their beds when they find themselves in a boarding-school against their will, and want to force a return to the parental home at all costs, although they have once cured themselves of the habit. Bed-wetting is uniformly effective under these circumstances.

Stuttering, a frequent companion of bed-wetting, is a transparently significant device: the stuttering child emphasizes his own weakness, and his inability to assume grown-up obligations. Stuttering serves to evade these obligations and to nullify them. An organ inferiority may possibly be the basis of stuttering. Many children stutter temporarily when they first learn to speak, but this early stuttering is one of the technical difficulties of learning to speak, and is not a behavior problem. When this childhood stuttering is not relinquished, however, or if it is resumed after a

period of normal speech, we may surmise the existence of an organ inferiority, but it is more probable that the child has found himself in a difficult psychological situation.

The stuttering child is usually the object of too much attention from his environment. Everyone tries to help the stutterer overcome his speech defect, forgetting that speaking, like walking, is one of those functions which must be automatic, that is without the cooperation of the conscious will, to be effective. The more conscious the child is of his speech defect, the greater his difficulty.

In the end the well-intentioned parent grows impatient, considers the speech defect of the child as a personal insult and attempts to cure him by force. The parent punishes the child for the injury to the parent's vanity. With this gesture the function of speech is withdrawn from the sphere of objectivity and becomes a family battleground.

The anomalous situation of the stuttering child has two facets, an accentuated ambition accompanied by an appropriate fear of failure, on the one hand, and a strangling of the social feeling, on the other. Stuttering proves an effective instrument in both situations. When defeat lies in the offing, the speech defect becomes a defense mechanism. As soon as the child feels insecure, he stutters and cannot answer his teacher's question. Misanthropy is a patent sequel of speech defects. Speech is probably the most important bond in human relationships. Not to speak is to be isolated: to be isolated one need only forego speech. A child who has not enough courage to be a social human being can

avoid social contact with his environment more effectively by stuttering than by any other means. In this process the child never assumes the responsibility but shifts the blame upon his speech defect.

Some stutterers read aloud, or declaim long orations faultlessly, if they are alone, but stutter miserably if they only imagine that there is someone in the room. Many stutterers can sing, because song is not so clearly a means of communication between human beings. The stutterer makes his speech defect the sacrificial goat or whipping-boy that shoulders the blame for his failures in social intercourse.

Show a stutterer that an exaggerated feeling of inferiority and an inadequate ability to make human contacts predominates his private life, and you will get the stereotyped answer, "Of course, it is because I stutter." Interpret stuttering as the *expression* of a sense of inadequacy and its consequent fear of life, and show the stutterer that his speech defect is only *secondarily* built up into a cause of his inferiority complex, and you will meet with stubborn resistance.

This interpretation shatters the entire philosophical concept of the stutterer. He will show you how vainly and how often he has attempted to cure his stuttering and will tell you of his eager desire to cure himself, as if this were proof of innocence. But these demonstrations of good will are part and parcel of his system. If the stutterer were to relinquish his make-believe war against his speech defect, he would have to assume the responsibility for his acts, which is precisely what he does not want to do. The stutterer wants to prove that his stuttering is the cause of all his failures.

The psychological significance of conduct disorders becomes transparent when these disorders recur in adults, as is often the case with bed-wetting and with stuttering. The recurrence always takes place in situations in which the individual finds himself faced with difficulties he believes he cannot solve with the ordinary instruments of rational life. The Great War was a tremendous experiment that proves our contention. Many soldiers who were bed-wetters or stutterers in childhood relapsed into these childhood habits on the occasion of some terrifying experience at the front. Their absolute and actual helplessness in the face of the terrific war mechanism compelled these soldiers to avail themselves of the same means that they possessed in the time of childhood helplessness, mechanisms they had relinquished only in the degree that they felt themselves capable of meeting adult problems. These nervous manifestations were also the most appropriate devices to secure their removal from the front.

It is unnecessary to discuss the numerous other childhood behavior problems individually so long as we take account of the individual situation. What we have said about enuresis and stuttering may be applied to every other symptom complex. A nervous symptom is always an appropriate instrument to attain the goal of the child's behavior pattern; it is always part of his compensation for an exaggerated feeling of inferiority, derived from his childhood situation; it may also be a defense mechanism with which the child expresses his unobjective ambition or disguises his inner insecurity and his inability to make social contacts.

The child's choice of symptoms is frequently an

index of specific organ inferiorities, although this is not always the case. Tic-like blinking of the eyes is often observed in short-sighted children. On the other hand, exceptionally ambitious or vain children use this trick to gain the attention of their teachers and parents, as if they were pleading for special privileges by emphasizing their nervousness in this way. Occasionally children utilize the involuntary tremors and jerky contractions of various muscle groups—which occur during an attack of the disease called chorea or St. Vitus' Dance—to make themselves the center of attention or to secure their exemption from many tasks. Sometimes these symptoms are retained long after the chorea has been cured. Other children who never have had chorea may imitate these symptoms in order to gain the same privileges. In children of a distinctly motor type the specific disposition to show these symptoms may be considered an organ inferiority with its "somatic resonance."

Nervous vomiting, nervous anorexia (lack of appetite), and nervous constipation develop on the basis of an inferiority of the digestive system. Few devices are better calculated to remove a child from the difficulties of school life than nervous vomiting. We have seen children who would vomit regularly on the morning of schooldays but not on Sundays or holidays. When the mistaken solicitude of parents and teachers divests eating of its objective meaning and elevates it into a spiritual battleground, anorexia is an appropriate expression of the child's hunger strike. Parents should never make eating the object of authoritative compulsion or the basis of business relations between them

and their children. It is an error to coax a child to eat by bribes of any kind.

Good advice is hard to give. Most parents begin this false strategy when the child is first weaned, by making the child's eating or not eating the object of groundless anxiety. Where this false strategy has taken place the child quickly realizes that his refusal to eat is the most sensitive point in his parents' lives. Consideration of his own health is foreign to the child at this age, because he lacks objective points of view. A hunger strike would be too expensive an instrument of battle were it not for the fact that some hereditary defect in his digestive system divorces hunger from the uncompromising necessity to eat. Only under such conditions does the child allow himself to test his power in this arena.

A bitter battle ensues between the repressive efforts of the parents and the exaggerated resistance of the child. The time comes sooner or later when both parent and child fear every meal. The tense situation destroys the parents' patience and tenderness and spoils the child's appetite. Eventually each meal becomes an extended battle. When a child refuses to eat, it signifies a neurosis not only on the part of the child but also on the part of the mother. The "I will not" of the child is pitted against the "You must" of the mother. There is no shred of objectivity in this warfare, for each opponent has but one idea in mind: to prove his superior strength to the other. The child usually wins. Unfortunately he gains a Pyrrhic victory, paying for his triumph with weakened health and a fundamentally false attitude toward life.

The constipation of nervous children is the patent expression of their stubbornness and boundless will-to-power. Once it is begun, "nervous constipation" is more easily maintained than a hunger strike, because an actual inability to effect normal evacuation sooner or later follows its onset. This harmful habit is frequently the basis of what Freud called the "anal character." We cannot, however, accept his sexual interpretation of the compulsion neurotic symptoms that follow in later life.

Incorrigibility and other traits of children who cannot be educated seem to lack clear relations to any organ inferiorities. We have already shown how anxiety may become a child's fundamental character trait and we know that this anxiety may become the child's most important means of maintaining his self-esteem. The child may utilize timidity, stubbornness, temper tantrums, laziness, or sexual precocity, in a similar fashion.

Teachers who use the method of individual psychology are accustomed to consider stupidity as a form of problem behavior and to treat it as such. This novel contribution of individual psychology seems a paradox only so long as you subscribe to the traditional pessimism that considers "talent" as the sole determining factor of achievement. The success of the method of individual psychology in the sphere of education becomes increasingly significant with time. In the chapter on organ inferiority we have discussed fully all that we need say about talent: we have every practical reason to believe that the significance of the "courage-training complex" outweighs the questionably impor-

tant and always uncontrollable factors of heredity and predisposition.

Consider the analogy between "stupidity" and a phenomenon such as a hunger strike, which is an obvious manifestation of "nervous" and mental factors. In each case the child is convinced of his inability to go on. In each case the conception of the adult environment vacillates between recognition of the child's point of view and the assumption of the child's falsely directed will. In the sphere of intellectual accomplishment a cultural prejudice, the belief in the existence of talent, corroborates the child, whereas in the matter of digestion we know very well that an actual inability to eat cannot exist. This is the sole reason why the overwhelming majority of children who use the hunger strike as a means to power eventually give it up, whereas "stupid" children remain stupid for the rest of their lives. In education pessimism actually creates the results which it assumes as a premise.

It is no trick to make a human being "nervous" or "stupid" for his whole life. As in the case of stupidity a false diagnosis of "nervousness" may produce what was mistakenly assumed to exist. The concept of "nervousness" should be carefully kept secret from all children, lest "nervousness" serve the child as a justification for his failures, as an excuse for uninhibited aggressiveness, and as an exoneration for domineering or egocentric conduct.

Every child realizes that the phrase "I am nervous" is an effective excuse. If a child were really nervous, we would tell him that *all* children are nervous in order to help him. Nervousness is a make-believe exemption from duties surcharged with fateful consequences.

The problems of life may be solved even by those who are nervous. That man who lives all his life with the idea that the world cannot exact any contribution from him, because he is nervous, loses much valuable time in foregoing the necessary training which would have made him capable of taking part in life like any other human being. The nearer he approaches the battle-front, where decisions must be made, the more anxious he becomes. His anxiety is not surprising, because he is unprepared to make these decisions. He has lost hope of ever compensating for early handicaps, since the idea that he is "different" is deeply rooted in his soul. All he can do is to exaggerate his nervous symptoms, in order to demonstrate both to himself and to the world that he is both different and sick.

When the intensification of his feeling of inadequacy is turned into capital, the capital stock of pessimism and hopelessness, on which all his failures are based, is increased. Thus a vicious circle is developed whose inexorable consequence is the very difficulty that nervousness was supposed to avoid. When the pain of this behavior makes the personality deficit so great that the account can no longer be balanced (for the nervous individual progressively narrows his sphere of influence and activity) the neurotic is ripe for inner reorganization and for treatment by psychotherapy.

The nervousness and problem behavior of the child develops imperceptibly into the neurosis of the adult. Crises often appear in the years of adolescence. The youth's physical maturation, together with the lessening of family tension and the development of a more objective attitude on the part of parents—who either

forego some of their pedagogic mistakes or admit them to the growing child at this time—may counteract the discouragement of the nervous child to such an extent that he emerges from the crisis a relatively healthy and capable young adult. This is certainly the case with that large number of young adults who were “good-for-nothing” children, and gave their parents endless trouble. They seem to steer their craft into calmer waters, as they grow older and their situation changes.

Many very capable men remember, not without some pleasure, what thoroughly bad boys they were and what unbelievable difficulties they placed in the path of their educators. Their favorable development is to a large extent due to other encouraging factors in their lives. Sometimes many years later these very people develop a neurosis, when they sense old age coming on and feel their life has become more difficult; these neuroses usually are directly related to some almost forgotten childhood difficulty.

In reality, even these cases show the traits of the nervous character in the every-day expressions of their life, although they are seemingly in possession of complete mental health. For their good fortune they may thank the fortunate constellation of circumstances, which withholds the crucial test during the years of their greatest activity. “Mental health” is a very elastic concept, which is never really attained. Any human being is capable of developing a neurosis: the so-called mentally healthy people are those who have not yet experienced a too difficult test situation.

The manifestations of the neurosis in an adult are infinitely more complex than in a child. The reason is

that both the sources and the purposes of neurotic symptoms admit a greater possibility of variation. The infinite realm of actual life offers the material. Suppose an organ inferiority determines the choice of symptoms for a child. As this child grows into maturity he acquires more and more organ inferiorities. This factor becomes more important than in the case of the child, where only certain more or less hereditary defects and children's diseases come into consideration.

At this point we must call attention to the organ inferiority of the vegetative nervous system, which is more obvious in adults than in children for reasons that still remain mysteries to us. This organ inferiority is an important, if not indispensable, premise of the development of neurotic symptoms. The vegetative nervous system has a dominating influence on many of the most important bodily functions, as not only the heart and blood vessels, but also respiration, digestion, excretion, sex, the sense of equilibrium, and the tonus of muscles are under its control.

In addition, the vegetative nervous system, together with the glands of endocrine secretion, which are so closely related to it, is very amenable to purely mental influences. Our whole emotional life is involved in this relationship. Every emotion and especially that most important of emotions, fear, can affect the organs which are dependent upon the nervous system. Fear is the emotional expression of an experience of inadequacy, and as such it fits into the biological purposive pattern as the proper response to actual danger. As soon as fear becomes part of the personal purposive pattern, by means of a conative reconstellation, it be-

comes an instrument of the personal goal. When fear becomes part of the personal pattern it ceases to be a defense against dangers that threaten the organism. It becomes a defense against dangers that seem to threaten the sense of personal self-esteem.

The experience of fear is in itself an important element in the equilibrium of this self-esteem. If fear, under primitive circumstances, was originally a biologically purposive reflex, calculated to avert or modify the danger from which it grew, as we may assume, fear is practically useless under the circumstances of human domestication. The final purpose of anxiety is problematical when it arises from insults to the sense of personal self-esteem and not from real dangers, especially when anxiety is no more than the emotional expression of the experience of inadequacy. The shock of the psychophysical occurrence of anxiety to the total organism, in itself, intensifies the feeling of inferiority; the feeling of inferiority, in turn, produces a multiplication of circumstances favorable to the development of further fear.

Fear is the fear of fear. When there is a special sensitivity of the fear apparatus, that is, of the vegetative nervous system—which is true of all neurotics—the unhappy bond between the feeling of inadequacy and the existence of fear is strengthened and accentuated. Each experience that threatens the neurotic's mental equilibrium is followed by further circumscription of his activity. In the vicious circle of anxiety, fear is accentuated by fear, so that the neurotic gains no greater security by limiting his activity; indeed, his anxiety may increase.

All neurotic symptoms are linked with fear and the excitation of the vegetative nervous system. It is probable that instability of the vegetative nervous system is indispensable for the production of a neurosis, and in certain cases it may be the sole organ inferiority that exists. At the present time we do not understand the exact nature of this inferiority, and what little we do know is too technical to describe in this book. Suffice to say, there are not only quantitative but qualitative differences in the excitability of the vegetative nervous system.

This much is known about these variations: the vegetative nervous system consists of two separate systems, the sympathetic and the parasympathetic, which are partially antagonistic to each other. Stimulation of the sympathetic system produces excitement, whereas stimulation of the parasympathetic results in inhibition of the activity of many organs. A decrease in the sympathetic tension, moreover, has much the same effect as an increase in the parasympathetic tension, and vice versa. The antagonism of these two systems, nevertheless, is not uniform throughout the whole organism, since the relation between the sympathetic and parasympathetic differs in various organs. Variations in the tension between the sympathetic and the parasympathetic may thus produce manifold and highly complicated differences in the vegetative behavior of every individual.

Our conception of the significance of the vegetative nervous system, and its close ally, the system of ductless glands, is completely in accord with the modern clinical point of view. Most investigators agree, how-

ever, that purely mental factors play a considerable rôle in all neuroses, although their significance is variously interpreted.

Individual psychology is actually the only theory that throws light on the generally misunderstood relationship between the physical and mental causes of disease. Individual psychology maintains its theory of psychological relativity, and postulates the purposiveness of all mental phenomena. The significance of bodily factors is admitted, but not as a direct *cause* of mental diseases. To say that physical factors could cause neuroses would destroy the whole system of psychological relativity. Elements outside the personality cannot influence the personality from within. Physical factors are conceived as the material of experience on which mental attitudes are built. Only what the personality experiences can play a rôle in its purposive pattern. Pathological changes in the vegetative nervous system are related to the purely psychological phenomena of the neurosis, only in so far as they become emotional experiences, especially experiences of fear and anxiety.

Let us apply our thesis to the well-known types of neuroses. That whole group of neurotic manifestations which are conveniently labeled neurasthenia fits into the scheme of individual psychology without further difficulty. The neurasthenic headache is a so-called vascular headache of vasomotor origin and is based upon abnormal excitation of the vegetative nervous system. The neurasthenic's easy fatigue bespeaks changes in the tonus of his musculature. His muscular tonus, like his tremors, is a product of his vegetative nervous

instability. Vegetative phenomena also account for the disturbances of sleep, for there is a close relationship between the vegetative nervous system and the sleep centers in the brain.

When the neurasthenic suffers from palpitation and other heart symptoms, the vegetative innervation of his heart is responsible; his frequent gastro-intestinal symptoms are due to the same cause, yet the majority of these manifestations, especially the heart symptoms, trembling, and insomnia, are more often mimicry of fear and anxiety. Fear is expressed by trembling, palpitation, and insomnia, even in cases which are not neurasthenic. The physical mechanism of neurasthenia is fundamentally clear to modern science, although we cannot always explain each symptom.

From the psychological point of view, the neurasthenic's symptoms are really based upon the neurotic personality pattern which individual psychology has described. The discouraged individual whose ambition has been frustrated seizes any available physical mechanism that will help him to evade the test of life's unavoidable problems, which seem so dangerous to him. By building up the fiction of his sickness the neurasthenic seeks exemption from the battle-front of life. By allowing fear, the emotional expression of his exaggerated feeling of inferiority, to manifest itself in bodily symptoms without taking into account the psychological background of his behavior, he creates physical ailments to which he is predisposed by the somatic resonance of an oversensitive nervous vegetative apparatus.

These physical symptoms of the neurasthenic are

exquisitely appropriate. They secure his exemption from useful work and produce the desired social isolation and cause disturbances in his sexual relations in the overwhelming majority of cases. It is not surprising that the neurasthenic usually claims that his symptoms are caused by overwork or "strain"; he arranges a chronological sequence which seems to make his symptoms the direct result of this "strain."

No one knows whether strong physical and mental strain can actually cause nervous symptoms, nor to what extent—especially when complicating psychological factors are present. This much is certain: there never was a neurasthenic whose nervous symptoms did not fit into a pattern that individual psychology could predict and expect. Overwork and overstrain never can be actual causes of neurotic symptoms. The neurotic may veil the real state of affairs from himself and his environment by citing his overstrain, because of the widespread idea that it causes symptoms. Anyone who has seen the unbelievable capacity of some human beings to work when they are honorably interested in their success will be inclined to believe that the neurasthenic's gesture is a trick, although it is true that many a neurasthenic overburdens himself with work in order to demonstrate a treacherous array of circumstances which might make nervous symptoms conceivable.

The real meaning of all nervous symptoms is found in the fact that they exclude personal responsibility, reduce required work to a minimum, or at the very least enable the neurotic to work under easier conditions. Discouraged as he is, the neurasthenic ex-

cludes further contact with his fellows by demanding more rest than a normal person; and as the neurasthenic, like most neurotics, is afraid of love and marriage, he effects his retreat by means of the symptoms of sexual neurasthenia.

Little by little the neurasthenic withdraws into himself, glories in the egocentricity which is a product of faint-heartedness, circumscribes his activities without winning greater security in the process, and allows his ambition and his desire for dominance, together with his demands for sympathy and consideration, to control his career. He shifts the responsibility for all his shortcomings upon his poor sick nerves.

Hysteria is an illness marked by gross physical manifestations, which seem to be evidence of a serious physical disease at first sight. Paralysis of a single limb, hysterical attacks which bear a fleeting resemblance to epileptic fits, vomiting, and innumerable other symptoms whose very multiplicity forbids description are typical hysteria symptoms. Kretschmer's explanations of the physical mechanisms of a great many hysterical symptoms are perfectly satisfactory. He calls attention to the presence of the "sham-death" reflex in many animals and shows how the paralysis that results from intense fear simultaneously removes the cause of this fear.

The existence of the sham-death reflex is probably due to its biological purposiveness. The inherited reflex has lost its biological value to a large extent, but it still occurs in human beings who may be "paralyzed by fear" in situations of extraordinary danger. All the so-called paralyzes of hysteria, the fainting spells, the

loss of movement in certain limbs, the loss of speech, the hysterical blindness and deafness, are products, according to Kretschmer, of this primitive sham-death reflex.

Kretschmer believes that the distinguishing characteristic of hysteria is a recapitulation of primitive mental mechanisms. He has shown an analogous manifestation, which he designates as the frantic-activity reflex (*bewegungssturm*), in animals. If a bird is lost in a room it flies about violently until it finds its way into the open air by accidentally flying through the open window. Kretschmer believes this behavior is a reflex, but it seems a form of purposive activity to us. As the bird does not know how to get out of its prison by carefully planning its escape, frantic efforts are its only hope of salvation. The more lively its movements, the greater the probability that it will find its way to freedom. When the living victim of a tiger or other carnivorous beast of prey struggles to escape from its enemy, even when fixed in the tiger's jaws, it exhibits this same frantic effort. Now and then an animal may succeed in actually freeing itself by such wild, but completely unplanned, frantic movements.

Motor restlessness is an expression of fear inherited through many generations of animal forebears, although its biological purposiveness and significance hardly exist today. We still see human beings frantically running up and down, wringing their hands, incapable of staying in one place, when they are afraid. Kretschmer traces the excited motor manifestations of hysteria to these primitive frantic efforts, and thus explains the hysterical attack, the wailing and mania

of hysterical excitation, as well as the hysterical tics and tremors.

Kretschmer's views are completely in accord with our description in so far as he conceives the reflex mechanisms born of fear as the keystone of the hysterical symptom-complex. We may assume that the primitive sham-death reflex and the equally primitive frantic-effort reflex have experienced a conative reconstitution in man, so that these mechanisms impressed into the service of the personality pattern are transmuted into the manifold clinical pictures of hysteria. As soon as this happens, the primitive reflexes no longer have their original biological purpose of saving the organism from real danger; they become the expression of an individual's desire to withdraw from a position of inferiority and to attain significance; they are subterfuges to avoid problems that seem insoluble to the hysteric; they are mental devices to enable the individual to dominate his environment under license of the irresponsibility of mental illness.

The psychic structure and goal of the hysterical patient is the same as that of the neurotic in general. We label the means he uses to attain his end, hysterical. It is probable that his choice of symptoms is partially determined by organ inferiorities and physical disposition, for not everyone can produce an hysterical attack when he needs it. On the other hand, the specifically hysterical form of neurotic behavior bespeaks a certain training which reflects specific character-forming factors in the environment.

We can hardly explain the fact that women make up the majority of hysteric patients by claiming that

women have a special predisposition and organ inferiority. It is more reasonable to believe that their hysteria derives from the relative inferiority of the female sex in our civilization. The multiplex phenomena of the masculine protest are exceptionally well-marked in hysterical women. Women have been subjected to a lasting subordination for thousands of years. In reconciling themselves and adapting themselves to this subordinate rôle they have developed a whole series of character traits usually called "feminine," which, as a matter of fact, are the specific characteristics of slaves. These character traits are comprehensible as emergency defense and offense measures with which women protect their insulted self-esteem. These character traits cannot possibly be hereditary characteristics of the female sex. They are the product of hundreds of generations of training.

We must admit, nevertheless, that the general prejudice that "these women" are gossipy, treacherous, and untrustworthy, may finally prove itself true by virtue of the constant pressure of their degradation. Until the present day, when the emancipation of women has freed them from their slavery, this prejudice was never questioned. Every-day life teaches us that lies and treachery are the slave's best weapons against an oppressor. Children who suffer the stern authority of their parents, and can find no other ways to avoid constant punishment, are the first to avail themselves of lies. Lies, exaggeration, and distortion are indistinguishably woven into the structure of what clinically we call hysteria.

Every hysterical attack lies on the border-line be-

tween psychoneurosis and simulation. Sham-death and frantic-effort are so completely removed from objective activity that when they occur we may assume that a strong "will-to-be-sick" and a fanatical desire to avoid all normal activity exist. This is the more certain because the hysterical behavior, after its conative reconstellation from the primitive reflex, is dramatically designed to impress the environment. The hysteric patient can hardly believe in her own sickness, and she must train herself in order to deceive herself. And even then the subterfuge "works" only when the patient can conjure up an emotional attitude that creates the necessary atmosphere of irresponsibility. Women succeed in being hysterical more easily than men, because they have learned to lie more effectively.

The almost brutal aggression against the environment which is concretized in a hysterical symptom indicates that it proceeds from an especially deep feeling of inadequacy. That the mental contents of the hysterical neurosis are chiefly, indeed almost always, concerned with sexual conflicts is an empiric discovery recognized long before psychoanalysis. If you observe the hysterical patient closely you find that she is evading not only the love relationship but all other human and occupational tasks as well.

The predominance of sexual symptoms in the neurosis has been explained in an earlier chapter. It is quite natural that the sexual question assume the limelight in the case of the hysterical woman, for the sexual problem is the most important problem in the lives of many women, who feel that its solution is the solution of all human problems. Sex, to women

dominated by the prejudiced pessimism of a masculine protest, seems an arena where the most serious defeats may be experienced. For this reason many women feel less secure and tend to exhibit their egocentric striving for significance most clearly in the sexual arena.

In the last analysis all neurotics and especially hysterical patients show a very marked tendency to express all their mental difficulties in a sexual "jargon," and the psychoanalysts' overvaluation of sexuality is derived directly from the thought processes of their patients. The neurotic's tendency to catalogue, to schematize, to simplify and vulgarize all so-called conflicts, his exaggeration of all contrasts, and his tendency to accept radical catchword phrases, is a product of his perplexed need for orientation and security. In the sexual conflict all the seemingly insoluble problems of life are simplified, vulgarized, and reduced to the simplest possible formula, the antagonism of man and woman.

The neurotic's penchant for irresponsibility plays into the hands of the generally accepted philosophy of "drives," impulses, and instincts. His "system" has a better chance in the sexual arena than in business or in social relationships. No one objects to a young girl who claims that "unhappy love" is the cause of her illness, because the general public believes in such romantic hocus-pocus. No one thinks of asking why this young woman's love should be directed only toward an impossible object, such as a married man.

The public wants to believe in Cupid and his bow rather than that the disposition to be unhappy in love

is a sign of a distinct personality type characterized by its fear of actual, that is, happy love. Men and women of this type know very well how to construct a novel of their lives in such a way that they never gain their object. They make Fate responsible for their unhappiness and believe themselves the unfortunate victims of destiny; they allow themselves to be consoled and pitied while they achieve the center stage of a tragic drama. The whole process lends them a fictional maximization of their self-esteem, while their gnawing sense of inferiority is drowned in the intoxication of their perplexity.

The sexual life is almost the only stage which permits some women to play the rôle of the tragic heroine. An hysterical woman, apparently ill of unrequited love, actually evades all of life's other problems as well. She projects all decisions into the distant future, lest she suffer a final defeat. Her egoism is her sole interest; she is ambitious and discouraged at the same time; and she maintains an unattainable goal as her ideal, so that she may fail the more completely.

The hysterical woman's disinclination to solve her sexual problems is simply a special aspect of her disinclination to play the game of life. To a certain extent she is as frigid toward all life's tasks as she is toward her husband. If she is inclined to sexualize her entire mental life, and wants to make her sexual conflict responsible for all her failures, her distracted indictment of life and fate is echoed in all her activities. She is saying in so many words: "Why am I only a woman?"

Compulsion symptoms comprise the third important group of neurotic manifestations. The psychophysics

mechanism of the compulsion neurosis is constructed around a core of fear, although this may not be obvious at first glance. Every compulsive impulse and every compulsive thought has one chief function: to shut out fear. Compel a patient with a compulsion neurosis to relinquish some compulsive activity to which he is accustomed by the main force of his will, and in the overwhelming majority of cases he will suffer an attack of severest anxiety. Clinically the compulsion neuroses are very closely related to the anxiety neuroses, and their relationship is easily indicated. Certain French authors have claimed that they have found an outspoken hyperexcitability of the parasympathetic nervous symptom in both types.

Psychologically, the compulsion neurosis is almost always the product of a strict or a nagging education. It begins in childhood, when the child either identifies himself with authority or stubbornly protests against it to the extent of having temper tantrums or fits of rage and anger. It is dangerous for the child to give these impulses free rein, and if his discouragement has reached a certain degree he does not dare to express himself. The child, therefore, swallows his anger, but since stubbornness must somehow be expressed, he attacks compulsion with counter-compulsion. The child fights his assailant with his own weapons.

One of our patients once expressed this in the following way: "Rather than be tied up, I will tie myself up." Another patient reported that she brought her strict parents and strict teacher to the point of distraction by always erasing what she had written on the blackboard because she felt it was not written well

enough. In the beginning her teacher was well satisfied with this meekness and care, but as the child grew more and more meticulous, and spent hours writing a single sentence, torturing her parents and her teacher with her perplexed efforts to find perfection, both parents and teacher lost their patience and wanted to put a stop to this pedantry. At this time the girl had acquired a veritable compulsion neurosis.

The child had finally found an effective weapon to defend herself against grown-ups. Her counter-compulsion—an offensive-defensive revenge against the compulsion of her education—naturally became the more deeply rooted, the more parents and teacher sought to break her habit. She had elaborated her pedantry into a striving for absolute perfection with all the fanaticism of repressed anger.

The majority of compulsion neurotics specialize in some distinct activity. One of our patients became a specialist in the cleanliness and neatness of her household. Her pedantic excesses terrorized her entire environment. Using a flashlight to discover the last particle of dust beneath tables and bookcases, she spent uncounted hours cleaning up her house, not permitting anyone to help her, for she believed that no one could be as thorough as she. She was so fatigued when she had finished with her work that she was incapable of doing anything else. The family was completely baffled, yet her activity was no more than a virtue, which someone had taught her, raised to a point of inexorable law, and carried out to its last consequences. The result was that she could do nothing whatsoever when she had finished cleaning her house. As she sank

into her bed, completely tired out after her strenuous labors, no one could demand that she do another thing.

Her entire activity was thus circumscribed by the four walls of her house, and this narrow kingdom was quite appropriate to the style of life of this discouraged woman whose ambition knew no bounds. The compulsion neurotic demands total exemption from life's tasks on the ground of his inability to alter his affliction. He spends his life acting "as if" he were doing something, but his activity is always futile. He is so busy doing nothing that he has no time to do anything useful.

The striving for perfection sometimes passes through a religious stage or takes a moral turn and is expressed as a striving for some ideal of saintliness. Compulsive ceremonies, prayers, and self-imposed commandments are the tools of the compulsion neurotic's craft. As the compulsive activities become more and more complex they assume a multiplicity of meanings. Beginning as the expression of repressed anger and as a counter-compulsion against external pressure, they develop into a quest of perfection until the compulsion neurotic believes that they render him superior to all his fellows.

When a woman washes herself for four hours a day, all other people who spend an hour a day at most in washing, are so many pigs. Compulsion neurotics who live in a dread of microbes and bacteria show a transparent tendency to disparage their fellows. They spend their lives in endless prophylaxis against infection; naturally they consider anyone who is not so meticulous, a plague-ridden leper.

Compulsive activities usually assume the characteristics of self-inflicted punishment. There are repeated attempts to suppress secret tendencies toward uninhibited anger, vengeance, or even a lust for murder, by symbolic acts of penance, which serve to exorcise the hidden devils in the neurotic's soul. While the compulsion neurotic atones for his wickedness, he protests loudly against the strict penance imposed on him. In his opinion, every evil tendency he discovers in himself seems to affirm the bad opinion that his parents had of him as a child. Despite his protest against his parents' severity toward him he is depressed, and in his perplexity strives for betterment, perfection, and sanctity.

The illusion of magic powers finally insinuates itself into the structure of his neurosis and he concretizes his belief in supernatural powers in certain formulas and ceremonies. "If I do not turn around and put my foot on this square of concrete which I have stepped over, my mother might die," he says. "If I neglect to say this specific prayer which I must repeat every hour, someone will have a great misfortune," is a favorite compulsion formula. Given this sanction the compulsion neurotic punctually fulfils each ceremony, and naturally his mother does not die and no one has a misfortune. He takes good care that this fiction of Godlike power, which is innate in these practices, is never put to the actual test. Such magic formulas frequently contain a threat of death against members of the individual's family, which betrays his secret hate. The compulsion neurotic does not openly admit these murderous thoughts, but he punishes himself with a ritual.

The final result of this neurosis is a complete standstill. Because of his tremendous waste of time and his progressive circumscription of all activity, this type of sufferer ends by completely evading all useful work. At the same time that the feeling of compulsion gives the patient a sense of irresponsibility the distance is infinitely extended between his neurotic ego and the tasks he feels are beyond his powers.

A fictional sense of superiority furnishes the compulsion neurotic with a certain security against his environment. His is the only neurosis which leads to permanent internment in a sanatorium, although the patient has complete insight into his sickness, and is in no sense insane. It is, in other words, the only neurosis whose result is the same as insanity. Internment in a sanatorium further restricts the activities of the patient to the arena of the institution, definitely precluding normal adjustment to life.

As we have said, the compulsion neurosis is frequently, although not always, elaborated on the basis of an inferiority of the digestive tract. Nothing is so well calculated to develop the counter-compulsion of hateful stubbornness and pedantry, as a parent's insistence on the child's regularity of excretion. In the beginning of the compulsion neurosis we often find chronic constipation as an excuse for all manner of aberrant behavior. In the secluded quiet of the lavatory the compulsion neurotic performs all manner of ceremonies, which extend his stay in the only place where he is completely secure, where he can do what he will without being under anyone's compulsion for endless hours. His ambition to have everything and give nothing is symbolically related to the phenomena of

eating and excretion. This feeling is the central point of the neurotic striving for superiority in the compulsion neurosis, as in other neuroses.

The anxiety neurosis, as we have said, is closely related to the compulsion neurosis. Indeed, we may consider any specific anxiety complex as a compulsion complex with a specific content. There is hardly any difference between anxiety and compulsion, and the behavior of the patient in one group is quite similar to that in the other. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the so-called ereuthophobia, the compulsive blushing which occurs when the anxiety neurotic meets another human being. When he blushes he loses his self-confidence, and finally concludes that he must give up all contacts with humanity. In most of these cases there is an organ inferiority of the vegetative nervous system which actually enables the individual to blush more easily. This vasomotor instability is the physical basis of the symptoms.

There are many people, to be sure, with a similar defect of the vegetative nervous system who do not suffer from ereuthophobia. Even though blushing may be painful to them they soon learn that the social disadvantages of their defect are easily compensated by frank and open conduct. No organ inferiority *compels* an individual to have a neurosis. There must be other factors present in the life of the individual which upset his inner security to such an extent that he feels justified in taking an unimportant physical defect and exaggerating it out of all proportion to its value. Thus he uses it as an excuse for his isolation and misanthropy.

Frequently compulsive blushing is related to ideas

of guilt, or is associated with definite occurrences. One of our patients, who has had ereuthophobia for years, suffers agonies whenever he enters a public place. The minute he steps into a restaurant he feels that all eyes are pointed to him, and naturally he blushes immediately. He chooses his table with all the ritual of a compulsion neurosis. It must be so placed that no one can look into his face, and there must be no mirror opposite him lest anyone should see him blush in the mirror. He must be as close to the exit as possible, in order to avoid running the gauntlet when he leaves the restaurant. It is little wonder that this patient finally avoided all public appearances and spent his days in the solitude of his room, in which he performed all but the most menial tasks in order to avoid human contact. His meals were brought up to him and left in an antechamber, so that he would not have to look the waiter in the face.

This illness began in early childhood after a public fiasco, which, in the light of his strict authoritarian education, was a great shock to him. This patient, who had been an officer on active duty in the army, was forced to give up his commission; but as soon as he was out of uniform his condition became so aggravated that it was intolerable. His uniform had secured him a certain external prestige. It had been an indispensable condition of his social career. We may well assume that in choosing his profession he secretly believed that his military position would largely remove him from the criticism and deprecation of his social equals.

He was capable of work only under the extenuating

circumstances of being a uniformed officer. While he was in the army he remained practically isolated. He believed himself cursed with a defect that rendered relations with women out of the question. It is not surprising to learn that this deserter from the battle-front of life was a courageous soldier and a model officer during the war. He did not fear death or wounds; but the necessity of choosing a civilian occupation after the war practically put an end to his career. He withdrew into a life of poverty, attempting to live on a ridiculously small pension which was the compensation for a wound received in battle, and after making a few weak attempts gave up every idea of trying some civilian occupation. He was content to make a profession of his unhappiness and of his meditation on suicide. It required considerable treatment to bring him back into normal living.

Agoraphobia, the fear of open places and crowds, is a definite type of anxiety neurosis in which physiological organ inferiorities play a distinct rôle. When a person suffering from agoraphobia attempts to walk across the street, he suffers an attack of dizziness analogous to the normal dizziness that most people experience when they look down from a high tower. This sense of dizziness is produced by a stimulation and excitement of the vasovegetative system and the closely allied organ of equilibrium in the inner ear. Excitement is produced by evoking an anxious feeling of a possible fall.

This completely normal reflex is doubtless useful in a biological sense and originally must have served to warn of the danger of a precipitous fall. It is quite

possible that union of anxiety and excitation of the organ of equilibrium plays a rôle in the production of dreams of falling, and is the basis of the symbolism that makes falling the expression of a danger threatening the personality. This mechanism is the starting point of agoraphobia, where hypersensitivity of the vegetative system exists, at least in the organ of equilibrium. We must reiterate that hypersensitivity does not *oblige* anyone to have an anxiety neurosis, for many people with the identical hypersensitivity remain perfectly healthy, and often overcome their tendency to be dizzy by training.

Where the psychological premises of a neurosis exist, the above described organ inferiority determines the choice of symptoms. Persons who suffer from agoraphobia are almost always spoiled children. Their lives are built around this thesis, "I must not be left alone." Their neurosis begins in early childhood, usually after a period of relatively normal development, for the agoraphobia does not develop until some test situation, such as the beginning of business activity or marriage, gives the signal for the appearance of the pathological manifestation. The case which we described in the previous chapter will explain the evolution of this neurosis.

We have found confirmation for the basic theories of individual psychology in this sketchy description of the more important types of the neurosis. Every neurotic is an individual who has attempted to compensate for an exaggerated feeling of inferiority based on his childhood experiences, not in the realm of useful activity, nor in objective living, but in a fictional will-

to-be-superior. His retreat from reality is simultaneously a flight from his life's problems. The neurotic deserts because he feels these problems are too difficult for him to solve. In order to justify his desertion he finds a neurotic symptom that not only justifies his retreat but seems to make him irresponsible for his actions.

The elaboration of symptoms, however, is the result of a psychophysical interaction in which anxiety, the emotional expression of the inferiority feeling, plays the most important rôle, while organ inferiorities of every kind, especially those of the vegetative nervous system, are determinant factors. Reflex phenomena, properly a part of the biological purposive pattern, experience a conative reconstellation and are enlisted in the service of the personality pattern, becoming instruments with which the neurotic attempts to attain his subjective goal of exaggerated godlikeness. As this goal is impossible of attainment its choice enables the neurotic individual to avoid the real problems of life. It is the neurotic's lack of courage which leads him to believe that he must desert.

Chapter X

The Psychoses

ORGAN inferiority plays a threefold rôle in the development of the neuroses. Defects in the physical organism produce a somatic resonance in the evolution of the neurotic symptom, with the result that the nervous manifestations appear with greater frequency at the weakest point of the organism. The neurotic's attempts to compensate and overcompensate for his defect, moreover, produce parallel neurotic character traits. The greed and suspicious ambition of the compulsion neurotic, for example, parallels an inadequacy of his digestive organs. Organ inferiorities, even when they are not specifically emphasized, nevertheless act as determining factors in the general exaggeration of the neurotic's feeling of inadequacy, and are latent factors in the evolution of his neurosis.

The insanities, or psychoses as they are technically termed, are produced by the same psychological mechanisms that determine the evolution of the neuroses. No other elaborations of the personal purposive trends of the personality than those we have described as normal or as neurotic are possible. The endless complexity of individual behavior patterns is the result of the countless variations on the same theme, the chief

and only theme of human existence. To question its unity is to question the fact that we are all human beings. The fundamental human pattern that begins with a feeling of inadequacy and develops, *via* compensation, to a feeling of security, is part and parcel of the psychological nature of man, based upon his position in nature.

We must, therefore, find the same mechanisms in the psychoses. The difference between the psychotic and the neurotic is that the insane individual has lost his insight into the nature of his illness and has completely failed to make the proper adjustment to his fellow men. The differential diagnosis between a psychosis and a neurosis is clearly demonstrated in the relation between the compulsion neurosis and that form of insanity known as paranoia, which is characterized by delusions of persecution and ideas of grandeur. The compulsion neurotic holds to one exaggerated idea, such as cleanliness, which he fights with his conscious thought; he is always conscious of its senselessness, but he cannot conquer it. He has maintained his critical sense and considers his own behavior pathological.

If he loses his critical faculty, and his compulsion idea becomes a fixed delusion, his neurosis becomes a psychosis. The critical faculties of logic and of insight into the pathology of our actions are the final bond to the world in which we live: without these faculties we cannot retain our contact with it. When the compulsion neurotic burns this bridge behind him, his exaggerated ideas seem true to him. We call this delusion. When we substitute our private individual logic for common

sense we make a gesture that divorces us from sanity and the sane.

In many cases—and this is especially true in paranoia—the delusions may affect only a certain portion of the mental life, so that the patient may retain his ability to earn a living. Paranoiacs often give the impression that they are completely sane. But you will discover how deep the chasm is that lies between the paranoiac and other human beings, and how futile it is to bridge this chasm, when you question him on the subject of his delusion.

We may interpret the psychotic's breach with the world of sane individuals and of common sense as a step farther in the flight from reality. In other words, insanity may be considered as an exaggeration of neurotic behavior. When a man loses hope of meeting the tasks of life adequately, or cannot attain his exaggerated personal ideal, he has no other course than suicide or insanity (which is an equivalent of suicide) if he refuses to change his goal in life.

Certain objections arise against interpreting insanity merely as a quantitative exaggeration of the neurosis. In one way insanity is a more profound neurosis inasmuch as we find a much more profound discouragement in an insane individual than we do in the neurotic. This is not the essential difference between the two. We have already mentioned the paranoid patient who maintains his business life and is insane only concerning a certain delusion. This man has not actually broken all bridges to reality, and although there is no doubt that he is insane, he actually accomplishes some of his life's tasks. On the other hand, we

have seen compulsive neurotics who have so completely broken with reality that they have been interned in a sanatorium. The patients, nevertheless, maintained their critical faculties, normal logic, as well as their insight into their illness, and, therefore, could not be considered insane.

The circles of the neurosis and the psychosis intersect one another so far as the patient's courage and his relation to the fulfilment of his tasks in life are concerned. The assumption that the neurotic maintains a certain contact with reality, whereas the psychotic does not, leaves a large borderline zone, within which a severe neurosis is more dangerous for the fate of the patient than a mild insanity.

It is apparent that there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference between the neurosis and the psychosis. This does not prevent us from solving the problem. When we discussed the neuroses we definitely avoided changing quality into quantity. We do not believe that neurasthenia is a mild neurosis, nor do we think that the hysterics and compulsion neuroses are more serious forms, although neurasthenics are sometimes better adjusted to life than hysterical patients. We have been more inclined to relate the choice of neurosis to external determining factors in the individual's experience or physical predisposition. We find the same fundamental mechanisms in the neurasthenic and hysteric, and we assume that the specific mental disease which occurs in any individual—a matter of secondary importance from the point of view of its purpose—is determined by the interaction of the aforementioned factors.

The factor of organ inferiority is a far more important determinant of the psychoses than of the neuroses. This means, in the last analysis, that the occurrence of insanity depends largely on the existence of certain hereditary or acquired physical anomalies. The mental difficulties which might produce hysteria under other circumstances produce a psychosis in the presence of this specific physical factor. Where this physical factor exists, the psychosis assumes the same function as the hysteria does in a case where there is no organic predisposition—with one important and essential difference.

There are some psychoses termed “process” psychoses in which an organic process starts with the appearance of the psychotic manifestation, and this organic process is not always reversible. The body-mind phenomena effect changes in the body apparatus—the brain, or in another organ—which completely preclude normal functions in the future. Progressive deterioration of the personality is the result of such an insanity.

This point of view helps us to understand the organic psychoses, such as the diseases of the brain. We may assume that the more profound the pathological change of the organ, the less disturbance in the mental equilibrium is required to produce a psychosis. So far as clinical practice is concerned we find that the laws of individual psychology validate themselves, even in these border-line cases. Any physician who observes closely will find that the initial onset of paresis, the progressive paralysis due to syphilitic disease of the brain, occurs as a result of a business or

social difficulty, or before some important decision which the patient is afraid to make, although the organic process has been present for years. If you read of a case of bankruptcy in which the defendant is acquitted because of insanity (paresis) you may assume, to be sure, that his mental disease was partially responsible for his business bankruptcy, but it is equally possible that before the business catastrophe occurred no signs of mental disease were present. The catastrophe, which the individual interprets as a great defeat, stirs up the latent symptoms of disease, and the symptoms subsequently make the individual irresponsible. Another individual might have taken flight into a "nervous breakdown" or depression after a financial failure, and this is much more frequently the case.

The "nervous breakdown" protects the bankrupt's ego-consciousness under extenuating circumstances. The paretic takes flight into the psychosis, which has been prepared by the disease processes in his brain. To be sure, his paresis would have come to the surface sometime, but it might have occurred in a less acute form or much later and under other circumstances. The truth is that the paretic's psychosis plays the identical rôle in the paretic's mental economy as a simple neurosis in less serious cases. Psychogenic factors may precipitate organic psychoses, but practically this has little significance because the somatic resonance of the diseased brain, as in the case of paresis, dominates the clinical picture.

It is quite another story in the process psychoses which do *not* follow organic disease, intoxication or

infection of the brain. In the organic or infectious psychoses there is little practical significance in the fact that there is evidence of the personal purposive constellation in the prepsychotic personality, and that this personality may precipitate the onset of the psychosis. In the psychoses which have no certain anatomical basis this is surely not the case. Dementia præcox or schizophrenia is the most important member of this second group of psychoses. Many cases of dementia præcox, to be sure, end in a final deterioration, but the dementia of the dementia præcox in most cases differs distinctly from the dementia that follows organic degeneration of the brain.

For one thing an individual with dementia præcox considered hopelessly insane has frequently been known to become surprisingly rational and sane after a change to another asylum. Even though this amelioration does not last very long, it nevertheless indicates the fact that the loss of intelligence in dementia præcox is not so definitive as in the dementia of organic brain disease, where insanity, once it has begun, never gets better.

Changes in the brain tissues of dementia præcox have been described, and some authors believe that these changes are related to the clinical picture. These changes, however, cannot be considered the primary causes of the disease, because they cannot be found in the early stages. Even those investigators who completely deny the validity of psychic factors in the etiology of dementia præcox do not look for organic changes in the brain. They usually seek changes in the endocrine system and feel that any brain changes that

occur are secondary to pathological changes in the glands of internal secretion.

There are such cases in medicine. We have the clinical picture of cretinism, based upon a primary functional disability of the thyroid gland, whose secondary symptoms are changes in the brain function, manifested as idiocy. It seems that an intact thyroid apparatus is a necessary premise for an intact brain, and some investigators believe that a similar condition holds for dementia præcox. To date, experimental attempts to link glandular insufficiency to dementia præcox have given very meager results. In no instance do they permit a definite conclusion that a specific disease of specific glands results in dementia præcox as specific degeneration of the thyroid always results in cretinism. All we can say is that certain elements in the clinical picture of dementia præcox might indicate that changes in certain glands of internal secretion, especially the sex glands, may have a relation to that dementia. But more than this we do not know.

We have already indicated in a previous paragraph that the glands of internal secretion are closely related to the vegetative nervous system. Let us further recall our chapter on temperament and its relation to physical structure, based on the experiments of Kretschmer. We may complement our previous statement by noting that most of Kretschmer's experiments were done on the insane. The asthenic constitution which usually accompanies a schizothymic temperament is to be found in its most outspoken form in cases of dementia præcox. There is a whole series of traits characteristic of the schizothymic temperament which are also characteris-

tic of dementia præcox when they cross the line of the normal and assume definitely pathological forms. We may assume that this disorder originates from the fundamental basis of the schizothymic temperament.

The manic-depressive psychoses similarly are closely related to the cyclothymic temperament and the pyknic constitution. The vegetative nervous system is the bridge between a man's physical constitution and that part of his mental conduct which we call temperament. If we can show that a defective organization of the glands of internal secretion is present in dementia præcox, and if we remember that there is a very close relationship between the glands of internal secretion and the vegetative nervous system, we can understand approximately the relation between physical disposition and the dementia præcox. In dementia præcox, hypothetically, there is a physical predisposition to disease whose actual nature we do not understand. The predisposition gives rise to an intensification and qualitative difference in the emotional experiences of the schizoid individual that does not exist in normal people.

Fear remains the focus of the schizophrenic's behavior. The fact that the sex glands may be organically inferior helps us to understand why sexual factors, especially excessive masturbation, play such an important rôle in the mental picture of dementia præcox. The abnormal disposition acts as if it were an organ inferiority of the vegetative nervous apparatus. It differs in quality from similar organ inferiorities in the neurosis. In dementia præcox abnormal emotional experiences produce abnormal attempts at defense, and

as a result the attitude of the schizophrenic personality to life differs greatly from the neurotic's outlook.

The same psychological factors, which might under other circumstances lead to a neurosis, are present in those cases of dementia præcox which we have examined by the method of individual psychology. Cases of dementia præcox examined in this way have shown a specific constellation of inadequacy in childhood followed by an intensified striving for significance. When schizophrenic traits appear early, and signs of dementia præcox occur at puberty or shortly thereafter, the neurotic flight from life progresses farther than usual, and ends in insanity.

The characteristics of the behavior of a young person who has completely lost his courage to adjust to life or to cooperate with his fellows—that is, an individual suffering from dementia præcox—are complete isolation, introversion, withdrawal of interest from the outer world, emotional negativism, a tendency to occasional fits of anger, stereotyped movements and speech, a tendency to make grimaces, and apparently senseless laughter or weeping.

Instead of meeting reality the patient with dementia præcox lives in an individual world filled with illusions, hallucinations, and insane philosophic theories. We find traces of the individual pattern and goal in the content of the psychosis. All important elements of his experience recur, distorted, bizarre, or dreamily symbolized, in an incomprehensible system. New words are formed and even a new language, understood only by the dementia præcox patient himself, may be part of his dreamlike activity. The struggle for significance

proceeds in a world of delusions and hallucinations, although real significance is excluded by the patient's retreat from life.

Sooner or later the dementia præcox patient is put into an insane asylum where his experiences drive him to the most profound introversion, rob him of the last remnants of his courage, and tend to make his return to reality impossible in the future. An astonishing change of behavior often follows taking such a patient out of an insane asylum and putting him under private care, where his personal liberty is limited to the least necessary extent and where he is spoken to as if he were entirely normal. Timidly and hesitatingly, the dementia præcox patient may dare to step out of his isolation, although he is constantly distrustful of his entire environment, from which he has experienced so much evil. His condition becomes markedly better, and his family believes that he is on the way to a cure; but his belief in himself and in the world has been too radically destroyed.

Some little event that makes him feel the limitation of his liberty, or tends to show him that he is still not treated like a perfectly well being, frightens him and he dashes precipitately into the refuge of his psychosis. Nevertheless, the fact that dementia præcox can be bettered, if only temporarily, by an encouraging, trust-provoking treatment, indicates that the patient's behavior is based upon a profound discouragement, and that the conception of dementia præcox as a flight from life and reality is not far from the truth.

If secondary pathological changes occur in that part of the individual's organism which is least resistant,

thus making a return to normality impossible, they may well be the result of the catastrophic change in the insane individual's style of life, the inactivity of his intellectual apparatus, and the profound distortion of all activity that comes with insanity. That individual who has a predisposition to dementia præcox unwittingly starts a pathological process in the beginning of his illness, when it is still purely neurotic and psychologically approachable, whose foundations have been laid in his constitution previous to his sickness. But once the process is started he can no longer master the incurable and progressive changes which end in advanced dementia præcox, with changes in the brain, motor disturbances, deterioration, and dementia.

This is the so called "process" of dementia præcox. In any specific case it is difficult to say where psychogenic factors merge with the "process" factors. In medical practice an attempt at psychotherapy is justified, even in the most advanced cases of dementia præcox, to the utmost degree that the necessary rapport with the patient can be obtained.

In paranoia, another psychosis which is considered incurable although no anatomic changes can be found, the patient deserves a similar trial. Paranoia never leads to deterioration and dementia; its final stages result in a complete isolation of the patient. The paranoid patient blames his environment by building up systematized delusions of persecution, ideas of reference, and insane ideas of grandeur.

In paranoia we see the characteristic traits of the nervous character in delusional distortion, but for this very reason the underlying dynamics are remarkably

clear. Every neurotic believes in his uniqueness. He is convinced that he is too good for the world, on account of his fictional superiority. His logic is not objective, because it always premises the very thing it wants to prove: that inferiority is due cause for exemption from life's tasks. On the basis of this logic the neurotic institutes a series of multiplex arrangements to avoid all personal responsibility for his acts.

In the paranoid system we find the same process, but its fanciful speculation is so far removed from reality that it becomes incomprehensible. In paranoia the egocentricity of the neurotic is exaggerated to gigantic proportions. The whole world seems to the paranoiac as an organization whose real purpose is to prevent him from attaining his just deserts. This is the result of the ever-widening concentric circles of the paranoiac's systematized delusions. He cannot conceive of any occurrence not directly related to him. His ego actually stands in the middle of the world, and his importance reaches colossal proportions. Because his very presence in the world is the sole reason for the existence of countless other human beings, the paranoiac believes that he need not raise a finger to any useful task.

It is remarkable that a paranoid patient who considers himself something of an exiled monarch will quietly carry on the bourgeois existence of a shoemaker or a clerk, or do carpentry in an insane asylum, as if every-day life had a kind of reality entirely different from the reality of his delusion. We onlookers know the truth, but the paranoiac refuses to recognize it. He believes his delusions are as real as every-day

life—but only in his ideas and in his work. If you watch him you can see how patently he reckons with the “as if” of his delusions. He refuses to recognize any insight into his illness, and yet that insight exists in his actions.

Paranoia, nevertheless, is to be considered a real psychosis. The paranoid individual burns the bridges which would give him access to humanity by excluding normal logic and substituting paranoid delusions. He fortifies his abnormal personality and secures it against any environmental influences, so that he alone shall determine how far he will recognize actual relationships, and how far he will maintain his isolation. Sooner or later the spark of insight present in his actions is extinguished. The little island of his healthy personality that remains is liable to be flooded by his delusions, and at any time the actual consequences of delusion may overtake him in the commission of a crime or of suicide.

We use the term “manic-depressive psychosis” to describe a whole gamut of mental phenomena which are doubtless to be considered insane although they do not have the characteristics of irreversible processes. Manic-depressive insanity usually begins with attacks of sadness or unusual good humor which pass away to recur after intervals of various length, occasionally with great regularity or with a photographic repetition of the symptoms. In some cases the interval, duration, and characteristics of the symptoms can be prophesied in advance, in others, not. Isolated cases of depression, that is, of simple melancholia, are to be classed among the manic-depressive psychoses.

The manic-depressive psychoses are associated with a pyknic physical type, as Kretschmer has pointed out. We may assume the existence of some predisposing factor, because of the great regularity with which the cyclothymic temperament, the manic-depressive psychosis, and the pyknic's physical constitution are found together, both in individuals and in families. It is probable that the cyclothymic temperament or predisposition is related to a specific constellation of the vegetative nervous system, which acts as an organ inferiority; this in turn modifies the type of experience, and forces the individual to specific types of compensation and overcompensation.

A single manic or depressive attack need not be caused entirely by psychic factors; a change in the vegetative tonus of some phase of the individual's life may temporarily create the physical foundation for an attack. We must consider this when the manic depression occurs out of a clear sky, without the occurrence of any possible predisposing psychic situation. If we consider each attack, no matter how it began, in its context with the total personality, we can show that an illness growing out of some internal cause may be just as purposeful within the personality pattern as any neurosis, and that it may serve as a vehicle of flight from life's tasks, as it may also serve for the fictional elevation of the ego-consciousness. The inner factors determine only the choice of symptoms and the time of their appearance; they cannot occur outside of the limits of the unit personality.

This is especially clear in melancholia, which usually occurs in specific phases of life—such as the menopause in women. Melancholia has physical as well as

mental determinants. There is one type of woman in which one may almost prophesy melancholia at the menopause. These are the women who, despite a strong feeling of inferiority throughout their lives, have managed to keep their mental equilibrium by feeding their feeling of significance with sexual triumphs. These are the women who want to be beautiful and much admired, to see men at their feet, to be spoiled by everyone—and this is the make-believe that helps them to feel that their lives are not empty. Actually they have no real achievements, because they have not dared to do anything worth while.

Women of this type do not have children, because the bearing of children and the task of their education militate against their ideal of useless beauty. A life of luxury spent in passing the time in futile pleasures seems perfectly adequate to them. The woman who has in no way prepared for lasting values in her life stands before an abyss when she can no longer conquer men with her youth and beauty. She has decades before her and doesn't know what to do with them. Her secret pessimism, born of deficient self-confidence, which has been hidden behind the curtains of a life of pleasure and man-hunting, appears at this time. There seems no escape for her, and she takes flight into melancholia.

The profound depression characterizing melancholia is the correct expression of her mental bankruptcy, and although melancholic women do not admit that their symptoms are the direct consequences of a false technic of living, they offer delusional explanations for their illness.

The melancholic patient simultaneously forces her

environment into the channel of her personality by means of her sickness, although this is accomplished with different tools from those of her heyday. Any woman who suffers from melancholia maintains the limelight of her little stage. She is the uncontested prima donna, whose sickness terrorizes everyone in her vicinity. The whole household must take care lest she commit suicide. Everyone else must cheer her up, so that she may think of something besides her insane self-reproaches.

Self-reproach, nevertheless, is the best means of protecting oneself from the reproaches of others. Anyone can recognize the violent aggressiveness of the behavior of a melancholic woman if he allows himself to be influenced, "as if it were a pantomime" (Adler), without listening to the contents of her thought processes and her speeches. Under these circumstances you can see how the melancholic patient exercises her boundless will-to-domineer. She seeks to maintain her position with these last distracted and perplexed defense measures when her former cowardly style of life with its emphasis on artificial triumph and prestige falls like a house of cards. The numerous suicides committed by melancholic patients are nothing more than the continuations of this perplexed strategy beyond the grave. Their purpose is to throw the blame on those who have remained behind.

Mania, a pathologically accentuated buoyancy and hilarity connected with intense motor activity, a tendency to talk too much and to show a flight of ideas, is one of the characteristics of the manic-depressive patient. Mania sometimes occurs where one might ex-

pect depression after a failure, or sorrow after some unhappy event. In other cases mania may be part of a life-long campaign against some member of the family, such as a husband. In a case under our observation a husband was wounded at his most sensitive point by his wife's extravagant spending during her manic period. Of course the husband could not make his wife responsible for her acts during her mental disease.

Since mania usually leads to commitment in an institution, and thus to a temporarily complete isolation from human relations, it is to be considered as the expression of a deeper discouragement than melancholia. The fictional good spirits of mania are comparable to the joking of a man condemned to death. It is the smoke screen that hides an inconsolable cowardice. The maniac laughs without restraint to keep from crying. He seeks to save himself by the main force of his pathological buoyancy. For this reason we consider the sudden or gradual change from mania to depression a hopeful symptom and the beginning of an amelioration of a condition which can be cured only when it is in this stage.

This necessarily brief review of the interpretation of the psychoses by individual psychology does not attempt to furnish proof of a conception which is still more or less contested; it is designed solely to give a brief bird's-eye view of the situation in which the insane person finds himself. We must be content to show that insanity may be aligned with the conception of the conative unity of the personality. The purposive activity of the unit organism may be traced even in the

various circumstances that seem to be foreign elements in the structure of the personality. So long as the patient has not sunk to a level lower than that of an animal because of the destruction of the mental apparatus, the melody of his style of life may be recognized in all the distorted forms of his behavior, and his indestructible personality may be found in every cross-section of his conduct, whether an hereditary predisposition or an organic disease of the brain has prompted him to that retreat from life which we call insanity.

Chapter XI

The Prevention of Mental Disease and Criminality. Education According to Individual Psychology

OUR description of mental phenomena according to individual psychology has taken us from the explanation of normal behavior through the discussion of the various conduct disorders of children, juvenile delinquency, neurosis, crime, and, finally, to the discussion of insanity. We have formulated the elements of a scientific understanding of character. Despite the complexity of the material presented, every form of human behavior that we have described is comprehensible when analyzed in terms of individual psychology. We have always been speaking of one and the same object, the human soul, which remains the human soul despite the onslaughts of destiny and suffering.

The fundamental idea of individual psychology encompasses the fundamental melody of human life. This melody is simple, and all who listen may rediscover it in all the variations of tempo, mood, harmony, and instrumentation, in the human symphony. To rediscover these simple melodies is to understand the variations. The variety and the type of change, to be sure, are not a matter of indifference, but they gain

their meaning only when their incontrovertible relationship to the main theme is established.

The very nature of the object with which we are dealing compels us to make evaluations as well as descriptions. Once the normal evolutionary tendency of human life is established, and the definitive concept of the ideal laid down, every type of behavior that is parallel to this universal tendency must be considered "right," whereas every other tendency must be called "false."

The criteria of value, tacitly underlying this concept, cannot be in the nature of a system of ethics. Hygienic criteria would be more appropriate. The difference between these criteria is the difference between the categorical imperative and the hypothetic imperative of Kant; ethical norms based on a transcendental idea of God are absolute, whereas, hygienic norms, whether in medicine or in psychology, are not even theoretically universal in application.

The hygienic norm is a practical one. Science investigates the bacterial contents of drinking water. The scientific investigation does not proceed because of any unprejudiced interest for the single-celled inhabitants of the water, but because it wants to establish scientific norms of pure, drinkable water and impure, undrinkable water. The scientist then makes the following announcement: "If you drink this water, you will probably get typhoid fever. No one can compel you not to drink this water, and thus avoid the danger of typhoid fever. If you wish to avoid typhoid fever you must follow our advice." In actual life the great majority of people will obey the command of the public

hygiene physician as if it were an absolute commandment, for most people prefer not to have typhoid fever. Nevertheless, there is a distinct difference between ethical and hygienic commandments. The "commandments" of individual psychology belong to the category of hygiene.

From the psychiatric point of view, we may be justified in giving criteria of what is right and what is wrong, in human behavior. It is impossible to prevent this critique from creeping into the description of mental phenomena. If we describe the inexorable consequences of bad education as seen in problem children, the fact that this education is bad, is an obvious conclusion. Therefore, it is apparent that most of what we have to say about the prophylaxis of the neuroses and psychoses, and of the prevention of juvenile delinquency and criminality has already been said. The most important practical advice is to avoid all methods of education that are mistaken because they are followed by bad results in practical life. If the reader will return to the appropriate chapter in which these are considered he will see all the things that one must not do; and if you succeed in avoiding all these errors, all that remains is by that fact the "correct" method of education.

This negative definition of correct education makes us wonder whether it would not be better to relinquish all attempts at educational influence, and trusting to the biologically correct predisposition of the child to follow automatically the best line of development, allow the child to grow up "wild" and without any training. Theoretically this is correct. But on further

consideration it is apparent that this method of non-education can actually never take place in reality.

In the first place education is not confined to the *planful* influence which the child gets from its teachers and parents. This is education only in the narrower sense of the word. Each of the countless happenings which the child experiences from the first day of its life has an influence just as intensive as any pedagogical procedure. Some of these early experiences are more important influences than any subsequent school experiences.

The child is educated by "things," by the change of night and day, by sickness, by his nutrition, his toys, his brothers and sisters, and by the countless strange and half-strange people whom he meets. Education is but one of the five groups of factors that influence the mental development of the child. In the chapter on education, planful pedagogy was shown as a part, and not the most important part, of the determining factors derived from the character of the child's parents and teachers, rather than from their pedagogical methods and objectives.

If we were to modify the tenet of non-education and let parents withhold all planful attempts to influence their children, telling them to concern themselves as little as possible with the child, since everything they might do would be bad pedagogy, the program of non-education still could not be carried out. The child is dependent upon the help of his adult environment at every step in his life, especially in those important first years of life when character is determined. The child would die if he were not cared for. As soon as

you have any contact with a child, you educate him; and, although you do not educate systematically, you educate by example, by love, by intimidation, or by encouragement.

The conclusion that no education is the best education leads us, nevertheless, to an important pedagogical maxim: The task of education is not to teach a maximum of valuable procedures, but to avoid as many errors as possible. The danger of positive mistakes is immeasurably greater than the danger of omission. The best education obviously is that education which avoids all distortion and disruption of the child's natural development, and strives, as far as possible, to obviate errors of development wherever they do occur. Every educator must learn that pedagogic modesty is the first principle of his craft.

We have already discussed the direction in which the natural development of the child proceeds. We have discussed the origin of the feeling of inferiority from the situation of the child in infancy and we have discussed its compensation. Compensation, as you remember, may be objective, real and stimulating to actual progress, or it may be subjective and lead to an exaggerated striving for significance and to attempts at artificial ego-maximation.

We have explained the natural law governing the relationship between the feeling of inferiority and the social feeling. You will remember how the natural social feeling, inhibited in the beginning by the parasitic relationship of the child, revives in the degree to which the child attains self-confidence and courage—that is, in the degree to which he overcomes his feeling

of inferiority. The normal trend of human development, therefore, is to cultivate the social feeling, to develop self-confidence, and to compensate for the feeling of inferiority along useful and objective lines: Actual progress and initiation into the fellowship of human beings are concomitants of this evolution.

A vicious circle is hidden in this situation, and it is this vicious circle which makes education a problem. The correct compensation of the feeling of inferiority by objective progress, adjustment, and adaptation to society, presupposes a beginning capital of courage. Yet courage can be gained only by correct compensation.

We can state the problem in another way. The childhood feeling of weakness compels the child to make false compensations; he strives for a subjective sense of significance, and thus makes real progress and real adjustment impossible. Subjective striving for significance leads only to make-believe triumphs and final defeat, never to encouraging results. The vicious circle consists in a progressive intensification of the feeling of inferiority, which consequently leads to further false compensation, *ad infinitum*.

Fortunately the child's creative powers can break through the vicious circle in some cases. These creative powers are charged with sufficient courage to enable the child to make his first actual progress and his first actual adaptation. Once he has made these first gains his development proceeds, so long as it is not disturbed, in a beneficent channel. The child's first triumph raises his courage and lessens his feeling of inferiority, thus enabling him to attack a bigger job. The first successful step increases his capital of courage, and every

subsequent step is easier than its predecessor. It is the task of education to set the child into this beneficent channel, or at least not to disturb him if he is in it.

In the last analysis education is encouragement. Only a courageous man, however, can make others courageous. Pedagogic theories are not nearly so important as the mental attitude of the teacher. A teacher is good or bad, not because he has a good or a bad program, but because he has or has not an adequate attitude toward life. The correct attitude of a teacher toward his children is best expressed in the phrase "friendly well-wishing."

We purposely avoid the word "love," because it is too often misused. A mother's egocentric, emotionally charged tenderness is called love by some people. The child either misunderstands or actually dislikes such love in the beginning, although he may gradually accustom himself to it after he learns how to use his mother's craving for tenderness to further his own striving for significance. Faint-hearted anxiety lest a child be hurt; the exaggerated solicitude that guards and watches his every step and allows him no independence; the perplexed anxiety that follows every little misfortune, and transfers itself almost without exception to the child—these are also called love by some people. The playboy attitude of some mothers, who live their lives in the person of their children, allows them no quiet, treats them as dolls made to amuse adults; this is also called love. We have observed such children who believe as a consequence of their mother's love that the chief thing in life is to please mother, to be sweet and lovely, to exaggerate their mother's tenderness by playing their rôle.

The readiness of some mothers to adjust themselves to the tyranny of the child under all circumstances, to be his slave, and to teach him a method of life which invariably ends in horrible disappointment and discouragement as soon as he has made his first step into reality—this, too, is called love. All the varieties of pampering and spoiling children are labeled love—the most misused word in the language.

It is for this reason that we avoid it. In place of love, we say “friendly well-wishing,” which contains all the positive and encouraging elements an adult can have in his attitude toward a child. It means indestructible comradeship with the child. It means an attempt to lessen as far as possible the tremendous distance of knowledge and power that already lies between the child and the adult; it allows no patronizing gestures. It contains the concept of boundless patience, which is the most important manifestation of the teacher’s self-confidence. You are impatient only if you do not believe in yourself and in your ability to succeed. It means cheerfulness and optimism, the best emotional attitudes for bridging the countless difficulties of the child’s every-day life. It contains empathy and identification with the childish way of thinking. Empathy with the child means not to ridicule the child’s play or work and not to deprecate the child by assuming a superior attitude. The child’s play and work must be approached by the teacher with the earnest objectivity of the playing or working child. The concept of friendly well-wishing contains, furthermore, many other elements which are self-explanatory, once you have understood the fundamental attitude.

The attitude of friendly well-wishing must be indestructible. The child must feel certain that no situation may arise which will alter the teacher's good will. Anyone who is easily angered is not a good educator. To lose one's temper in contacts with children is a sign of timidity. When a teacher feels his prestige threatened by a child's boisterous behavior he feels that his inflated godlikeness has been punctured. To re-establish his mental equilibrium he must intimidate the child with strictness or brutality.

This method often succeeds, but always at the cost of the pupil. If the teacher rescues his own ego-consciousness he destroys that of the child, but the damage to the child is far greater than the gain to the teacher. The adult might attain the prestige necessary to his intensely subjective way of living in other ways. The child, however, is dependent on the teacher, and the atmosphere which the teacher creates by his attitude is the only atmosphere the child can breathe. If this atmosphere is poisoned by anger and misanthropy, the child loses his trust in human beings. A crisis of the child's trust in human nature is the greatest calamity that can befall him. Once a child feels that he has been betrayed, he sees only his danger and looks to his defenses. His sole object in life becomes the immediate rehabilitation of his damaged self-esteem, and as his courage is not adequate to attain these defenses by correct compensation, he looks for false defenses.

By maintaining an attitude of friendly well-wishing at all times, the educator can prevent unfortunate reconstellations of biological patterns inherited by the child. This is especially true of the child's nutritional

activities. The child is usually weaned to a vegetable diet during the second half-year of his life, and this weaning process may give rise to considerable difficulties. Often a child refuses to eat vegetables, or takes a spoonful of spinach only to spit it out on finding that it is different from his previous feedings. The best way to overcome this difficulty is to make an ally of the child's hunger. If a few meals are omitted, the child's hunger will be stronger than his resistance to new foods. When the child has accepted his new diet one or two times, as a result of these maneuvers, he will also have developed a taste for it.

This thoroughly natural method of conquering the child's resistance premises complete confidence and patience on the part of the mother. If the mother is anxious or too solicitous, or believes that some real harm can come to the child if he does not eat at every meal-time, she will probably force him to eat, either by coddling, or by compelling him to take food against his will. Whether the mother succeeds or not in compelling the child to eat, the child has learned an unfortunate mechanism of reconstellating his normal urge to eat into an instrument of power. Sooner or later this child will eat to keep on the good side of his mother, not to satisfy his hunger. When this has happened it is but a brief step for him to refuse to eat entirely, because he can conquer his mother's will by refusing. Other circumstances determine whether a child refuses to eat because he is not hungry, or because he wants to resist his mother.

This early conflict leads eventually to the hunger-strike, which may continue at intervals for years, and

become a constant source of conflict between child and parent. Hunger-strikes may be avoided if the mother is patient when she first weans her child, and allows time and appetite to cure him of his distaste for new foods. Although this advice is easier to give than to follow, no mother can afford to be nervous, impatient, or anxious in her attitude toward her child.

Maternal anxiety and oversolicitude is especially dangerous when a child learns to walk. A child does not fall and seriously hurt himself when learning to walk, except in the very rarest instances, because the childish ability to relax all his muscles—an ability shared only by dancers, athletes, skaters, and other practiced sportsmen—is the best guarantee against injury. An anxious mother will watch a child who has courageously attempted to take his first steps fall on his face, and become just as frightened as if she had suffered the same accident. Thereupon she tries to guard him from the least injury that might occur in the natural course of learning to walk. In most cases, she will falsely term her anxiety "love." The child has not been hurt in his fall, but cries, if he cries at all, because he has been frightened. As a rule a child will learn to walk very easily if his parents allow him to experiment without hindrance.

An anxious mother inoculates her child with her fear, so that, frightened of his own daring, he makes no further attempts to walk unless supported by a parent. If parents are always concerned lest the child fall, he is robbed of a valuable opportunity to learn independence and self-reliance. The process of learning to walk becomes a source of anxiety and fear, in-

stead of being an opportunity for self-education, in which an occasional mishap is actually an asset.

The parents' friendly well-wishing is just as important when the child learns to talk. A child acquires the complicated articulations of speech by slow stages; his first "baby talk" is unlike the speech of adults because the association tracts between the motor speech center and the sensory speech areas are not functionally perfect in the beginning. The best way to teach a child to speak correctly is to talk to him as if he were an adult, and to articulate as clearly as possible, repeating each word and phrase if necessary until he can imitate it correctly. If the child uses a word wrongly, or mispronounces it, one should firmly but gently correct him without becoming excited or making his mispronunciation too apparent. Although this method requires much patience, it is the only way to teach a child to talk correctly.

Sentimental or oversolicitous mothers make much of the child's "baby talk"; they become ecstatic at each new word, teach the child other "baby talk" phrases, accept the child's imperfect language, and answer him in his own terms. The vicious tradition of many generations that fosters "baby talk" is incomprehensible. Instead of the child's learning to talk like a grown-up, the grown-ups talk like a baby. This tradition produces children who are understood only by their own parents or nurses. When such a child meets and talks with another person, his sentences must be translated into English before he can make himself understood. The ability of the child to make human contacts is consequently circumscribed; for speech is

the most important single tool with which human relations are effected.

The real meaning of this mistaken educational technique can be deduced from its results. The anxious, sentimental, oversolicitous mother does not really *want* her child to make human contacts; she wants to keep the child to herself as long as possible. The more unintelligible a child's speech the less likelihood there is that he will prefer the company of his playmates to that of his mother. The unfortunate price that the child pays for retaining his mother's love is an interminable extension of the time required to develop independence and companionability. And, as we already know, the result of this inhibition is discouragement and pessimism.

If a child is to develop social feeling he must have courage and his mother must be unselfish. A mother's duty is to withdraw as far as possible into the background and allow a child to follow his own devices in his play life, both at home among brothers and sisters, and on the playground among his friends. Family conflicts are inevitable, because each child in a family looks out for his own prestige, and answers every assault with a counter-assault. Conflicts between children, however, are far less dangerous than conflicts between children and adults; indeed a child's conflicts with playmates may often have excellent results. If a child is not a weakling from the beginning, his conflicts teach him the proper proportions between the defense of his own rights and the consideration of the rights of playmates.

Trial and error are excellent teachers so long as each

experience remains objective, whether it is a negative or a positive one. The trial-and-error process is distorted when adults interfere. It is customary for adults to separate children in their arguments, act the rôle of a police court magistrate, seek out the guilty one who "started the trouble," and punish him. This is the very worst thing that can happen, because children gain the false idea that there is a real question of "rightness" or "wrongness." As a result a child feels that if he can prove that his playmate is "wrong," all he must do is to call on the higher authorities to settle the dispute, thus translating the feeling of "being in the right" into a sense of power over his antagonist.

The only logical rôle that an adult can play in the disputes of children is that of the patient and friendly referee who demonstrates to the contestants the disadvantages of conflict to both victor and vanquished, and at the same time shows the youthful warriors the undoubted advantages of cooperation. This attitude on the part of parents will not conjure conflicts away, but it will help the children to make objective deductions from their disputes.

The goal of peace between children is surely never attained by moral preachments. "Children should be nice to one another!" "Never take anything away from another child!" "Try to be considerate!" These and other well-meaning bromides are of no avail, because children learn not from mottoes but from experience. Moral preachments are not only futile, they are often injurious to the child.

Suppose little Mary slides on the frozen sidewalk at breakneck speed. She falls and hurts herself, and

begins to cry bitterly. If her mother picks her up and comforts her in a friendly fashion, the matter is settled, and Mary is the richer for an important experience. She will surely be more careful sliding on the ice next time.

The majority of mothers are not so objective as Mary's. Another mother sees her six-year-old girl sliding on the ice and cries out: "Hilda, stop that. You'll fall down and hurt yourself!" But Hilda does not listen because she is accustomed to her mother's nagging and believes this advice is an empty threat. She has heard these threats many times before, and nothing has ever happened. Consequently she does not take this advice, which would seriously spoil her fun. Hilda's mother follows with: "Hilda, stop that sliding right away, and come here!" Her tone is threatening, and there is no friendliness in it. Hilda becomes stubborn and begins sliding in dead earnest. Her mother is incensed at this defiance of her authority; she wants to vent her spleen and stop Hilda's sliding by force. In her anxiety Hilda does fall. "You see? Didn't I tell you? That's your punishment for not minding me! It serves you right! If you won't listen, you'll have to suffer the consequences!"

Little Hilda weeps bitterly, not so much because of her pain, but because of her frustration, because of her anger at her mother and the unkind Fate that played her such a thankless trick. The objective result of such a fall—which might be formulated: "If you are not careful in sliding on the ice you may fall and hurt yourself"—is veiled by the humiliation dominating the scene. The whole situation is transformed into

a belligerent opposition to her mother's will. Hilda wants to prove herself right. She is afraid, at the same time, that she may suffer similar defeats in the future. If, in addition, Hilda's mother punishes her, not so much as a "reminder," as she claims, but actually to vent her anger and celebrate her triumph over the little rebel, she has done all that could be done to make the child feel insecure, and to break her confidence in her mother. The result of the mother's admonition is an intensification of the family war for prestige, which can have only evil results for both mother and child.

One of the most important laws in education is to let children have their experiences, both good and bad, without interference. In order to educate a child to independence the adult educator must assume the attitude of a well-wishing bystander, an almost passive rôle, which is not easy for most parents to adopt. Most children desire independence, but are not certain how far they may demonstrate it, nor to what degree they have attained it. A child should learn to wash and dress himself, eat, go to bed, and go to school alone as early as possible, not because this gives his parents less trouble, but because it helps him to know his own powers. It may actually be more difficult for the parents to have the child independent.

For a mother to sit by and watch a child plaguing himself with the task of tying his shoelaces, when the mother could tie them so much more quickly and efficiently, demands no little patience. The mother's fingers itch to tie the laces for the child, and finally she may blurt, "Oh, let me tie them for you; you can't

do that yet!" The child may protest at first, but eventually he will allow his mother to tie his laces, and the next time he will not even make the attempt. If the child fails, he is ridiculed. The child, therefore, thinks it is better to let his mother tie the laces from the very beginning. In this way he presses his parent into his service. The more such experiences accumulate, the more the child's independence is threatened and distorted, at the same time that his dependency becomes exaggerated. To be sure there is little honor in dependency, but it is the safer way.

A child's dependency is expressed in all his activities: his cleanliness, his orderliness, his attitude toward his school work, and his punctuality. The dependent child acts in such a manner that he must always be nagged, reminded, threatened, or blamed. Eight-year-old Dorothy dawdles so long in the morning that she must be hurried, scolded, and prodded to get to school on time. Countless times her mother says, "Hurry up, Dorothy! Quit wasting your time, or you'll be late. . . . It's already a quarter to nine!" It is usually only twenty minutes to nine, and Dorothy's mother hopes to goad her child into action by lying about the time. On the other hand Dorothy knows her mother is lying, and takes the lie into account. Dorothy answers in the same tone her mother uses. If she is warned quietly, she answers quietly. If her mother is excited and ill-tempered, Dorothy is excited and peevish. If her mother is furiously irate, Dorothy also is violent.

Finally this inevitable nagging is too much for Dorothy's mother. She says: "For all I care, be late. I'm not going to scold you any longer. Waste your time as

you will. I'll let your teacher punish you for being tardy." Then Dorothy is furious, has a temper tantrum, and wants to be driven and scolded again, although she angrily protested a few minutes before, as if her mother's nagging were the most unpleasant thing in life.

Dorothy does not want to dismiss her mother from her service, and she hates to relinquish the relationship that makes her mother responsible for her punctuality. She is not at all annoyed by her mother's scoldings. On the contrary! If Dorothy's mother had declared she was quite disinterested in Dorothy's tardiness, this unpleasant situation would never have arisen. The worst that could have happened would have been a few tardinesses at school, because Dorothy, like many only children, played too much, and had little sense of time—only children often learn to tell time much later than other children—but she would have realized, by experience, that it is unpleasant to be tardy at school. She would have seen the teacher's look of displeasure, would have had to make her excuses, and might even have been punished for a second tardiness. If Dorothy went to a progressive school whose point of view considered the psychology of the child, she would not have been punished at all. On the contrary the teacher would have attempted to make that day especially interesting and jolly, so that tardiness would be a distinct loss. Then Dorothy would have learned to be punctual.

The natural development of punctuality is disturbed in this case by Dorothy's mother, who prevents her learning punctuality and responsibility, by allowing her to take advantage of her dependency. It may be

that Dorothy's mother makes this mistake not because she lacks pedagogical insight, but because she desires to be indispensable to the child. There are mothers who try to experience, in the person of their children, what they themselves missed in life. Such mothers say: "You can do nothing without me." The behavior of the child seems to respond: "You are quite right, mother. But now you must do everything for me!"

Independence and responsibility are indissoluble. There is absolutely no reason for the attempt of some educators to teach children a sense of their own responsibility by punishment and reward for their deeds and misdeeds. For one thing the godlike rôle of the justice-dispensing teacher is likely to intensify the child's feeling of inferiority, and thus hinder his development toward responsibility and independence. In the second place the child does not experience the natural consequences of its acts because the reward and punishment of the teacher, which are purely artificial consequences, dominate the picture. Consequently the child loses his perspective. The rewards and punishments, moreover, are not the natural consequences of the child's behavior, but rather the results of the moral attitudes and precepts of the teacher. In other words, the offender realizes that he is not punished for his misdeeds, but is punished for being caught. The child concludes that he does not have to be "good" if he is clever enough not to be caught at being "bad."

At this juncture the temptation to do the forbidden thing appears. Every misdeed that the child can arrange without getting caught is a triumphant victory

over his teacher. In the end the rebel believes that the heroism of his fight against authority is worth an occasional spanking when he is detected. Even when corporal punishment is meted out, he can belittle the teacher's power by being courageous, and not murmuring.

The child also realizes that rewards may be gained by trickery. It becomes less important to be "good" than to make the teacher *believe* you are "good." If the teacher is deceived into making an unmerited reward, the reward is the sweeter because the child has proved himself cleverer than the teacher. It is obvious that strict and authoritarian education is the greatest stimulus to treachery and lying in a child. We may say that treachery and lying are morally justifiable weapons to a child who is at war with authority. An adult criminal, brought to the bar of justice, is permitted to lie in self-defense. Are parents justified in punishing a child twice for the same crime? Children lie because they are afraid of punishment. Shall they be punished for their misdeeds and for their lies, too?

As a matter of fact, children learn a sense of responsibility only when they have experienced the actual consequences of their deeds. Parents have no other duty than to let nature take its course and to see that no serious damage occurs to the child. Suppose Jack breaks a window with a carelessly thrown stone, and the owner comes to Jack's father and wants him to pay the damages. The father may take Jack aside and say: "Jack, this is a very unpleasant business. The window-pane you broke costs two dollars to replace. You know we haven't much money. Where are we

going to get it?" Jack is very quiet and depressed. The father continues. "You know mother was going to buy herself a new hat today for five dollars. Should she be deprived of her new hat?"

"No," answers Jack, "why should she?"

"Well, who will have to deprive himself of something to pay for the window?"

A long silence ensues. Then Jack answers, "The fellow that broke the window."

"Have you that much in your savings bank?" Jack looks and finds he has only one dollar and a quarter. "All right," answers his father, "I'll lend you seventy-five cents; and if I take five cents from your spending allowance every week until you have paid me back, you'll hardly notice it, and the damage will be paid for." Jack agrees, and the matter is closed. He will probably think twice before breaking the next window. It costs too much.

No one is angry with Jack for his misdeed. He has learned to weigh any damage he may be responsible for against any possible pleasure he may have in doing it. Every childish misdeed cannot, of course, be followed by such logical consequences. On the other hand there is no law which states that every little misdeed must be properly atoned. This does not happen in real life. When a situation arises in which the direct consequences of a childish misdeed are not evident, and no punishment follows immediately on its commission, it will suffice to talk that matter over quietly with the child at some future time.

If, as is the case most frequently, the child's misdeed is charged with emotion, as when Jack hits his

little sister, the parents' best course is to make no comment at the time the misdeed is committed, but speak to Jack, hours later, when he is in a good mood, and the subject can be discussed in a general way, reasoning why hitting one's younger sister is not desirable. To take the matter up with Jack immediately after his "crime," while he still in the heat of the dispute, would be unavailing, because he would oppose any interference and draw no rational conclusions from a "lecture." If the occasion is not acute, one may reason with him immediately.

No one can guarantee that Jack will never again hit his sister. On the other hand one surely cannot be certain that he will refrain from hitting his sister if he is punished by whipping. This method antagonizes the child against both parent and sister. It seems better logic to reconcile the boy with his sister, interest him in her progress, and stimulate him to assume some sense of responsibility for her well-being, so that he will naturally give up mistreating her. This may not always be immediately successful. All good education requires patience, but no education is expedited by impatience under any circumstances.

The educational theory which consists in "letting nature take its course," allowing children to gain their experiences as they come, must be modified in the case of those children whose situations are known to be dangerous or conducive to an intensification of their sense of inferiority. This is especially true where children suffer from organ inferiorities. Two sets of dangers threaten the weak, sickly, or neglected child. The poorly equipped child may be deeply discouraged by

his relatively inferior performance when measured by the performance of normal playmates, and he may become so accustomed to the help and care which is temporarily bestowed during illness, that he will not trust himself to attempt the most modest tasks alone. In either case the child's philosophy of life is pessimistic.

Both these dangers may be avoided if we are cognizant of the child's situation. Although it is impossible to convince the child that he is not inferior, the child may nevertheless be guided so that he chooses a vocation in full realization of the inferiority. At the same time he may be encouraged to make the best possible adjustment to life despite the defect, after he has been taught that an adjustment is possible. Spoiling the child during actual illnesses can be avoided by helping him only as far as is absolutely necessary, while mobilizing all forces for the earliest possible resumption of independence, by making independence the object of his ambition.

Unfortunately education cannot ameliorate to any large extent the evils that derive from unhealthy social and economic situations. This is the task of society at large, and certainly the state should make every attempt to prevent children from suffering mental injuries because of the poor economic situation of their parents. Philanthropy should not be left entirely in the hands of private charity, which all too often hurts children by doling out presents without altering the underlying situation. Children should not have to beg for an even chance. It is their birthright. Our prevailing economic philosophy is morally responsible for

healing the social wounds it causes. It is the duty of every honest, self-respecting citizen to demand that the children of his community are not only physically, but also mentally safeguarded.

So far as the children of the wealthy are concerned the chief task of education lies in preventing pleasure-hunger and a disinclination to do honest work—two unfortunate traits which are often the consequences of a child's growing up in a wealthy milieu. The parents' example will usually determine the attitude of the rich child; the best education is of no avail when the children of the rich see their parents living contrary to their educational precepts every hour of the day.

The dangers originating in the ordinal position of the child in the family constellation may always be avoided when they are recognized. The motherless orphan must be given a real substitute for his mother. Either the child is placed in the custody of some woman who can assume the veritable rôle of mother, or he must be placed in an institution where the best influences of communal education may be obtained. The only child should not always be the only child. Parents frequently have but one child because they fear the economic responsibilities of having more children; in assuming their responsibility toward the unborn child they sin against the child who is already alive. The difficulties of being an only child cannot be entirely avoided—it is a task too hard for the majority of contemporary parents. The best prophylaxis of this situation is to avoid pampering such a child by educating him to be independent and by putting him into a group of contemporaries as early as possible.

If a second child is to be born, the first-born should be adequately prepared for its arrival. The first-born should realize that parents must give the newborn baby more attention and care, and that this is possible because the first-born has already attained so much independence. The older child should assume as many responsibilities in the care of the infant as possible, because the least significance that he gains in caring for a small brother or sister helps the first-born to maintain his self-esteem. The jealousy of the older child can almost certainly be avoided by preparing him to assume the rôle of a relatively more mature individual toward the younger child.

To safeguard the youngest it is essential to allow the older brothers and sisters to share the responsibility of his education. This will avoid the older children's tyranny over the youngest child, and will also prevent the child's being spoiled not only by his mother, but by his older brothers and sisters. Children educate one another with astonishing skill. Often they understand the difficulties of the younger child exceedingly well, and are willing to be of assistance wherever possible. When children do assume the task of education, they are usually more tactful and ingenious than adults.

Dangers arising out of the sexual constellation of a child can be avoided if the entire adult environment is not only theoretically but also practically convinced of the moral, intellectual and physical equivalence of men and women. Parents must decide to combat the prevailing notions of the inferiority of the female sex. The child will learn of the popular views of women's

inferiority, even though they are not current in his immediate family, and the best way to rebut the prejudice is to admit its existence, but tell the child it is unjustified, that women are quite as good as men, and that it is no more difficult to be a happy woman than to be a happy man. It is obvious that such statements as, "Show that you're a boy," "Nice girls do not do that," "Only boys can do that," should never be made.

It is the consensus of scientific opinion nowadays that sex instruction should not be left to chance or to the gutter. The time and tempo of this instruction must be determined by the questions of the child. Every sex question a child asks is to be answered objectively, and clearly, and appropriately to the child's age. A child may learn at an early age that children grow in their mother's body and are born after nine months' growth, without any mental shock. Most children realize the difference in the sex organs of the sexes by independent observation, so that detailed instruction in this matter is usually unnecessary.

The child's next question usually concerns the relationship of the father to the child. If we are afraid to tell the child the whole truth it will usually suffice to say that a blood relationship results from the mutual love of a father and a mother, and that a child can be born only when parents love and live with each other. The physiology of cohabitation, the last remaining question, should be explained to the child by the time he has attained puberty, if not sooner. This instruction, however it is given, must be presented tactfully, objectively, and without sentimental or ceremonious solemnity.

When a child is told about cohabitation it may be considered desirable to explain two points which he has not questioned. The first is that it is customary not to talk about sexual matters in society, and that it is advisable to conform to this custom in order not to cause unpleasant arguments. The second is that sexual intercourse is harmful to children, and that occasionally irresponsible adults tempt children to have intercourse, but that contacts with such adults are to be avoided.

At this time it may also be necessary to tell the child about venereal disease and prostitution, depending on his social and economic status. Surely among poor children these matters must be discussed at this time. Instruction concerning masturbation is imperative at the time of puberty. Masturbation should be quietly discouraged, but in no case should the parent tell a child that great perils beset the habit of "self-abuse," because this is not true.

The more open, the more objective, the less mysterious sex discussion and sex instruction is made, the less dangerous it is to the child. Those who instruct children about sex will do well to overcome their own prejudices first. When children accidentally witness the sexual act between their parents, at an age when they still know nothing about sex, the sight may be a great shock to them. A young child considers coitus an act of violence, although he may dimly sense its real meaning and be very deeply affected by it, suffering a distinct injury to his sense of trust in his parents. In such a case the only course is to talk the matter out frankly with the child despite all obstacles. Although

the Freudian psychoanalysts exaggerate the dangers of a child's witnessing intercourse between his parents, the scene is not wholly without bad after-effects. Such an experience should be prevented by having a separate sleeping room for the child wherever possible.

Education by individual psychology consists, then, in maintaining a fundamental attitude of friendly well-wishing toward the child, and in avoiding those situations which have been described as harmful. Every situation which tends to intensify the child's feeling of inferiority, moreover, whatever its source, should be avoided. This general description still leaves a great deal unsaid for practical purposes. The parent or teacher who understands these principles will know when he is in danger or when he has made a mistake, but he will be at a loss in numerous situations of everyday contact with children. What is to be done to a three-year-old child who stubbornly persists in leaning out of a window? How should one act toward a lazy child? What shall be done if a child is disorderly? How shall grown-ups act when a child has obviously misbehaved in order to anger and disturb his parents? These are all problems which ought not to concern medical pedagogy, because they are normal and common occurrences. No mother runs to a psychiatrist for help in such cases; she must help herself.

The solution of these problems depends upon the resourcefulness, the imagination, and the educational "intuition" of the educator. Even the most progressive education is inadequate if a recipe for every possible emergency is not given. We have, therefore, made an outline of the pedagogical tools of individual psychol-

ogy arranged in approximately systematic form, as a guide for parents and teachers. Naturally this outline makes no claim to completeness.

I. *Comradely Persuasion*. The child's natural tendency to oppose adults is taken carefully into consideration, and in any concrete case the child is led to useful conclusions from premises that he admits and recognizes as self-evident.

II. *Distraction*. In the case of young children who are in danger—as in the case of a three-year-old child who leans out of a window—quick distraction of the child's interest to some new object removes all difficulties. The parent's voice should stimulate a lively interest in the child, and the tone of the voice is far more important than the distracting object. In other cases the suggestion that some new or interesting game be played will distract a child's attention from a disturbing or undesirable activity, or put an end to a disagreeable conflict, provided the child has not been driven to opposition by previous authoritarian demands.

III. *Disinterestedness*. The only way to deal with childish pranks which are premeditatedly designed to excite, disturb, provoke, or anger the adult environment, is to ignore them. This disinterestedness must not be ostentatious or permeated with any emotional tone. To ignore the child pompously is to give the child its victory. The child must really believe that its prank is not noticed because the parents' or teacher's attitude of indestructible well-wishing is not in the least influenced by the mischief.

IV. *Refutation by Imitation* (Ida Löwy). A child can be cured of a bad habit or practice by imitation

which reduces the misbehavior to the absurd. If a child who can speak normally talks so indistinctly that he cannot be heard, let the teacher whisper even less audibly. This mechanism is often effective in weaning the child of his practice.

V. *Refutation by Contrast* (Ida Löwy). This method is closely related to the foregoing one. The more loudly a child cries, the less audibly the teacher or parent whispers.

VI. *Nonplus or Disconcert the Child*. Methods IV, V, and to some extent III belong in this category. A child can be taught insight and influenced to give up a bad practice if the parents' response to an action which the child considers provocative is unexpected or disconcerting. Under such circumstances the child is disarmed because he finds no opponent. Suppose a child makes faces. Approach him very closely, look intently into his face. "Why do you look at me like that?" the child will ask, somewhat anxiously. "I want to learn how to do what you are doing, it is so interesting!" (Ida Löwy.)

VII. *Humor*. A sense of humor is the most important pedagogical tool. We see it definitely in the previously cited example of the boy who makes faces. It should be used with discretion, because like other such tricks it may insult the child, and cause a temper tantrum rather than the desired effect. One should never be ironical with a child. Irony is a good method of teaching insight to an adult, but it is not well tolerated by children, who are prone to find it deprecating. Friendly good humor, an infectious laugh, and a joke, however, are well calculated to smooth out a tense situation and win over the average child.

VIII. *Quiet Blame Mixed with Praise*. "You are usually so sensible, but this time you have been foolish" (Künkel). Another formula is: "You have done that quite well, but in this and that way you might do it much better."

IX. *Appeal to the Mental Maturity of the Child*. "What you are doing would be very clever for a seven-year-old boy, but you are already nine years old." This is a temporary method, which cannot be repeated very frequently without losing its force. It should be utilized only on occasion.

X. *Conscious Misinterpretation of Mischief*. Jack overturns a chair in the course of a temper tantrum. The parent says: "Isn't it too bad the chair fell? Did you hurt yourself? Goodness, it made a great deal of noise!" Jack will seldom be able to decide to carry his stubbornness to the point of explaining the parent's seeming error, but as he cannot consequently continue his ill temper, he gives up his mischief.

We might add a great list of such educational tricks but those we have already cited will suffice to give the tenor of the method with which the teacher, skilled in individual psychology, approaches difficulties, and deals with children. None of these tricks is guaranteed to be successful. The intuitive imagination of the teacher is indispensable, but it will never appear unless the teacher is fundamentally convinced that no childish mistake is worth making a great fuss about. No childish prank should be taken tragically, and even the most serious situations should be given a humorous twist.

The good teacher or parent never withdraws his essential comradely well-wishing *under any condition*.

The fundamentals we have outlined are valid in the school as well as in the home. We anticipate that our ideas of educating children will meet with serious objections from many school teachers. The old principles of teaching are still all too common. When we suggest that teaching should proceed not only without the rod but also without authority, the school teachers ask in amazement, "But how shall we maintain discipline? Discipline we must have!"

On the contrary, there is no excuse for military discipline in a schoolroom. Orderliness and a voluntary adjustment to the schoolroom community to which the child subscribes are necessary and desirable. We must not take the child's assent to this communal adjustment too seriously. A child that does not feel well, or is bored, will quickly forget any regulations to which he has agreed. But it is the essential duty of the teacher to see that the child is never bored, and always feels "at home" in the schoolroom, that he never has any reasonable objection to the work of the class, and that he always has the opportunity to see and hear and do a great many interesting things. The modern progressive school has demonstrated that this ideal can be closely approximated.

As education has become modernized the old-time "discipline" has become less stultifying. It is probable that the old-fashioned type of education was impossible without the premise of strict discipline, because it was so boring. Lazarsfeld has pointed out that the "authority of the institution," as vested in the teacher, is adequate to maintain any necessary orderliness, especially when the children are practically self-govern-

ing, and are interested, by virtue of various monitorships, in maintaining order among themselves.

We must make some mention of the Montessori method in this connection because this method of education has been extended beyond its first application to the pre-school child and the backward child to the education of school-age children. One of the essential tenets of individual psychology, education to independence, is happily encompassed in the Montessori method. A great deal may be done to establish a child's independence if he can be taught the daily responsibilities and tasks in game form. The special training of the sense organs which plays such a great rôle in the Montessori method is not injurious, but is rather futile. One of the great objections to the Montessori method is that the children are too much accustomed to solitary activity. The invaluable opportunity for communal effort which a kindergarten presents is neglected, and we question also whether learning activities in game form should be continued into later childhood. The danger is that the child never experiences actual work, and cannot find the appropriate attitude toward future occupations because he has learned everything as a game. Real life is not patterned after the Montessori method, and a child who is still in a play school at the age of fourteen has a great deal to learn. It is a disadvantage to a child never to have had any training to work, no matter how many talents and proclivities he has learned, nor how many solid facts he has gathered.

The pedagogical *attitude* of the teacher is far more important than his theoretical or didactic method of

teaching. Although the modern school, with its freedom from artificial authority, is based on a progressive system of education, this progressive system alone will not maintain the school. Teachers must first be converted to a system of education in which punishment has no place, and they must be convinced that it is feasible and practical. The pillars of progressive education are comradely relations between teacher and pupil, and democratic cooperation between pupils. The fear that a teacher will not be able to accomplish her school program without strict discipline is unwarranted. Once let a teacher win her pupils to a sense of joyous cooperation, and her school work will be done more quickly and with less friction than ever with the help of discipline.

There may be a few pupils who will refuse to cooperate. These children should be especially stimulating to any teacher who has a knowledge of psychology. It will be her task to learn something of the causes of the child's unwillingness to cooperate by investigation of the child's home situation. She will attempt to influence the child by enlisting the help of the child's relatives wherever possible. Granted that a child's parents are half-way agreeable to the task of the progressive educator, the majority of "problem" children can be greatly benefited by concurrent effort between teacher and parent. When the parents have no insight the teacher's task and duty is to secure a change of environment wherever possible.

We cannot expect any real progress in general education unless the average teacher realizes that her duty is not to peddle facts from schoolbooks, but first, last,

and always, *to educate children*. We must resign ourselves to the fact that the average parent does not know how to educate his child. Society's sense of responsibility is not mature enough today to make interference in the home feasible, not to say imperative, when the child's mental health is endangered, but the prevention of neuroses, juvenile delinquency, crime, and insanity could, nevertheless, be accomplished to a great extent if teachers were more carefully selected, psychologically instructed, and better paid. Modern education will have to penetrate into the masses *via* the teacher. It is to be hoped that the day will soon come when a father will be ashamed to whip his children and a mother's conscience will prevent her spoiling them. Teachers are entrusted not only with the education of our children, but also with the instruction of parents.

Chapter XII

Medical Pedagogy and Psychotherapy

IF the principal object of education is the prevention of mental disturbances, then medical pedagogy and psychotherapy have as their chief goal the treatment of damage that has already been done. Both professions require specialized training, and really satisfying results are not to be expected before one has had years of practice. Medical pedagogy premises the existence of child-guidance clinics. Such clinics formerly existed only in isolated European cities, where they were established chiefly by the International Society of Individual Psychology. These advisory child guidance centers for "problem" children are under the direction of physicians trained in individual psychology, with similarly trained pedagogical assistants. They are free clinics, open once or twice a week, supported in part by public corporations and in part by private associations. They are often an integral part of some school. Children in need of guidance are referred to the clinics by schools, children's homes, or parents.*

** Translator's Note:* Many child-guidance clinics have recently been established in America, where the need of mental hygiene in the schools and juvenile courts has gained widespread recognition. Several such clinics, supported by various private organizations, exist in the public schools of New York City. Many of the larger

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The procedure of these clinics is usually as follows: the psychiatrist, who acts as adviser, greets mother and child and listens to the mother's complaints in the presence of the child. It is desirable that the child be present at this first interview with the mother, for it may be assumed in general that the child comes to the clinic full of distrust, and in most cases his relation to the mother is by no means one of genuine confidence. If we were to exclude the child from the first conference with the mother, he would assuredly feel betrayed from the start, or believe that a plot between the mother and physician existed. The child would then be totally averse to trusting the psychiatrist any more than his mother, and the psychiatrist needs all the child's confidence he can gain.

When the psychiatrist has spoken with the mother, she may be sent from the room; the child is then interviewed alone. In each case contact must be made with the child, either by general conversation about things which interest the child, or by entering at once into the difficulties concerned. The first interview must convince the child that he will get a fair hearing.

It is assumed naturally that the psychiatrist understands the case before the interview with the child. This is usually possible after the mother has told her story. The following questionnaire will establish the points necessary for an understanding of the case. The mother obviously is not to be asked to answer each

hospitals maintain child-guidance departments, and the Children's Court of Manhattan is equipped with a diagnostic and therapeutic clinic. The translator's clinic is patterned after Dr. Adler's Vienna clinics, and the questionnaire, modified to meet local needs, is utilized as a basis of examination.

query in order. The questions serve rather as a guide for the examiner in learning what the trouble is. He must ascertain the most important points in free conversation. The questionnaire should be used before, not during the consultation.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE UNDERSTANDING AND
TREATMENT OF PROBLEM CHILDREN *

1. What is the complaint? By whom is the complaint made? How long has the condition existed? What was the external and mental situation of the child when the faults became evident? (Question regarding: changes in environment, beginning of school, change of school, change of teachers, birth of younger brothers or sisters, failure in school, new friendships, and the like.)

2. The child's general deportment: What are his favorite games? His favorite stories? Favorite characters in history and fiction? What are his earliest memories? Are there impressive or often-recurring dreams? (Dreams of flying, falling, being hemmed in, being late for a train, of running races, of being taken prisoner, anxiety dreams.) Does the child lose himself in fantasy? Are there day-dreams? Does he think soberly and reject fantasies?

3. Relation to the school: Intellectual standing. How does he behave at school? Does he like school? Is he often tardy? Is he excited before he starts to school? Does he hurry? Does he lose his books? Is

** Translator's Note:* This is a condensed and systematized modification of the original questionnaire prepared by the International Society of Individual Psychology.

he excited over his school tasks and tests? Does he forget or refuse to do his tasks? Does he waste his time? Is he lazy? Can he concentrate? What is his attitude toward his teacher? Is it critical? Arrogant? Indifferent? Does he seek help of others in his tasks, or does he wait for them to proffer aid? Is he ambitious in athletics? Does he read a great deal? What kind of reading does he prefer? Are there special difficulties in learning to write? In arithmetic? In drawing? In singing? Does the child begin various things and soon leave them unfinished? Does he run away from difficulties? What is the intelligence quotient (when available)?

4. Character: Has the child been or is he afraid to be alone? Afraid of the dark? Does he have night terrors? Is he noticeably cowardly? Is there a tendency to lying? What and whom does he fear most? Does he run away from difficulty? Is there excessive caution? In what respect is the child discouraged? Is he uncertain of his future? What ideas has the child had regarding his choice of career? What does he think of marriage? What is his parents' marriage like? In what occupation are the members of his family engaged? Does he speak openly of his inability, of his lack of talent for school? For work? For life? Has he thoughts of suicide? Does he believe in the injurious effects of heredity? Has he been systematically discouraged by those about him? Has he a pessimistic point of view? Has he superstitious ideas? Is he over-religious? Is there a time relationship between his failures and his misdeeds (neglect, formation of gangs)? Does he overestimate external success? Does he feel

himself slighted? How does he react to attention and praise? Does he lack independence in eating, dressing, washing, going to sleep? Is he heedless? Is he awkward? Is the child egoistic? Does he manifest outward vanity as to hair, clothes, or shoes? Has he been much teased and ridiculed? Is he sensitive? Has he made friends easily, or has he been quarrelsome? Has he tortured animals and human beings? Does he tend to be a leader? Or does he shut himself away? Is he given to malicious laughter? Is there a tendency to disparage others? Is the child servile? Given to revolt? Defiant? Is he tyrannical? Does he bully the strong—or only the weak? Is he a collector? Is he miserly? Avaricious?

5. Childish faults: Has the child given much trouble? Does he wet his bed? Bore in his nose? Bite his nails? Does he eat greedily? Are there other bad habits like making faces or playing the clown? Is he a show-off?

6. Organ inferiorities: Correct information concerning home conditions, illnesses in the family, concerning alcoholism, criminal tendencies, neuroses, debility, syphilis, epilepsy must be obtained. Has the child been or is he of marked physical weakness? Could he walk and talk at the usual time? Properly? Is there a speech defect? Did the teeth develop normally? Has the child had rickets? Is he ugly? Has he obvious defects such as clubfoot or knock-knees? Is he badly developed? Is he abnormally large, abnormally small? Has he eye or ear defects? Is he left-handed? Does he snore at night? Is he strikingly good-looking?

7. Social and economic position of the child.

8. What are the primary, secondary, tertiary sexual

characteristics? How does he regard the other sex? How much sexual enlightenment has he had? Does he masturbate?

9. Is he a stepchild? Is he illegitimate? Is he an adopted child? What were or are his real parents like? Is there still contact with them? Has he attached himself particularly to any one person? To the father? To the mother? Grandparents? Nurse? Has he manifested a strong desire to lie in bed with either parent? Have there been deaths in the family? How old was the child when death occurred? Is the child an orphan? Who dominates in the family? Where does the child stand in age as regards the other children of the family? Is he the oldest, second, youngest, only child, only boy, only girl? How much difference in age between brothers and sisters? Are they rivals?

10. Training: Is the training strict, nagging, over-indulgent, ambitious? Are the children terrified at life? What supervision is there? What is the outlook?

It is usually not difficult to establish contact with the child, once you understand his case. It is of the utmost importance to make clear to the child, himself, in a manner which he can comprehend, the nature of the difficulties under which he is suffering. When you hear the child's own version you may be astonished to find that he knows more about individual psychology than his parents; children understand the "meaning" of a fear, or of a failure in school, quite correctly. Every child is amenable to encouragement once he has been won over to his doctor.

The purpose of child guidance is not to safeguard

the interests of the parents but to help the child. There is no need of exonerating the parents' former methods of training to the child, if we consider them wrong. In order to win the confidence of the child it is frequently necessary to disavow the parents' methods in his presence. It goes without saying that some parents are deeply offended at this. When parents are offended it shows that they have come to the clinic not for the sake of the child but for their own sake, not to hear how matters might be improved, but in the hope that the psychiatrist would assure them that their methods of training are excellent and exonerate them for the child's failure. Armed with this new weapon they would then have taken up the warfare with their child afresh.

When this hope proves false, as is frequently the case, some parents fall into a fine rage and withdraw, abusing the psychiatrist. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, again for the child's sake, to treat parents diplomatically. If we arouse their enmity, though we may be entirely right in our opinion, we do the child no good. The adviser as a rule should never bluntly tell the parents that their previous training has been all wrong and mistaken. He must begin quietly with an approval of the parents' methods, and then in the further course of instruction tell them completely and with all necessary clarity how the training *should* be carried on.

The psychiatrist or adviser should act, out of consideration for parents' vanity, as if he knew that his advice was really known to the parents and that they had formerly used these principles in their training.

In this way he may actually succeed in winning over the parents, instead of antagonizing them by wounding their pedagogic pride. All is won when the parents understand and accede. It suffices then to have the child brought to the clinic a few more times to check up on his progress.

It is true that there are few such easy cases. The parents often refuse to be taught. We already know the reason: a parent's method of training his child is rooted in the parent's character, which cannot be altered merely by theoretic insight. To accomplish results one should treat the parents. But that is practically impossible in the vast majority of cases. When parents lack insight we must attempt to remove the child from their influence as much as possible. The child should be placed in a properly conducted educational community when such is available. In other cases, a worker trained in individual psychology takes the child, spends her afternoons with him, and utilizes this time, which otherwise would be spent in ruinous conflict with the parents, for the child's advantage.

The trained worker has an opportunity to exercise a gradual cautious pedagogic influence upon the mother and to show her, by example, how much better one gets on with the child with correct methods. It is often arranged to have the children who visit a guidance clinic taken on holiday or Sunday excursions by one of the clinic assistants. This provides splendid opportunities for human associations, especially valuable to those children who find difficulty in making contacts.

Educational institutions for problem children are necessary for severe cases. In the institution the chief

treatment should be prophylactic. The influence of a healthy environment is automatically beneficial when the errors of authoritarian education, usually considered indispensable in such institutions, are avoided along with other educational mistakes. The horrible old reformatories, fortunately, are disappearing or being transformed into educational institutions, where training is given more humanely and reasonably than by brutal old-style policemen. Although the training in public institutions falls far short of the ideals of individual psychology, the more modern care of neglected and delinquent children shows better results than ever before. There would be nothing left to desire if these institutions did not stop half-way in their progress, and would begin to train delinquent children by completely discarding force and punishment in any form.

Although it may be necessary for a problem child to consult a psychiatrist repeatedly for pedagogic therapy, we cannot speak of a real psychotherapy of children, because most of the psychiatrists' efforts are directed to changing the child's environment. Real psychotherapy is impossible before a child is at least fifteen years old. At this age young people are usually sufficiently emancipated from the influence of their environment to be amenable to psychotherapy. Only when they are independent individuals can we attempt to immunize them against the unfavorable influences of their family situation, thus making them healthy despite the unreasonableness of their parents. Psychotherapy of adolescents often produces unquestionably satisfactory results.

We shall confine our discussion of psychotherapy

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to a discussion of the fundamentals necessary for an understanding of its working principles. The practitioner is referred to works by the author and by Nowotny for a more complete discussion of the technic of therapy by individual psychology.*

Psychotherapy is impossible if the patient does not seek the psychiatrist. This is frequently an important factor, as in many cases it is the relatives who want the patient treated against his own wishes. Such treatment is usually a failure, because the patient, submitting under protest to the consultations with the physician, usually succeeds in convincing him that further attempts at a cure are futile. Nevertheless, we should not reject this type of patient, because it is frequently possible to reveal the patient's position to him in so striking and dramatic a fashion that his attitude toward the treatment is fundamentally changed, and he thereafter consults the psychiatrist of his own free will.

When the psychiatrist has oriented himself in regard to the patient presenting clinical symptoms, the discussion of his actual situation follows, and from this point the symptoms tend to become matters of secondary interest. It is not important to explain them and their origin to the patient in the beginning. The psychiatrist's sole task is to understand the patient,

* Erwin Wexberg, *Die Individualpsychologische Behandlung in Die Psychische Heilmethoden*, edited by Karl Birnbaum (Georg Thieme Verlag, Leipzig, 1927). Translation by W. Béran Wolfe, M. D., in preparation.

Karl Nowotny, "Die Technik der Individualpsychologischen Behandlung" in *Handbuch der Individualpsychologie*, edited by E. Wexberg (J. J. Bergmann Verlag, Munich, 1926).

whose portrayal of his immediate status gives us a clue to the superficial meaning of his neurosis.

It is not difficult to tell the patient some striking truth after the first consultation: that he fears marriage, that he wants to evade some test of strength, that he is defending himself against his wife, or the like. Whether or not the psychiatrist gives a patient this simple interpretation, without waiting to adduce further proof, depends on the specific case. With some it works amazingly well because they are fascinated by the entirely novel method of interpreting human behavior in terms of purpose and means rather than in terms of cause and effect, as they have been accustomed to doing. Such patients attack the remainder of the analytic task with great zeal.

On the other hand simple, straightforward interpretations are dangerous for the very reason they are correct, and the patient's sudden insight into the nature of his illness prevents him from recognizing the truth in the future. To understand this we must remember that many patients do not consult a psychiatrist to get well, but to justify and legitimize their illness, as we have said elsewhere. When such a patient realizes after an hour's consultation that he is not going to be treated as a sick person but as a deserter from the front of life, and his attitude toward his problems is going to be discussed just as if he were a normal person, it may well happen that he will be impelled to take flight from this new situation and attempt to save his neurosis from the logical onslaughts of the psychiatrist. Such a patient might better be treated more indulgently in the beginning, getting a

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gradual acquaintanceship with the ideology of individual psychology.

It is a fundamental principle of psychotherapy not to tell the patient all one knows about his mental condition at once. It is wise to allow the patient to tell as much of his story as possible before making any interpretations of the material he offers. If the patient believes that his situation in life is transparent and can immediately be interpreted by individual psychology, he will become silent, find no more material to relate, cease dreaming or forget his dreams entirely. The psychiatrist should have collected so much significant material from the patient at the time this temporary standstill is reached that he is no longer dependent upon further communications for a complete understanding of the case. It is the task of the psychiatrist to know the patient in his total situation; he must know the present and the past, and the unswerving pattern which connects the two. Everything, from the first childhood recollection to the present neurosis must fit into this pattern, which is composed of a mosaic of countless experiences. The psychiatrist must be able, in a word, to sum up the patient. When the patient grows silent, the psychiatrist may speak.

The next phase of the treatment is in the form of conference-discussions between patient and physician. The patient is practically given a course in individual psychology, distinguished from similar courses chiefly by the nature of the laboratory material, which is derived in this case from the patient's own past and present life. These conferences regularly involve dis-

cussion of the relationship of the patient's "I cannot" and his "I will not"; the discussion of his responsibility for character traits and actions having their origin in his unconscious life; the unmasking of his conflicts; and the explanation of the invalidity of his emotional experiences. The patient must learn, as Adler has put it, that "feelings are not arguments."

The mere discussion of these problems is certainly not the whole treatment. A patient may be very much impressed with the discussion, and may admit the standpoint of individual psychology intellectually, and yet on the following day present the identical objections which have been refuted in previous conferences. To be convinced of the truth of individual psychology is not a purely intellectual matter. Individual psychology cannot be learned in the same way that mathematics or chemistry is learned. Each separate statement is true or false depending upon the patient's admission or rejection thereof. Nowhere is logic so subjective, so tinged with personal bias, so little "common sense," as when the patient discusses individual psychology and its theories, be that patient ever so intelligent and unprejudiced in other matters.

There is an inner transfiguration of the personality that proceeds hand in hand with the patient's gradually strengthened conviction in the rightness of individual psychology, and this inner transformation is the most fundamental prerequisite of a cure. During the period of transformation the patient's symptoms either disappear entirely, or are greatly improved. Almost always some slight residue remains, which, although of no practical importance, indicates that the patient is not entirely cured.

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If the treatment is terminated at this stage, which is often the case, the results are partial, but practically very satisfactory and adequate to the case. Other methods of psychotherapy probably never accomplish any more than this. We must admit that the patient has withdrawn from the final struggle, and that he has avoided the final enlightenment. This is corroborated by the fact that, inasmuch as the patient's participation has been chiefly an intellectual acknowledgment of the principles of individual psychology, the whole discussion has been too academic. Although it is probably true that the results obtained so far are impossible without the patient's inner cooperation, his untroubled relation to the psychiatrist indicates that his cooperation is not very profound.

As soon as this phase of the analytic enlightenment has passed, a second phase begins in which the patient attempts to transform his relationship to the psychiatrist into a personal one. The patient may simply fall in love with the physician—although this is by no means always the case. This love is not genuine, for its purpose is transparently to bring the physician to his knees, and to change the analytical arena. If the psychiatrist was formerly no more than an impersonal exponent of the principles of individual psychology, all that has been learned in the first phase of the treatment is now applied directly to the person of the physician. The patient makes his personal relation to his physician the decisive problem of his life.

The personal relationship between patient and psychiatrist, which the psychoanalysts call "transference," is not at all a "libido transference" as the Freudians would have it. It is not true love, but an attempt to

degrade the physician and involve him in the patient's emotional meshes; it is an attempt on the part of the patient to free himself from the probing of his physician, which is so painful to his self-esteem. One of the easiest ways to paralyze the activities of the psychiatrist is to exalt his personality. The patient no longer cares what the physician says, so long as his voice can be heard. As one patient expressed it: "You can tell me what you will now. I will swear by anything you say because you have said it!" No better way of nullifying the psychiatrist's words could be invented.

If the patient succeeds in enticing the psychiatrist to relinquish his professional rôle, and involves him in an infatuation—and such things occasionally happen—the physician has naturally lost the prestige of his position, and the theory of individual psychology has been refuted by the personal relationship. The patient's neurosis is reactivated in all its pristine glory, and the physician, now become a "friend," must play the rôle of prime minister to a neurotic majesty.

When the patient fails to involve the physician in a personal relationship, a phase of active or disguised hostility supervenes. The patient sometimes expresses this hostility by prying into the physician's private life in the hope of discovering some point of weakness. A personal relation with the doctor is sought under the guise of honorable friendship. His domestic affairs, his financial status are suspiciously scrutinized, the least indication that all is not harmony is seized as damning evidence, and the physician, as well as individual psychology, is "finished." The patient argues

that he cannot get worth-while advice in the most important problems of his life from a man who has not solved his own problems effectively. Let him first set his own house in order!

In this situation the essential problem of psychotherapy by individual psychology appears. If the patient's argument is correct, we cannot treat neurotics by individual psychology. We know that "mental health" is an ideal norm never attained in reality, not even by professional psychotherapists. We are all sinners, half-cured, perhaps, by the grace of circumstance; perhaps it is only the momentarily favorable situation of the physician which keeps him out of the patient's chair. No one of us has the right to reproach a fellow human being for faults that we ourselves might commit or actually do commit.

We are not concerned solely with reproaches. Anyone who misinterprets the rules of conduct sponsored by individual psychology, and makes ethical maxims out of them, has only himself to blame if he is unmasked as a Pharisee. Even as psychotherapists we can but demonstrate to our patients their style of life, and show them the natural consequences of their conduct. The mirror we hold up to the patient shows him more than the ordinary mirror—not only each line, but also the meaning of each line. The patient himself must draw his own conclusions.

We refuse to give any practical advice during the entire course of the treatment for two reasons. In the first place, the patient would make us responsible for the outcome of direct advice, and would take pains to have that responsibility rest heavily upon us, as he

would be justified in doing. The second, and more important reason is that we have no right to direct the patient's practical affairs even in matters in which our special knowledge makes us better equipped than the patient. We are happy to recommend a good apothecary or bookseller; but if a patient wants us to decide whether he shall divorce his wife, we calmly put the matter back into his own hands, not without explaining that we are no wiser than he, and that while we might decide so serious a matter for ourselves, we should hesitate to do so for anyone else.

The uniqueness of individual psychology, the characteristic that differentiates it from all other schools of psychotherapy, is the fact that the physician who practices individual psychology denies his own authority from the moment he sees a patient. That such authority actually exists is unquestionable, and the physician cannot entirely abrogate that authority, despite all his efforts—no matter how often he assures the patient that he might make the same mistakes, or that in a few years he might be put into a position identical with the patient's. Although this authority can never be entirely removed it is important for the physician to work toward this end. The physician must disclaim all rights to the throne of sanctity which the patient is often willing to concede to him. The least gesture on the part of the physician that would accentuate the difference between the physician and the patient—barring the physician's place in life and his previous training—would signify a complete refutation of all the wisdom of individual psychology.

If the physician is a human being, exactly like his

patient, the patient's demonstration of the physician's personal shortcomings does not influence the validity of the interpretations of individual psychology. The physician as well as the patient must regard individual psychology in the light of an objective, universal, common-sense point of view. What the patient learns in the course of his treatment must be valid, even though he later discovers that the physician who taught him is an inferior person with more faults than his own. Of course such a physician will not succeed in his treatment, because he has not himself understood important elements of individual psychology and cannot therefore impart them to his patient. So far as the physician understands individual psychology, all that he tells his patient is valid, for it is not so much the physician who speaks to the patient, as the logic of life. The physician is but the mouthpiece of a truth greater than himself.

The psychiatrist who practices individual psychology never relies upon his personal authority to prove the validity of his statements. It is always the insight of the patient which passes final judgment. If the psychiatrist later appears in a light other than the patient originally imagined him, the value of his interpretations is not, therefore, changed. To be sure, it would be better if the psychiatrist were faultless, for then he would really understand all human relationships perfectly, and be completely emancipated from all personal prejudices, the best imaginable apostle of his doctrine. But inasmuch as no perfect psychiatrist exists, we must be satisfied if he is relatively as free of errors as possible. His therapeutic success is the

best index of his capability—no one who is not personally fitted to practice individual psychology will attain therapeutic results.

Although a patient may have succeeded in "showing up" his psychiatrist as an imperfect human being, he does not therefore refute the logic of individual psychology, and he cannot extricate himself from the net of his new-found insight. At this point the patient may remobilize all the old symptoms that have disappeared in the course of the treatment, and say, in effect: "The entire treatment is futile. I am back to the same situation in which I came." But the thorn of individual psychology is not so easily removed. In the course of time the patient demonstrates to himself the impossibility of keeping "new wine in old bottles." The inextinguishable new insight which he has gained is in flat contradiction to his former neurotic attitude. The patient cannot continue his neurosis, because a neurosis "works" only so long as the patient himself does not understand it. It thus happens that the patient sometimes recovers completely from his neurosis some months after the apparently unsuccessful termination of his treatment by individual psychology.

The patient's recovery may be materially delayed by his actual situation. As the neurosis is the expression of the patient's purposive striving for a definite goal, the patient may be said to be justified, in a sense, in maintaining his neurotic attitude. We could not strive for the patient's unconscious goal with any more effective means than he uses. Given the patient's definite situation and his definite goal, no one could logically use any instrument but a neurosis to attain that goal.

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The patient's tools are adequate—it is his goal which is false; and there are situations in which a neurosis is not without some real justification.

If, for example, a woman defends herself against a brutal and tyrannical husband by producing nervous symptoms which guarantee her a modicum of consideration, we cannot entirely blame her. If the treatment, moreover, can indicate no other solution of her problem, the psychiatrist will have to concede her the right to be ill under the circumstances. Theoretically, the neurosis is the lesser of two evils in this case.

A thoroughgoing analysis of such cases usually demonstrates the existence of a mutual neurosis in a couple. The husband proves to be a neurotic whose neurosis is partially dependent on his wife's neurosis, and a response to it. If the wife were capable of establishing the relationship toward her husband on a purely objective basis, a basis of unconditional community of feeling, her attitude would in time act like a psychotherapeutic treatment of her husband. A change in the wife's attitude would force a change in the husband's reaction, and the actual basis of the mutual neurosis would be removed in this way. The reciprocally conditioning relationship of a mutual neurosis in two people makes a cure more difficult, but not impossible.

What do we mean by psychotherapeutic cure? The disappearance of symptoms does not justify us in speaking of a cure, for in individual psychology, as we have often stated, the symptoms are considered to be relatively unimportant. We are not so much concerned *how* a patient avoids his obligations in life, as *that he does evade them*. The goal of the therapy of individual

psychology, and the test of its success is this: that the patient no longer attempts to evade the solution of the necessary problems of life, the problems of work, of social adjustment, and of love and marriage, by setting up subterfuges and pretexts, and that he attacks these problems with energy and enthusiasm. As long as the patient merely *talks* of his insight and his willingness to change without doing anything about it, he is far from being well. If a patient says, "I will," but lifts no finger to accomplish his task, he is really not willing. So long as he sets terms, procrastinates and makes conditions, he is saying, "I will not," in psychological language. The patient's "later" means "never." Willing and acting are one and the same thing.

Although we have made the patient's activity the criterion of our psychotherapeutic success, it behooves us to be cautious until we know surely what his attitude toward his work is. We might reiterate that the objective reality of the patient's working is more important than his feelings about his work; that so long as he worked, his attitude really did not matter. This is only partially true, for any piece of work begun without inner preparedness, solely because a psychiatrist has suggested it, or because of a goading sense of duty, comes to grief sooner or later. Fellowship with other men and women may be honorably sought and maintained, yet if the inner warmth of these relationships is absent, the contacts fail to evoke a corresponding fellowship in the friend or lover, and it is apparent that this relationship is only a make-believe social communion.

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The true goal of our psychotherapy is the production of this inner warmth of feeling. The healthy, normal person works, makes friends, and loves as a matter of course. His activity is as self-understood as his breathing or his digestion. The inner warmth we seek to establish can never be the result of a rigoristic, ethical, or rational "Thou shalt!" This goal is never entirely attained, for the difficulties of human existence make its theoretic, not to say practical, attainment impossible. What psychotherapy by individual psychology *can attain* is the substitution of lesser errors for greater ones, and this is infinitely worth doing.

The psychiatrist's attitude toward his patient is of momentous importance in the psychotherapy of individual psychology. We cannot emphasize too strongly the fundamental rule laid down by Adler that the physician must "abjure his private interests" in the treatment. As soon as the patient gains the impression that the physician takes a personal interest in the outcome of the treatment, that the physician considers a cure as a personal triumph and a failure as his own defeat, the physician, as Adler has again said, "enters into treatment at the hands of his patient." The patient then determines whether he will reward the psychiatrist by getting well or whether he will punish him by growing worse. The physician must not merely pretend that he is disinterested in the outcome of the case; he must actually be disinterested.

It is for this reason that young physicians who use the method of individual psychology are sometimes unsuccessful, for their ambition, consciously or un-

consciously, is too much involved in the outcome of their cases. The best therapeutic results can come only after years of practice, when such results are necessary neither for the physician's economic security nor for the subversion of his insecurity. When these conditions are no longer exigent, therapeutic results follow of themselves, because the psychiatrist is in a position to maintain his attitude of friendly well-wishing without the conscious exercise of his self-control, and because he can equably display his infinite patience without becoming frightened when the patient has a relapse, just as he can be ready and willing occasionally to tell a patient that he cannot cure him.

It is a momentous resolution on the part of the patient to recognize the truth of the psychiatrist's point of view, and admit, by relinquishing his neurosis, that the psychiatrist is right, and that he, the patient, has been in the wrong for years. Now and again the patient needs an easy bridge to cover his retreat. Under these circumstances the patient may consult some hypnotist or faith healer who will reap the fruits of the therapy of individual psychology, and win the eternal admiration of the patient.

For this reason individual psychology cannot present statistics of its successes, but those who use the method become more and more convinced that in the treatment of the neuroses no other method is comparable in its effectiveness. Frequently patients who abrogate the treatment after a few weeks, apparently uninfluenced by the therapy, return to normal activity months later, practically cured, because they have been forced to carry out to its logical conclusions what they learned in their treatment by individual psychology.

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Individual psychology is indicated in every neurosis and psychoneurosis. No case is too difficult, none too simple, to be benefited by treatment. If relief of symptoms is imperative, other, quicker but theoretically unsound methods, such as hypnosis, should not be preferred; actual results may be as rapidly achieved by individual psychology. It is a fundamental thesis of individual psychology that the clinical symptoms of a neurosis do not indicate how serious or how slight it is, because the nature of the neurosis can be determined only during the course of the treatment. The severity of the neurosis, as well as the prognosis of the cure, is determined by a single criterion: the gulf between the patient's present situation and the solution of his life's problems. This gulf is never so great that it would not be advantageous to bridge it by psychotherapy.

THE END

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
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